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The University of Denver College of Law was honored to have as its guest
lecturer for the ninth annual Myres McDougal Distinguished Lecture, Professor Seymour Rubin, Professor Emeritus in Residence at American University. Professor Rubin chose to discuss the topic of international trade in
the contemporary world. Through a historical overview, Rubin illuminates
how the formal underpinning of modern trade law came about. He then
proceeds with an analysis of whether the "rules" promulgated during the
post-war era are still adequate, in light of the increase over the years in
trade and commerce, and the presence of new international financial institutions on the scene. Professor Rubin concludes that despite the "unevenness" of the application of the MFN principle, the evident rise of non-tariff
trade barriers, the increasing complexity of international development and
the colossal international debt crisis, it would be folly to abandon the present system and its principles. The system provides a framework and forum
for sensible and calm discussion of the most critical issues between nations.
The risks of abandonment are too great.
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The University of Denver College of Law was honored to have as its guest
lecturer for the tenth annual Myres S. McDougal Distinguished Lecture,
Professor Thomas M. Franck, Professor of Law and Director of the Center
of International Law and Studies at New York University School of Law.
Professor Franck chose to discuss the topic of United States foreign policy
and the United Nations, particularly emphasizing the present United States
attitude of obloquy towards the U.N. As Professor Franck observes, the intensity of the current negative feelings of the U.S. toward the U.N. stems
primarily "from our own national proclivity for unrealistic optimism" with
regard to the role of the U.N. in the world order, as well as from the backlash of our own institutional reforms within the U.N. Franck notes that the
United States campaign for membership in the U.N. was premised upon
unrealistic beliefs of the political power of the U.N. Through historical
analysis Franck examines how United States attempts to improve upon the
workings of the U.N. ultimately succeeded, in both transferring many of the
important functions of the Security Council to the General Assembly, and
restricting the veto power of the members of the Security Council. As
Franck reveals, although effective while the United States could count on a
majority of members in the principal organs of the U.N., these institutional
changes in the power structure of the U.N. resulted in a backlash against
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United States interests by the mid-1950's. As a result, the United States
began pursuing a policy of violating U.N. rules which did not suit their
purposes, and just recently has begun a gradual withdrawal from the U.N.
system. Professor Franck concludes his remarks by emphasizing that the
United States must not withdraw from the established international political system.
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The United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China recently concluded a treaty that called for the return of Hong Kong to the sovereign
control of the PRC. Most of the legal relationships that are to govern the
parties for the duration of the agreement have been set within the provisions. However, there remain significant gaps that are only exacerbated by
the vastly different approaches of the parties with regard to implementing
those provisions. While the author considers the areas of sovereignty, treaty
implementation, state succession and nationality, this is not a plain discourse on the state of international law. The unique feature of this article is
that each area considered includes an analysis of the influence and role
each actor plays with regard to the transition of the rule over Hong Kong.
The author is able to provide unique insight into all of the legal processes
pertaining to Hong Kong.
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF THE CONTRACTUAL
RIGHTS OF CONTRACTORS UNDER THE DEEP SEA-BED
MINING PROVISIONS (PART XI) OF THE THIRD
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE
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The author examines the contractual rights of contractors under the Third
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in light of the review
provisions of article 155 of the Convention. The article explores the potential conflict between provisions of the Convention, which provide for security of these contractual rights and one of the underlying purposes of the
Convention, "equitable exploitation" of the seabed, which is embodied in
the Review Conference provisions. In the latter portion of the article, the
author suggests that by using general principles of the United States bankruptcy law, the economic value of the contracts can be guaranteed under
the Convention, even if it should become necessary to restructure the contracts for political reasons. By treating the International Sea-Bed Authority
as a "failed" enterprise, the author argues that the economic value of the
investments in sea-bed mining ventures could be protected and the political
concern for "equitable exploitation" respected.
Two MODELS FOR A RAWLSIAN THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND JUSTICE .........................
Daniel W.

Skubik

In this article the author extends Rawls' theories of domestic justice as fairness, as articulated in his treatise A Theory of Justice, to the concerns of
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international law and foreign relations. The author argues that certain strategic moves permit a delineation of the two fundamentally distinct Rawlsian models of international justice. The bulk of the article is devoted to
explicating and comparing the principles and consequences of these two
models. The first model is derived from passing references within the treatise itself. Its structure consists of major institutions touching upon the
rights, duties and advantages of nation-states. These nation-states are the
component actors of the international community. The second model,
which follows alternate Rawlsian assumptions, is comprised of a structure
of major institutions touching upon the rights, duties, and advantages of
individuals and societies. Individuals make up the component actors of the
international community. The article concludes with a brief equilibrium
analysis of the models' outcomes and an argument that the second model
better reflects fundamental principles of fairness. Finally, the author maintains that a commitment to justice as fairness leads not to familiar modern
notions of international law and the "justice" of statal egoism, but rather to
the generation of self-interested community interdependence.
COUNTERTRENDS IN FINANCIAL PROVISIONS FOR THE
PROTECTION OF CORPORATE CREDITORS: THE MODEL
BusINEss CORPORATION ACT AND THE E.E.C.
CORPORATE DIRECTIVES ....................
Jeff Keustermans 275
This article examines the corporate law restrictions in both the United
States and the E.E.C. countries pertaining to financial distributions to
shareholders. Initially, the article presents an overview of the basic terminology and operation of the statutory "legal capital" systems. The author
then discerns that there are two countertrends in the main bodies of laws
governing corporations in the United States and the E.E.C. countries. The
author notes that the E.E.C. countries have created more severe requirements than their U.S. counterparts for the raising and maintenance of a
minimum capital for the protection of creditors. In contrast, the Model
Business Corporation Act, which forms the basis for many state corporate
laws in the U.S. has eliminated the outmoded concepts of stated capital and
par value. The author concludes that neither of the corporate law restrictions in the United States or in the E.E.C. countries are adequate for the
protection of creditors. The author proposes a new solution to the conflict
of interest between shareholders and general creditors of a corporation, by
proposing that all distributions to shareholders be made subject to a minimum capitalization requirement and to financial ratio tests.

CRITICAL ESSAYS
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976 AND THE
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE ................
Manuel R. Angulo

Adrien K. Wing
The introduction of Senate bill 1071 to amend the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act threatens to dismantle the act of state doctrine as it is
now used by the courts. The authors believe that if enacted into law, the
amendment will "vex the peace of nations," and potentially endanger
the harmony of our relations with friendly foreign states. In the opinion
of the authors, the act of state doctrine is a viable tool by which U.S.
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courts recognize their limitations in the face of acts by foreign sovereigns. Despite prior legislative attempts to limit the scope of the doctrine, and numerous ambiguous rulings by federal courts, the basic purpose and rationale for the doctrine remain in tact. Consequently, the act
of state doctrine must not be eliminated through the "back door" of the
FSIA.
THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE:

ABANDON IT ........................

Donald W. Hoagland 317

This article addresses the dilemma which exists in United States courts
in applying the act of state doctrine. As expressed in the Sabbatino case,
the act of state doctrine limits courts' ability to hear cases involving expropriation by a foreign sovereign government within its own territory.
Federal courts have been inconsistent in applying this doctrine. The author examines the Supreme Court's application of the doctrine in the
Sabbatino case. Subsequent to the Sabbatino decision, Congress showed
its approval of Justice White's dissent in Sabbatino by passing the second Hickenlooper Amendment, which instructed courts to adjudicate
expropriations in violation of international law, unless expressly objected to by the executive branch. The author advocates abandoning the
act of state doctrine. Since exceptions to the doctrine have greatly lessened its importance, the author states that the concepts of comity and
conflicts of law allow U.S. courts to address the validity of expropriations without the artificial and conflicting results of applying the act of
state doctrine.

Myres S. McDougal Distinguished
Lecture
International Trade Realities: Are There
Rules of the Game?
SEYMOUR
I.

J.

RUBIN*

INTRODUCTION

Thank you very much, Ved. I am grateful for the invitation which
has been extended to me to speak in your series of lectures in honor of
Myres McDougal. Mac is not only an old friend of mine, as of so many
others, but is also one of those rare persons who combines scholarship,
thoughtfulness, and a deep conviction that it is possible to improve the
way in which we all think about legal issues, and consequently, the policy
issues which are heavily infused with legal aspects. He and Harold Lasswell, his long-time co-worker (and in a sense, mentor) are responsible for
a whole generation of scholars. I admire greatly their aspirations and
their work, though I must confess that I am sometimes a bit confused by
my inability to speak what has come to be known as McDougalese.
I have taken as the subject of my talk "The Rules of the
Game"-cribbing from the title of a book written some time ago by Kenneth Dam, former Provost of the University of Chicago and Undersecretary of the Department of State. I borrow thus openly, because Ken's
book is mainly about trade rules and rules associated with international
trade, such as the rules of international finance, and that, in a major
sense, is what I want to talk about as well. Stepping timidly in the footsteps of McDougal, I hope to suggest that some of these "rules" of the
game, which were confidently enacted in the era of institution-building
following World War II, were probably not rules even when they were
first adopted, but have become something less even than guidelines at the
present. McDougal and Lasswell called for lawyers and scholars to perceive what they understood to be the underlying realities. Somewhat immodestly, I too feel that I am suggesting that we look carefully at what
exists, at how the world operates, and from that appraisal derive our con-
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cept of what the working rules are. The formal documents are of course
important, but they are far from the entirety of the story. What happens,
and why, is the subject of my inquiry.

II.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

What then have been the "Rules of the Game" in respect to international trade and finance?
Even during World War II, plans were being made, mainly in the
foreign establishments of the United States and Great Britain, for postwar reconstruction. It was evident that much had to be done, not only to
rebuild a world-a large part of whose physical plants and equipment had
been destroyed by the war, but also to rebuild social and economic institutions, and to redesign them to cope with new issues and new challenges.
Moreover, it was thought that lessons had been learned from the events
in the economic area which preceded the actual outbreak of war, when
the Great Depression had led many countries, not least the United States,
to try to export their economic problems by limiting the inflow of imports. In those relatively simple days, this was done mainly by the imposition of high tariffs. Whether the responsibility for these economic
problems was due largely to the imposition of high reparation demands
on countries which had already been impoverished by World War I, or
the expectations of some European countries that they could ensure security and prosperity by impoverishing their defeated former enemies, is
an inquiry best left to the historians. The relevant matter here is that
there were demands and policies that were at least partially responsible
for the crash which followed the feverish post-war period of the 1920's,
and that the depression led the United States down the path of protectionism, with the now infamous Smoott-Hawley Tariff Act as a result.
The consensus, thus, in the years just before and immediately after
the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, was that a great effort should be
made to construct a better and more economically sensible world, and
that this effort was for the benefit of all. One did not, in those early days,
consider much the eventual role of Japan and Germany as major trading
partners and economic powers. But one did focus on reconstruction, especially of the economies of the former allies, as a major and primary task.
Moreover, such reconstructions were to indicate the interdependence of
nations, and the fact that international trade and commercial intercourse
was a positive sum game-not a zero sum game, in which the gain of one
could be accomplished only at the expense of another. Out of these
thoughts and this effort arose the Bretton Woods system-named for the
New Hampshire town at which the Articles of Agreement of the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund were fashioned.
There were three main legs of the intended system, only two of which
were directly the product of Bretton Woods. At Bretton Woods, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (with development
very much in second place) (the Bank) and the International Monetary
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Fund (the Fund) were created. The Fund had as its principal aim the
establishment or re-establishment of convertibility at stable exchange
rates, and the elimination of the welter of restrictions, multiple exchange
rates, and war and post-war restraints on currency transactions which
had emerged. There were, of course, transitional phases in the road to
stability and convertibility, but the thesis was that there would be a gradual and steady progress toward a world of full convertibility and stable
rates of exchange.

The second major Bretton Woods instrument was the Bank, which
focussed, in the first instance, on reconstruction, and only secondarily
(and without too much thought) on development. Priority, it was thought,
had to go to reconstruction of the economies of the major trading nations
of the world; it was they that had been the influential actors on the world
scene; it was they whose economies (again with the notable exception of
the United States) had been depleted and whose physical plants destroyed. The first task was to restore those economies to health. And,
though it was largely unspoken, it was thought by most that the so-called
developing countries (then less politely called undeveloped or underdeveloped by all but the French) were not likely to play an important role in
the reconstruction and development of the post-war world.
Thus when it began operations the Bank focussed on the tasks of
reconstruction, somewhat to the distress of the developing nations. (One
influential factor was the perceived need to establish the credibility of the
Bank as a borrower in the world's capital markets.) It was only with some
tardiness that the Bank began to pay attention to developmental needs,
and that supplemental institutions, like the International Development
Association (IDA), which could make long-term, low-interest loans, came
into existence. It was in fact not until the 1960's that countries, led by the
United States, began to put together substantial development or grant
lending programs for the less developed. And it was not until much later
that the Bank and similar institutions began to make funds available for
"social" programs-hospitals, health care, water and sewage systems-as
well as for the more "bankable" projects, like dams, roads and ports,
which could be evaluated more easily in terms of profitability and an ability to earn enough directly to ensure that the loan was likely to be repaid.
Trade was the third leg of this tripod. Reduction or elimination of
trade barriers was the aim. Observing the proliferation of trade barriers
spawned by the Great Depression, nations were persuaded of the virtues
of a multilateral and open trading system. Essentially, the policies were
to be similar to those of the United States Reciprocal Trade Program.
The heart of this system was to be a multilateral trade negotiation, the
object of which would be to reduce tariffs on goods traded between (in
the main) the industrialized nations, and to set up a mechanism for: generalizing the concessions which each negotiator would make to the other
in a series of related bilateral negotiations, and continuing the process to
attain further tariff reductions through an ongoing series of trade talks.
Generalization was to be accomplished by means of a fundamental com-
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mitment to the principle of unconditional most-favored-nations treatment-a concession accorded to one trading partner would be accorded to
all others. Hence there would emerge, from a series of bilateral agreements, a master and generalized agreement, at least on tariffs and on
matters essential to guard those tariff crossings. There was to be an organization, the purpose of which would be both to encourage further
rounds of tariff negotiations and to supervise the trade agreements. As a
concomitant part of the overall scheme, there were to be a series of other
agreements, which would guarantee that what was given in a tariff negotiation, for example, would not be taken away by a private cartel arrangement (and still less by subsidies, quotas, or devices intended to distort
the trade which the tariff negotiations had liberalized). The instrument
for this was to be a new organization-the International Trade Organization (ITO). Among its principal tasks, the ITO was to administer the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
The basic text of the GATT was completed, after extensive negotiations, in 1948. The GATT was intended to be just what its title indicated
-an agreement rather than an organization. (The ITO was to be the organization.) It embodied as its "cornerstone" the most-favored-nation
(MFN) principle, to which there were several important exceptions. Perhaps most notable was the understanding that there could be common
markets or customs unions and free-trade areas. Within a common market (or free-trade area) favorable tariff treatment could be extended to
members without extending that treatment to non-members, as is generally required under the MFN principle. The principal exemplars were the
European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA). Exceptions were also made for developing countries,
for agriculture and other situations. Clauses were inserted and designed
as safety valves-the "safeguard" provisions of Article 19, for example,
which allowed countries, at the price of giving up some concessions, to
protect themselves against the effects of unexpected and sudden inflows
of imports.
The Charter of the ITO, completed in Havana in 1948, established
the world trading organization and contained a number of substantive
chapters on rules. These dealt with commodity arrangements, restrictive
business practices, and employment practices, as well as dispute resolution. Brief investment clauses were, at American insistence, also
incorporated.
The result of what may loosely be called the Bretton Woods process
was thus a reasonably complete arrangement-the Bank, the Fund, and
the ITO. The Bank and the Fund did come into existence, but the ITO
did not, for a series of reasons too complicated to be detailed here. Consequently, on the trade side, the GATT had to suffice and had to double as
both agreement and organization. Somehow, mainly through the ingenuity of its first Director, Eric Wyndam White, and the need for some sort
of organization, it managed to survive, and for years to do an excellent
job. But non-ratification of the ITO was a great mistake. It is now appar-
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ent that the substantive clauses of the ITO Charter-which were lost because it could not achieve ratification-were of great value. The simple
formulae with respect to the responsibilities and the treatment of private
foreign investment anticipated much of the debate swirling around that
topic and around "transnational corporations," and, had they been in effect, could immeasurably have bettered the contribution of investment to
development. Similarly, the provisions with respect to commodity arrangements, restrictive business practices, and social and labor conditions
correctly anticipated problems which have been with us for years.
Thus, we emerged with what could be considered to be a comprehensive system. It did not include all elements of an ideal system-several of
what had been considered key elements of the ITO Charter were not to
be found in this array-and even within its terms there were numerous
imperfections. To paraphrase Wyndam White, the GATT was itself a series of exceptions held together by mutual tolerance of violation. But
there it was, operational, able to cope with most aspects of world economic intercourse, and representing an important part of what Ken Dam
called "The Rules of the Game."
III.

ANALYSIS

My inquiry this evening is whether these "rules" are still adequate.
Certainly, for a good many years, they have stimulated a great increase in
trade and commerce. During this period tariffs have been reduced, assistance has been given for development, and global production has risen.
New international financial institutions have made major contributions.
But the 1980's are not the 1960's. Recrimination seems to have replaced
cooperation in international economic discourse. The present issues are
different-or so it seems. Can the structures stemming from Bretton
Woods now do the job? Can they handle the problems with which anyone
who reads the daily newspapers is familiar? Perhaps putting it somewhat
differently, are there still "Rules of the Game"?
If illustration of the dangers of such analysis and especially of prophecy in this regard were needed, it is provided by reminder that a basic
objective of at least one institution-stable and fixed exchange rateshas now been abandoned in favor of "floating" exchange rates. In 1971,
the United States, in the administration of President Nixon, effectively
abandoned the gold standard, while at the same time imposing a major
and unilateral increase in tariffs (later itself abandoned). As someone has
said, prophecy in this regard is like trying to tattoo a soap bubble.
One may begin this inquiry by asking how well the system has really
worked. Despite the enormous increase in world trade since the early days
which I have alluded to, the system has not achieved satisfactory progress
in reducing trade barriers. At least in this last decade, non-tariff barriers
have been substituted for tariffs. There has been progress, but at quite a
price.
One difficulty, evident from the beginning, has been the very uneven
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application of the "cornerstone of the GATT"-unconditional MFN
treatment. As I have noted, Article 24 of the GATT always permitted
customs unions, whose members accord to each other treatment much
more favorable than they give to outsiders. That license was stretched to
"free trade areas," and then extended to then special arrangements such
as that between Canada and the United States, and now between the
United States and Israel. The favorable treatment originally granted in
the GATT to developing countries was eventually formalized and expanded, with the requirements of reciprocity being expressly put aside.
The Generalized System of Preferences, designed to assist the developing
countries, but with results which may not have been quite that, was
adopted and encouraged. How this has affected the notion of unconditional MFN treatment is evident from the proliferation of regional and
other preferential arrangements (e.g., the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the
several Lom6 Agreements, etc.). Moreover, a great many of these arrangements, which perhaps might fit (with difficulty) within the permissive
clauses of Article 24 of the GATT or which could have obtained special
permission within the framework of the GATT, were simply never even
contemplated by the GATT.
Thus, the system of open, fair and non-discriminatory trade based on
the MFN principle showed flaws almost from the beginning, and these
flaws have greatly increased.
The next deterioration has been an evident rise in non-tariff barriers.
As tariffs were drastically reduced, nations exhibited all ingenuity in erecting other barriers. These non-tariff barriers took all sorts of forms.
Some of them were quite forthright, such as explicit import quotas. Some
of them affected particular industries, such as agriculture, which, from
the outset was (in the United States as in other countries), an area in
which non-discriminatory trade was hardly known. The developing countries were in a special category and exempted from many of the rules.
Other kinds of discrimination have appeared. There are the so-called
"voluntary export restraints," which have been imposed on allegedly willing trading partners, and accepted to avoid something worse. The exemplar of restraint agreements, honored by multilateral acceptance and by
time, is the Multi-Fiber Agreement. And there are other discriminations,
in areas which had not explicitly been covered by the GATT. These include particular services in the new fields of transborder data transmission, as well as the more traditional areas of insurance, banking, and shipping. In these areas of increasing importance and vague rules, the trend
has been toward greater rather than less discrimination.
It has become evident that the mechanisms which we had erected,
whether those of the Fund, the Bank or the GATT, were not entirely
adequate to handle these problems. For example, the GATT had never
given proper emphasis to resolution of disputes, to the way in which one
state could settle a dispute with another within the framework of the
GATT. In the GATT context, if one state found that another was discriminating against its exports, the response was basically the right to
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retaliate. Retaliation may be a form of psychological vindication, and it
may give pause to others and thus be preventative, but retaliation leads
to escalation and seldom to reconciliation. (I note with some bitterness
that when the United States "retaliated" in the so-called "chicken war"
of the early 1960's, it raised the cost of my cognac. I found that retaliation worked against me much more than it did against the French. That
is an illustration of why I don't think very much of retaliation as a device
for settling trade disputes!)
Perhaps more importantly as the years went on we began to find that
even the Bank and the Fund were not able to handle the issues facing
them. That is, I suppose, partially because the nature of the issues
changed, and partially because the problems became larger than it had
been thought they would become. For the Bank, "reconstruction" was finished and it focussed on the problems of development. Reconstruction
had been relatively easy. In Western Europe the essentials remained.
There had been much physical damage, but the people and their skills
remained. They still had the capabilities and education. The tradition of
education, the tradition of engineering and of research and all the other
things that go to make up a great society were all there. Basically, all that
one had to do was to put some money at their disposal, and they went
right back to work. The railroads were rebuilt, the factories were restored,
and with Marshall Plan money and an expanding world economy, all
went well.
But development is a more complicated process than reconstruction.
Though the Bank did its best, and institutions like the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) were established by developed countries to coordinate and enhance the effectiveness of bilateral development aid, results
were, though significant, spotty. Nevertheless, there was some progress,
both institutionally and in terms of measurable results. With development occupying a priority in the attention of aid donors, with establishment of the IDA, and with the contributions of the regional development
banks, it was possible to hope that indeed the aspirations of the post-war
planners would be realized. This was especially so since the needs of the
developing countries were coming to be more clearly realized. The Bank
came to the conclusion that lending for non-bankable projects-health,
education and the like-was within its mandate. It came to accept "program" lending and restructuring of an economy. It began to plow the
profits of earlier loans into development. And institutions like the Fund
also turned attention to structural adjustments, with long-term benefits.
All of this resulted in a fairly optimistic global picture, but the 1970's
brought reverses. That was the period of successive oil shocks, when the
price of oil went suddenly to levels which placed inordinate demands on
the world economy, especially that of the non-oil-producing developing
countries. Global recession had a severe effect. Faced with difficulties of a
new order of magnitude, the consensus with respect to the benefits of
liberal trading policies, while nominally still the accepted gospel, became

154

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 14:2-3

more honored in the breach than in the observance. What had been the
exceptional concessions to straying from precepts of MFN treatment, and
of lowering of trade barriers, became instead the rule. Indeed, in many
cases (estimated at some 20% of global trade) the rules in a sense became
irrelevant, since that trade is barter, or so-called counter-trade.
Much of the philosophical underpinning of the GATT gave way. "Industrial policy" became the slogan of the day. The thesis that trade policy should not determine more important issues-like employment in developed as well as developing countries-was a frequent thesis of
international conferences. It was thought by many-the present speaker
included-that the guidance by government bureaucrats implied by "industrial policy" was likely to have no better results; but that seemed oldfashioned and sentimental attachment by a few to policies now outgrown.
And indeed, governmental policies gave emphasis to the new view, or to
something like it. Governmental intervention, even by states professing
continued adherence to GATT policies, became increasingly evident. The
non-tariff interventions, as well as the frequent deviations from liberal
trade policies, plus the increasing share of world trade outside of the
GATT, all had an effect. And this too was accentuated by the temporary
relief given to the developing countries by the "intermediation" of the
private commercial banks, which undertook to recycle petro-dollars to the
developing nations. That recycling, while giving momentary relief, gave
rise to the enormous problems which are now recognized in the form of
the "debt-crisis" of the developing world. Though there were many who
pointed out early that the burden of interest alone on the then outstanding debt was overwhelming the ability of the developing countries to service that debt, and that these further loans, many at high rates of interest
or floating rates, would be completely unserviceable, the loans continued
to be made, without the early structural adjustments necessary for economic viability. The results soon became evident. Debtor nations had to
cut back imports or subsidize exports, or both, simply to earn enough to
service their external debt. And the consequent surge of protectionism,
both open and somewhat disguised, with which we have now become accustomed, became itself a "Rule of the Game."
Little was done about this in a serious or timely fashion. What was
done seemed reminiscent of the 1930's, with each country and each group
seeking to protect its own interests, mainly at the expense of another
country or group. To protect the farmers of at least some EEC countries,
a complex system of price supports (the Common Agricultural Policy)
was instituted (modeled to a certain extent on previous United States
agricultural price supports, but even more distortive). Subsidies led to
protective measures, such as countervailing duties, some justified, some
not. To give United States exporters what the United States considered
to be fair treatment (but other regarded, as did many in the United
States, as unfair and even uneconomic), the Domestic International Sales
Corporation (DISC), was established and maintained by the United
States for years after the GATT found it to be an unfair trading practice.
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There was a proliferation of special trading arrangements in what seemed
to be almost complete disregard of MFN obligations. "Orderly marketing
arrangements" and "voluntary export restraints," negotiated on a bilateral basis outside the GATT, became endemic. These were done without
even the modest amount of control evidenced in the renegotiation, on a
multilateral basis, of the Multi-Fiber arrangements. Devices outside nominal GATT controls were used, such as the French requirement that video
equipment be cleared through the tiny customs facilities at Poitiers, a
place previously notable for the medieval exploits of Charles Martel.
Complicating all of this was an all-too-frequent tendency to blame
someone other than oneself for unsatisfactory economic performance.
Transnational corporations, whose effects on international trade and the
welfare of the developing countries are not always easy to measure, became, in the mid-1970's, an object of special concern and interminable
debate and conferences. The UN Commission on Transnational Corporations, established in late 1974, became a sounding board for these complaints. Some issues clearly existed here, but they were clearly minor, and
the remedy was largely irrelevant to the constrictions of growing protectionism. In the midst of all this, the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations,
culminating in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations of 1982, achieved a
series of codes, some of which had a dubious effect on the beleaguered
MFN principle, some of which made minor contributions to the improvement in trade relations, and most of which went unratified by many countries. Talk emerged about mechanisms other than the GATT-perhaps a
reinforced OECD, with strengthened rules looking toward more liberal
trade practices among at least the developed market economies.
This is a grim picture. Its reality is illustrated in the debt crisis, perhaps especially that of Latin America which has, with Mexico, Brazil and
Argentina, some of the major debtors. The statistics there, are striking.
Latin America owes, roughly, one-half of all the debt of the developing
nations. Two-thirds of that is owed mainly to private commercial banks,
not exclusively in the United States. That is a very impressive statistic,
and depressing as well. Bear in mind that this debt was largely accumulated at a time of intensive attention, by public and private institutions,
to financing the needs of the developing countries. It is to a substantial
extent the result of the "intermediation" which had at one time been
taken as a sign of how the private banking system could in fact rescue
such countries from the consequences of the oil crisis. For 1983, the interest bill alone of the Latin American countries as a group took more than
35% of their export earnings. Total debt service, including such payments
as were made to reduce the principal amount of debt, took 66% of export
earnings. The total of such payments was in excess of $40 billion. One can
compare those figures, even as adjusted in terms of constant dollars, to
the $14 billion which was the then impressive amount which the United
States put into the Marshall Plan, over a period of years.
At least one consequence has been the realization that this crisis has
affected many outside of, as well as within, the developing countries.
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First, of course, comes to mind the commercial banking system, which
can hardly afford to see defaults by major debtor countries, and which is
desperately struggling to keep loans in such a condition that they do not
have to be considered by bank examiners to be in default - which would
have serious effects on profit and loss statements. Another is the austerity
regimes which have had to be adopted in the developing countries. Taking so much of export earnings for debt service deprives a country of
funds for the costs even of adequate replacement, much less new investment or increased social benefits. The consequence, at least in some countries, has been debilitating political as well as economic effects; instability
in several Latin American nations testifies to that. The Fund, with its
prescriptions for conditions under which it would make funds available,
which in turn are conditions for further lending by the commercial banks,
has hardly enjoyed popularity (however unjust this feeling may be) in the
developing countries. In an era when democracy has seemed to be finally
on the rise in Latin America, this type of austerity puts it to a rough test.
Moreover, austerity has its consequences abroad, as well as at home.
It is estimated that Latin American restrictive measures have resulted in
the loss over three years of some 400,000 jobs in the United States. In this
situation remedies are not easy to find. In Latin America this is particularly bitter since it emerged in full flower when the world was witnessing
the emergence of what have been called the NIC's-the Newly Industrialized Countries-with their promise of development and generally higher
living standards. Surely, one cannot blame only or even mainly the commercial banks, though these are sometimes accused of having thrust their
loans on the innocent developing nations. Nor can one fault the IMF for
being hard-hearted; it cannot throw more money (a supply of which is
limited) into a sinking situation, or one in which long-term remedial measures are not being taken. Nor can one merely take the Micawberish attitude-that something will turn up, and that we can merely muddle
through. The figures dissuade. Nor can a simple and easy solution be devised, certainly not by me.
IV.

CONCLUSION

I suggest, however, that in order to get started back on the road to
economic health one must do something about the debt overhead, which
threatens default and weighs heavily on the prospects for social improvements and economic expansion. Somehow, Latin America and its creditors will have to devise a method of restructuring Latin American debt.
One way of doing that, unacceptable to all but Mr. Castro, is simple default. But perhaps the debts of Latin America, or at least of those countries willing and able to take rigorous steps toward their own structural
reform, could be consolidated into long-term instruments. Given additional resources, the Bank could take those instruments, and against
them issue Bank obligations to the commerical banks. No one would very
much like that, but it may be the only alternative to default, or at least to
the arbitrary capping of interest payments, or to a continuing series of
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"roll-overs" on a cliff-hanging basis.
The possibility of an increased aid program also exists. It would be
targeted toward desirable structural adjustment in the developing countries. Concessional aid does not enjoy good press in this era of huge deficits and unmet social claims at home. But bilateral aid has some advantages over the more popular multilateral institutional aid, like that of the
IDA. It would be possible, at least by using the unpopular device of tied
aid, to ensure that the contributions of donor/lending countries could result in increased exports and additional jobs in those countries. Moreover,
inefficiencies of the sort normally connected with tied aid would be drastically reduced if there were a substantial number of contributors.
Choices would then exist for the purchasing country, and it could buy
where economics and not merely the availability of funds for purchase
would dictate the choice.
One thing that should not be done is to abandon the present system
and its principles. It has served quite well-with all of the difficultiesfor some 40 years. It provides a framework and a forum for sensible, and
sometimes calm discussion. An anecdote which I think is relevant comes
from the early days when airplanes were a rarity, and from the then sensational country-fair stunt of wing-walking. Asked whether this sport was
not terribly dangerous, a practitioner of the art said, "Not too much, if
you obey the first law of wing-walking: never let go of the strut you are
hanging onto until you have a firm grasp of the next one."
We must make progress. But we must not relinquish our firm grip on
principles and institutions which have for so long served us well.

Myres S. McDougal Distinguished
Lecture
U.S. Foreign Policy and the U. N.
THOMAS

I.

M.

FRANCK*

INTRODUCTION

This fortieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations in
San Francisco is an opportune time to reconsider the U.S. relationship
with that Organization. Objectively speaking, the U.N. should get a mixed
40-year report card: an A for its efforts on behalf of children and the
eradication of smallpox, B's for truce supervisory and related services, as
well as for the dispute mediation efforts of the Secretary-General. It deserves barely a C- for its work in human rights, but a B for its humanitarian efforts on behalf of millions of refugees from Kampuchea to the Sudan. It deserves an F for its failure to prevent some 200 armed conflicts
which have broken out since the Charter was written with the opening
words: "We, the peoples

. . .

determined to save succeeding generations

from the scourge of war."
Such a mixed report deserves no standing applause, but neither does
it call for a pie in the face. Yet, that is essentially the response the U.N.
will get on this occasion from U.S. leaders, the media and the public. At
best there will be indifference. For the most part, there will be obloquy.
My object this evening is not to praise the U.N., nor even to examine
why it has fallen so low in the esteem of the U.S. leadership and public.
Certainly, there are good reasons for scorn, and if one is so minded, the
search for warts can be most rewarding. If the U.S. Defense Department
can be characterized by detractors as the home of the $100.00 screwdriver, the U.N. can be reified as the folks who voted to spend millions on
new buildings for the Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa
while Ethiopia and much of the rest of the continent starves. To much of
the world's agony, the U.N.'s answer is: let them eat studies and reports.
But surely we are a nation that has grown tolerant of bureaucratic waste
* Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International Studies, New York
University; B.A. 1952, LL.B. 1953, University of British Columbia; LL.M. 1954, J.S.D. 1959,
Harvard Law School. This article is the text of the tenth annual Myres S. McDougal Lecture in International Law and Policy, presented at the University of Denver College of Law
in May of 1985.
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and incompetence. That it should exist at the U.N. does not fully explain
the current disenchantment.
Rather, I will try to show that the intensity of our current negative
feelings about the U.N. system stems, in part, from our own national proclivity for unrealistic optimism. That optimism caused us to develop
wildly unrealistic expectations of what the U.N. was and what it could
and would do. And when those proved unfounded, our national spirit led
us to pursue the national pastime of institutional reform, tinkering, and
self-improvement. We were unwilling to see the U.N. as a modest, sometimes useful, sometimes dangerous place for the conduct of our multilateral diplomacy. We demand that it be better and more.
II.

EARLY U.S. POSITIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE

U.N.

The problem begins with the campaign to ensure U.S. entry into the
new organization, in 1945. This was one of the most dramatic examples of
the "hard sell" in twentieth-century American politics. It compares with
the fanfare and high hopes that accompanied the launching of the "War
on Poverty" in the 1960's. Government officials, eminent citizens, public
interest groups, newspapers and Members of Congress of both parties
participated in an unprecedented effort on behalf of the Charter just
signed in San Francisco. This campaign, partly orchestrated by the Executive Branch, was spurred by memories of the unexpected failure of the
Senate, after World World I, to facilitate U.S. participation in the League
of Nations.
Government officials, some specially recruited for the purpose, others
summoned out of retirement, fanned out across the country to preach the
word. Former President Herbert Hoover described the San Francisco
Conference as the "most fateful conference in all American history ..."
and predicted that during its "fleeting moments the future of mankind
may be molded for the next hundred years."' Secretary of State Cordell
Hull let it be known that the U.N. held the key to "fulfillment of humanity's highest aspirations and the very survival of our civilization."'
Senator Tom Connally, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, greeted the Charter as "the greatest document of its
kind that has ever been formulated." 3 His counterpart in the House of
Representatives, Congressman Sol Bloom, celebrated "this new Magna
Carta of peace and security for mankind" which would be "a turning
point in the history of civilization."" His Republican colleague on the
Committee, Representative Charles A. Eaton, called it "the most hopeful
and important document in the history of world statesmanship" and "the
greatest and most hopeful public event in history." It would carry us "to-

1.
2.
3.
4.

Wideroaks Plan Urged by Hoover, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1945, at 29, col. 1.
Hull Asks Nations to Affirm the Charter, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1945, at 10, col. 1.
91 CONG. REc. 7953 (1945).
91 CONG. REC. 7299 (1945).
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wards a golden age of freedom, justice, peace, and social well-being
"8

Superlatives were thicker than lobbyists on Capitol Hill. Even in the
privacy of the closed sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Senator Walter George opined that the Charter was "perhaps the most
important foreign policy step that this Nation has taken in all of its whole
history"' and Senator John L. McClellan of Arkansas called it "the most
momentous document ever produced by man."'7 Senator Alben Barkley,
soon to become Vice President, thought it would "take its place alongside
the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of
the United States, Lincoln's Gettysburg Address and his Second Inaugural Address as one of the great documents of human history." s The few
skeptics were labelled "peace criminals" 9 by Senator Francis J. Myers of
Pennsylvania.
III.

EFFECTS OF THE RATIFICATION CAMPAIGN ON U.S.PERCEPTIONS

In general, the effects of the campaign to ensure U.S. participation in
the U.N. created a false baseline of expectations against which the subsequent performance of the organization inevitably was measured and
found wanting. In particular, that campaign generated some very specific
and unrealistic perceptions.
Throughout the campaign for ratification, the Charter was presented
to the American public as a natural outgrowth of the U.S. Constitution
and the U.N. itself as the next phase in a higher federalism that emulated
and drew upon our constitutional history. Secretary of State Edward R.
Stettinius, Jr. spoke of the Security Council, the General Assembly, the
Economic and Social Council and the International Court of Justice as
"vines and trees" transplanted from our soil to "unfamiliar environments" where they would flourish, even if it had been necessary "to cut
them back and prune them" for their journey from "the world of individual and group relations to the world of international relations . . .. '
President Truman, speaking to the San Francisco Conference, said that
the U.S. Constitution "came from a Convention which - like this one was made up of delegates with many different views. Like this Charter,
our Constitution came from a free and sometimes bitter exchange of conflicting opinions. When it was adopted, no one regarded it as a perfect
document. But it grew and developed, and expanded and upon it there

5. Id. at 7299-7300.
6. The Charter of the U.N., Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, minutes of the Exec. Sess., (July 29, 1981) (unpublished manuscript) (available in the
National Archives, Washington, D.C.).
7. 91 CONG. RaC. 8082 (1945).
8. Id. at 7969.
9. Id. at 8105.
10. Summary of Report on Results of the San Francisco Conference, 13 DEP'T. ST.
BULL. 77 (1945).
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was built a bigger, a better, a more perfect union. This Charter, like our
own Constitution, will be expanded and improved as time goes on.""
Senator Connally promised that what we were joining was "an agency
of tremendous influence and power" which states had "invested with authority, if necessary, to preserve and restore international peace... a star
in the night . . . a gleaming beacon . . . ."" Senator Warren Austin of
Vermont, soon to become the chief U.S. delegate to the U.N., thought
that the General Assembly had been given "jurisdiction over the general
welfare of the peoples of the earth.""
Inflated expectations, when they are inevitably disappointed, tend to
turn to backlash. The problem is endemic to our system of government.
To secure Congressional support for a new venture, if is too often touted
as the complete answer to a bale of disparate, complex, and perhaps, essentially insoluble problems. In modern political public relations terms, it
will not do to present a program as a "mere amelioration", "better than
nothing", or "the least of evils". It must be oversold to have a chance in
Congress. The public demands elixirs; the system is geared to provide
them. Yet, the very technique of overselling, needed to ensure that the
proposal gets a chance at life, also ensures that it will ultimately be
judged a failure and, perhaps, even be repealed.
IV.
A.

THE REALITIES OF THE

U.N. DISPUTE

RESOLUTION PROCESS

Impossibility of MultilateralAgreement

It did not take long to learn that the crucial dispute settlement and
collective security machinery of the U.N. could not work in the absence of
Big Power unanimity, a condition which, in practice, could almost never
be met after San Francisco.
On January 19, 1946, the Shah of Iran complained to the Security
Council about the continued presence and role of Soviet troops in the
Province of Azerbaijan." It was the U.N.'s first major crisis; and demonstrated, right from the start, the severe limitations under which the organization operates when it is drawn into a dispute between the superpowers, each of which can block action by the Security Council - the
only organ empowered to take action in such crises.
This should have been expected by anyone reading the Charter or
following the turbulent behind-the-scenes negotiations at San Francisco,
where in such matters as its claim to multiple memberships in the organization, and its handling of Polish Representation, the Kremlin had made
it clear that it would not accept the authority of international agencies in
matters of national security or other important self-interests. However,

11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 3.
91 CONG. REc. 6878 (1945).
Id. at 8060.
U.N. SCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 16, U.N. Doc. S/1 (1946).
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U.S. leaders had steadfastly denied this. Asked what would happen if a
permanent member vetoed action in the face of aggression, Secretary of
State Stettinius had answered that "we should not be too deeply concerned with the kind of question Franklin Roosevelt always characterized
as 'iffy'. '" Instead, testifying before the Senate, he said, "I believe the
five major nations proved at San Francisco beyond the shadow of a doubt
that they can work successfully and in unity with each other and with the
other United Nations under this Charter." 6
B.

Institutional Engineering by the United States

The campaign to transfer dispute settlement to the Assembly began
with the international crisis growing out of the Greek civil war. In December, 1946, Athens complained to the U.N. that its northern neighbors
were supporting Greek Leftist guerillas. The Security Council was quickly
deadlocked and Washington decided to seek collective action through the
General Assembly, where the Soviets could not veto and the U.S. would
be able to count on almost an automatic majority. Thus, ten days after
the inconclusive Security Council debate on the Commission's report, the
U.S. brought the question to the Assembly. On October 21, 1947, that
body overwhelmingly voted to set up the United Nations Special Com17
mittee on the Balkans (UNSCOB).
This had consequences that reached beyond the immediate crisis.
The Assembly, conceived as a global town meeting, was suddenly propelled into the business of peace-making and conflict management. It was
a fateful tactical choice, for we had now demonstrated how the Assembly
could be used in disputes between members, and that it could influence
their outcomes.
The Assembly, over strenuous Communist opposition, proclaimed an
embargo on aid to the Leftists in Greece and authorized UNSCOB to
"observe compliance", which it did by reporting "large scale" violations
by the governments of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. 8 The Assembly
then passed further resolutions calling on those members to desist.19 It
also billed all members for UNSCOB's expenses, much to the annoyance
of those who voted against it. UNSCOB continued in its observer role
until December, 1951.
If UNSCOB did not have a profound effect on the Greek civil war, it
did have an effect on the Charter. It was a precedent for the right of the
Assembly to assume the Security Council's responsibility for settling disputes, conducting investigations and fact-finding, as well as monitoring

15. Report on the San FranciscoConference, 12 DFP'T. ST. BULL. 1007, 1010 (1945).
16. The Charterof the United Nations: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 79th Cong., 1st. Sess. 49 (1945) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
17. G.A. Res. 109(11), U.N. Doc. A/519, at 461-62 (1947).
18. G.A. Res. 193(11), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
19. Id., at 1 3.
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compliance.
This shift of power from Council to Assembly proceeded apace during the Korean War. When North Korea invaded South Korea on June
25, 1950, the Soviet Union happened to be boycotting the Security Council in protest against the failure to seat the representative of Peking. This
fluke made it possible for the council to authorize the first and only U.N.
collective security operation,"' after the U.S. had succeeded in getting it
not to count the Soviet absence as a veto (more "engineering"). However,
by the end of that summer the Soviets had returned to the Council, just
about the time (September) when General Douglas MacArthur's U.N.
forces began advancing rapidly across the old boundary between the
Koreas. This meant that the U.N. command needed new instructions, but
with the Soviets back, the Council was paralyzed. To overcome that problem, Dean Acheson - now Secretary of State - had the General Assembly take over the Council's role. On October 7, 1950 it passed a resolution
which, in effect, authorized MacArthur to pursue the retreating North
Korean army into its own territory."
Empowering the Assembly to do this had far-reaching implications
for the distribution of functions and powers within the U.N. SecretaryGeneral Trygve Lie declared himself elated. "This was Korea, not Manchuria," he wrote, "this was the United Nations, not the League of
Nations." 2
With Lie's support, the U.S. next persuaded the Assembly to establish simplified procedures for convening that body to do most of the
things the Charter had assigned to the Council whenever the Council was
deadlocked by a veto. This procedure became known as "Uniting For
Peace".22 In proposing it to the Assembly, our Ambassador, Benjamin Cohen, actually said that the U.N. should follow the U.S. Supreme Court's
practice of construing the Constitution flexibly, allowing the system to
invent new ways of overcoming unanticipated difficulties without formal
amendment of the basic compact. To the mystified delegates he cited our
Court's decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, in which additional "implied
powers" of the federal government were inferred from those enumerated
24
in the Constitution.
The British were strongly, if privately, opposed to Uniting For Peace,
warning that a future third world majority would take advantage of it to
undercut the veto at a time when the West might need it.25 Some Ameri-

20. 5 U.N. SCOR (473rd mtg.) at 18, U.N. Doc. S/1511 (1950).

21. G.A. Res. 376(V), 5 U.N. GAOR, U. N. Doc. A/1434 (1950).
22. T. LIE, IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE 345-46 (1954).
23. G.A. Res. 377A(V), 5 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/1481 (1950).
24. B. COHEN, THE UNITED NATIONS; CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, GROWTH, POSSIBILITIES 18-19 (1961).

25. The British Government, under severe pressure to support the Acheson Plan which they eventually felt compelled to do - told U.S. Ambassador Lewis Douglas, in
London, that "safeguards provided by [the] veto are useful since at some future date [the]
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cans, like Dean Acheson, saw no problem because they did not take the
U.N. seriously in the first place. Others foresaw the dawn of a brave new
era.
McGeorge Bundy, as editor of the Acheson papers, expressed the
view that Uniting For Peace was "certainly the most important development in the application of the Charter since it was signed in San Francisco in 1945 . . . . [T]he basic authority of the United Nations in organizing collective action against aggression now rests with any two-thirds
of its members. This is a measure of the degree to which the United
States Government is prepared to entrust itself to the weight of the indefinable but important force called world opinion." 6 The editors of The
New York Times agreed. They rejoiced that the Assembly was not to be
"the principal organ of this world organization" and would "assume executive functions that previously were "supposed to be left to the Security
Council . . . ." By passing the resolution, the U.N. had reached a "turning point as an instrument for the suppression of aggression .... ,,"
The U.S. next used Uniting For Peace in 1956 during the Mid-East
War, again bypassing the Council in favor of the Assembly. It was the
Assembly which ordered a cease-fire and created the U.N. Emergency
Force to patrol it.28 In 1960, when the Congo crisis compelled the U.N. to
intervene, we once more led the way around a dead-locked Security
Council to the Assembly. Thereafter, when France and the Soviet Union
refused to pay their assessed share of the large costs of those operations,
the United States persuaded the General Assembly to obtain an advisory
opinion from the International Court of Justice which held that countries
opposed to an action in the General Assembly were nevertheless obliged
to pay their share of the cost.29 Even in 1963, there were those in the
State Department who warned that the Court's advice was not in the
long-term interest of the U.S., but we were still in our institutional engineering period and the cautions went unheeded.
While creatively engineering the transfer of power from the Council
to the Assembly, the U.S. was also trying to whittle away at the veto. In
September of 1959, the Government of Laos requested the sending of a
U.N. emergency force to "halt aggression" by North Vietnam. When the
Council met to consider this request, the U.S. proposed to send a factfinding committee to investigate. A vote was taken, producing the then-

U.K. might need [the] veto to protect [its] own basic interests" against the potential "irresponsibility" of the General Assembly. DEPT OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES 323, 320, 330 (1976).
26. THE PATTERN OF RESPONSmILITY 256 (M. Bundy, ed. 1952).
27. Turning Point for the U.N., N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1950, at 26, col. 2.
28. G.A. Res. 997(ES-1), 10 U.N. GAOR (562nd plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/3256 (1956);
G.A. Res. 1000 (ES-1), 10 U.N. GAOR (565th plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/3290 (1956); G.A.
Res. 1001(ES-1), 10 U.N. GOAR (567th plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/3308 (1956).
29. G.A. Res. 1731(XVI), 16 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/5062 (1961); Certain Expenses of
the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 163 (Advisory Opinion of July 20, 1962).
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customary majority for the Western proposal, but with the Soviets opposed. Moscow's representative thought he had cast a veto. However, the
presiding officer (Italy's Ortona) ruled that the creating of a sub-committee was a procedural decision and thus not subject to the veto. This tactic, the result of a prior agreement between the U.S. and Italian delegates,
created a potentially important loophole in the permanent members' veto
power; one to which, incidentally, Secretary-General Hammarskjold was
strongly opposed. 0 Precedent by precedent, we were creating a U.N.
which would make a great deal of trouble for us once we lost control of
it. 8 1
Two more instances will illustrate the "engineering" proclivity of this
period. One concerns our campaign to win a second term for SecretaryGeneral Trygve Lie, whose stout support for the U.N. action in Korea
had earned him the emnity of the Soviet Union. When Moscow announced that it would veto his re-election, the U.S. first replied that it
would veto anyone else. Then, after the Security Council was deadlocked, we used our majority in the General Assembly to pass a resolution
"extending" Lie's term of office for a further five years, 2 a maneuver certainly not sanctioned by the Charter. The second instance of our creative
engineering occurred after the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, when,
as a symbolic show of disapproval, we persuaded the Assembly to refuse
to accept the credentials of the Assembly delegates sent by the Kadar
regime installed by the Soviets. Again, we did not seem to count the longterm costs of setting this precedent, which is now used annually in efforts
to reject the credentials of the Israeli delegates.
V.
A.

U.S.

RESPONSES TO PERCEIVED

U.N.

INADEQUACIES

U.S. Abrogation of U.N. Policies and Rules

For as long as the United States could count on the support of a
majority of members in the principal organs of the U.N., it was relatively
easy for us to play by the rules, especially as we could use that majority
to interpret the rules, or change them to suit our purposes. By the midfifties, however, we could no longer count on this automatic majority; and,
gradually emulating our adversaries, we began to violate those rules
which did not suit our purpose, thereby alienating us from the organization and undermining our moral authority.
In June, 1954, the CIA, in cooperation with neighboring Honduras
and Nicaragua, mobilized and equipped an army of exiles to overthrow
the Leftist Guatemalan government of President Arbenz Guzman. When

30. For an interesting discussion of this event, and Secretary General Dag Ham-

marskjold's disapproval of the tactic, see B.
31. See generally T.

URQUHART, HAMMARSKJOLD

344-45 (1972).

U.N.
(1985).
32. G.A. Res. 492(V), 5 U.N. GAOR(V) (298th plen. mtg.) at 289, U.N. Doc. A/1475
(1950). The resolution was adopted by a vote of 46 to 5, with 8 abstentions.
FRANCK, NATION AGAINST NATION: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE

DREAM AND WHAT THE U.S. CAN Do ABOUT IT

1986

U.S.

FOREIGN POLICY & THE

U.N.

Guatemala complained to the Security Council,33 Washington denied any
involvement and expressed indignation at the charge. We insisted that
the Council not take up the Guatemalan complaint, but that it seek mediation in the Organization of American States. The U.S.-led majority was
easily able to prevent the U.N. from responding affirmatively to the Guatemalan plea for an on-site investigation of what was happening. Just
before Guatemala was finally overrun it was Ambassador Lodge, at that
time presiding over the Council, who succeeded with our allies in getting
the Council to adjourn without adopting an agenda or hearing the Guatemalan complaint.34 This was clearly a distortion of the intent of the drafters of the Charter. Shortly after San Francisco, U.S. Delegate John Foster
Dulles had stated that the U.N. would be "given the first opportunity to
maintain peace everywhere, using presumably regional organizations;
which it is invited to do, but not absolutely compelled to do."35 Secretary
of State Stettinius had told the Council in January, 1946, in connection
with Iran's complaint against the Soviets, that "the United States Government believes that any member country of the United Nations which
makes a complaint has a right to be heard at this table." 6 What we did to
the Charter in 1954 undoubtedly made it easier and cheaper in terms of
public opinion costs for the U.S.S.R. to invade Hungary in 1956, using the
same arguments about the primacy of regional organizations (in this case
the Warsaw Pact).
The tendency to cheat on the rules had surfaced in other instances in
which the U.S. has used covert, or even overt, force against another state
in violation of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter. Of course we are
neither the only, nor the worst, cheater. Cheating has become quite respectable nowadays. As many as can, do. We are not the only ones to be
disillusioned.
That sad reality requires some rethinking on our part. Should the
U.S. now try to raise the standard of compliance by upgrading its own
performance - "cleaning up our act" - or should it openly embrace the
venal ways now so prevalent, practicing them with less guilt and more
skill? In the area of human rights, for example, should we join the U.N.
majority to criticize and discomfit Chile's Pinochet regime for its failure
to live up to international human rights standards, even though the Assembly's majority blocks criticism of Poland's Pinochet-lookalike, General
Jaruzelski? Since the advent of the Reagan Administration, the U.S. has
focused on the "double standard" and declared itself unwilling to join the
censure of Chile as long as the transgressions of General Jaruzelski go
unnoticed. Theo VanBoven, when Director of the U.N.'s Human Rights

33. Cablegram dated 19 June, 1954 from Min. Ext. Rel. of Guat. to Pres. of Sec. Council. U.N. Doc. S/3232 (1954) at 1. For a full account of "the American coup in Guatemala,"
see S. SCHLESINGER & S. KINZER, BITTER FRUIT (1982).
34. 9 U.N. SCOR (675-76th mtg.) at 32, 34, U.N. Doc. S/3236/Rev. 1 (1954).
35. Senate Hearings, supra note 16, at 474.
36. U.N. SCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 18, U.N. Doc S/1 (1946).
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Division, criticized this. "I find it unacceptable," he said, "that a situation
of gross violations of human rights in any country should not be discussed, or action taken thereon, simply because other situations have not
been taken up as well. '3 7 The Reagan Administration, however, now has
taken the position that if others are allowed to cheat, we will no longer
play by the rules that are not enforced. That approach, although not
without logical or tactical merit, is subject to the reply that we were
among the first to fiddle with the rules; and, when that became impossible, to cheat on them.
B.

Withdrawal From the U.N. System by the U.S.

Outright repudiation of the rules, and of the whole U.N. system, is
the most recent response of our failure to get the organization we were led
to expect and which we expected to lead. This has generated a growing
withdrawal syndrome. As Senator Steven Symms of Idaho explained,
"[t]axpayers are sick and tired of playing host to our enemies and critics
abroad."3 8
The "withdrawal" mode of response is of quite recent origins and
poses the most serious tactical questions. We withdrew from the International Labour Organization in the era of the Carter Administration, but
then returned. We have announced our intention to withdraw from
UNESCO, and already selectively do not participate in some organs of
the General Assembly, such as the Committee of Twenty-Four (on
"colonialism"), the Special Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the
Palestinian People, and in such Assembly-convened activities as the 1983
Conference on Palestine and, perhaps most significantly, the institution
being established to administer the treaty on the Law of the Sea. We
have also tended to distance ourselves from international efforts to stabilize commodity prices through production quotas or price support systems, and from aspects of the program for world population control.
The "withdrawal" mode is activated by different degrees of fear and
antagonism towards international organizations. First, there is the antagonism directed towards a particular organization, such as UNESCO, because of the way it operates. Second, there is antagonism towards some
institutions - the sea law authority, for one - because their activities
are ideologically incompatible with the dominant philosophy of the
United States Government. Third, and most significant, is a discernible
tendency to reject, for tactical reasons, all multilateralism.
Examples of the last-mentioned predilection abound of late. Although Nicaragua has frequently used the Security Council to indict the
U.S. for interference in its internal conflicts, the U.S. has refused to recip-

37. Address at opening of 38th Sess. of Comm. on Human Rights, Geneva, 1 Feb. 1982,
reprinted in T. VON BOVEN, PEOPLE MATTER: VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS POLiCY 83 (1982).
38. Senate Votes to Cut Contribution to U.N., N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1983, at A7, col. 1.
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rocate with an indictment by the U.S. and El Salvador of Nicaragua's
interference in the Salvadoran civil war, on the ground that we should
take as few initiatives in the Council as possible. The same general mood
was evident when the U.S. withdrew its agreement to the jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice, in order to avoid having to face Nicaragua there, and later refused to participate in the "merits" phase of the
Court proceedings.
Another indication of the new, general skepticism towards all multilateral forums is the refusal of the U.S. to try to use U.N. peacekeeping
machinery - one of the few things at the U.N. that works - during the
1982 Beirut crisis. Although the PLO and, reluctantly, the Soviet Union
were prepared to have the Council authorize a U.N. force, or an enlargement of the existing UNIFIL force in southern Lebanon, to supervise the
departure of the Palestinians from Beirut, this option was not really pursued. Admittedly, the Israelis expressed reservations about the impartiality of a U.N. contingent, and the Christian-led Lebanese Government
preferred to accept French, Italian and U.S. contingents with British support. Nevertheless, a U.N. presence clearly could have been established
had the chief U.S. delegate pressed for it. She did not, because she believed the U.N. to be the inferior instrument.
The non-U.N. alternative, however, did not prove to be any bargain.
The U.S.-French-Italian force left too quickly, then returned after the
Shatila Camp massacre with an uncertain mission. Once it encountered
resistance from elements of the population, it was quickly shown to have
a fragile political and military foundation. Its composition virtually guaranteed the accelerated intrusion of the cold war. A neutral force, established by the Security Council and underwritten by all one hundred fiftynine U.N. members, would probably have fared better and could scarcely
have done worse.
This may simply illustrate that a realistic skepticism towards the
U.N.'s capabilities, while perhaps a healthy antidote to earlier illusions
and unwarranted optimism, can create new dangers to the national interest if indulged to excess. It is not necessarily true that the organization is
capable of doing nothing that accords with the national interest of the
United States.
VI.

CONCLUSION

That the U.S. responses to the U.N. have come primarily in the form
of exaggerated reactive tendencies may evince an insufficiently clear vision of America's long term global interests and commitments. In the future, however, the severity of our reactive "swings and roundabouts," the
intensities of our mercurial tendencies, could cause us to catapult right
out of the established international political system. That has become a
distinct, immediate possibility. It must not happen. The U.N. would not
cease to exist if we were to leave it. Rather, it would become a greater
danger to our national interests. What we need is a strategy for being
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more effective within the principal organs. We need to identify a few salient, long-term goals that are rooted deep in our national history and conscience. Then, we should carefully plan a few skirmishes, each year,
which, if won, would advance us along the road to those goals. Finally, we
should commit to victory in those designated skirmishes all the resources
and strategies - the educating, wheeling, dealing, arm-twisting - that
befit a nation in which politics is the national art form.

The Transition from British to Chinese
Rule in Hong Kong: A Discussion of Salient
International Legal Issues
RODA MUSHKAT*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Hong Kong has been a British colony since 1841 and as such has
pursued a markedly different economic, legal, political and social path
from that of China. While China has embraced communist ideology and
practice, often in an extreme form, Hong Kong has unwaveringly maintained its capitalist orientation and has remained an integral part of the
Western world. The bulk of the colony's population has always been Chinese and its cultural roots lie deeply in Chinese soil. In most other respects, however, the two systems are almost completely at variance with
each other.
Despite the structural differences between Hong Kong and China,
Hong Kong will shed its colonial status in 1997 and come under de facto
Chinese sovereignty. After protracted negotiations, the People's Republic
of China (PRC) and the United Kingdom have concluded an agreement
on the future of Hong Kong which stipulates that the PRC will resume
the "exercise of sovereignty" over the colony as of July 1, 1997 and that
thereafter, Hong Kong will function for a period of 50 years as a "special
administrative region" (SAR) of the PRC.'
The transition from British to Chinese rule is an event of enormous
political magnitude with far-reaching repercussions. It raises a host of
complex issues, both academic and practical. Many of these issues have
already attracted the attention of scholars and policy-makers. I
Thus far, however, there has been little discussion from an international legal perspective of the radical changes under way. The arrangement for Hong Kong's future envisaged by the PRC and the United
Kingdom has no exact precedent in the international legal arena and con* Lecturer in Law, University of Hong Kong; LL.B., Hebrew University; LL.M., Victoria University of Wellington; Post Graduate Diploma in International Law, University of
Manchester; Member of the Israel Bar.
1. Draft Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Future of Hong Kong,
White Paper (Sept. 26, 1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1366 (1984)[hereinafter cited as The

Draft Agreement].
2. The University of Hong Kong, for instance, recently held a conference devoted exclusively to the 1997 question which provided a useful vehicle for a multifaceted examination
of transition-related problems. See HONG KONG AND 1997: STRATEGIES FOR THE FuTuRE (Y.
C. Jao ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as STRATEGIES].
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sequently, should be of great interest to students of international law.
Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that experts in this field will apply
themselves earnestly to the subject in the near future. The aim of the
present article is to provide, in the interim, a preliminary analysis of a
number of key international legal issues which emanate from the SinoBritish agreement. This is a challenging task given the sui generis position of Hong Kong vis-a-vis external entities and the diverging attitudes
towards international law by the two principal parties involved, the PRC
and the UK.
It is obvious that the legal facets of the agreement surrounding Hong
Kong's future cannot be dissected in the light of established principles of
international law alone. The PRC stance on many issues is so fundamentally different from the one embraced by the non-communist world that
an alternative approach is called for. Ideally, a synthesis should be sought
reflecting conventional international legal norms, the Chinese posture,
and the realities of Hong Kong's geo-strategic situation. In this article,
such a synthesis is attempted with respect to the questions of sovereignty,
treaties, state succession and nationality.
II.

HONG KONG'S UNIQUE STATUS

Hong Kong, as a British dependent territory, lacks the main attributes of statehood from the standpoint of public international law. It can
thus be deemed as having little, if any, international legal personality.
The colony does have a legislature capable of legislating extensively on
domestic law and an executive and judiciary with similar powers which
may impinge on the UK's discharge of its international obligations. Its
external links, however, both as a matter of fact and as a proposition of
law, are largely managed by the UK authorities.
At the same time, and here lies the colony's uniqueness, the commercial and industrial prominence of Hong Kong has given it a considerable
measure of independence in international contexts.3 To illustrate, the colony is treated as a separate territory for the purpose of multilateral agreements such as the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).'
It is also a member of several international organizations including the
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
(ESCAP), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), the Asian Productivity Organization (APO) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Furthermore, in several instances over the past
decades, the Hong Kong Government, "acting with the consent of" the

3. For an elaboration and further illustrations, see Dick, The Law and Practiceof Hong
Kong and Foreign Investment, in INTERNATIONAL LAW PROBLEMS IN ASIA 153 (V. Shepherd
ed. 1956).
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187; U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, 609 U.N.T.S. 3.
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UK authorities, has negotiated agreements directly with foreign governments concerning such crucial matters as textile quotas.' It is also worth
noting that local officials have concluded a number of agreements with
the Provincial government of Guandong on questions of significant mutual interest, such as the supply of water. 6
Indeed, the high degree of independence enjoyed by Hong Kong in
the management of its external affairs has been reaffirmed in the SinoBritish agreement which seeks to formalize its status as a "separate customs territory" that "may participate in relevant international organizations and international trade agreements (including preferential trade arrangements), such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and
arrangements regarding international trade in textiles."' The agreement
also states that after 1997 the Hong Kong SAR "may on its own, using
the name 'Hong Kong, China' maintain and develop relations and conclude and implement agreements with states, regions and relevant organizations in the appropriate fields including the economic, trade, financial
and monetary, shipping, communications, touristic, cultural and sporting
fields."' Finally, the agreement enables the SAR to participate in international organizations and conferences and trade agreements either as a
member of the PRC delegation or in any other capacity as may be permitted by the Chinese authorities. The agreement may thus be seen as
not merely reinforcing Hong Kong's unique position as a fairly independent actor in the international arena, but also lending to it additional
substance. Under such circumstances, one can regard the territory as an
entity approximating an international legal personality, with its own
rights and obligations. Consequently, it is appropriate to examine questions of international law which originate from this unprecedented
configuration.
III.

CONTRASTING CHINESE AND BRITISH ATTITUDES TOWARDS
INTERNATIONAL LAW

While enjoying a notable measure of independence, Hong Kong is
constrained in its external policy-making. It remains a British dependency and at the same time is increasingly sensitive to Chinese interests
and wishes. Therefore, Hong Kong must operate within a complex legal
framework, particularly since the PRC and the UK employ concepts of
international law which are often extremely difficult to reconcile.
This complexity stems from the fact that the PRC's notion of law in
general and its assumptions regarding the role, function, validity, and jus-

5. Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, Misc. 18, UK
Command Papers 6205 [hereinafter cited as MFA]. The Arrangement is indexed in M.J.
BOWMAN & D.J. HARRIS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS No. 209
(1984).
6. See Water Supplies Department, Fact Sheet 1985.
7. The Draft Agreement, annex I, § 6, para. 1, supra note 1, at 1387.
8. Id. annex I, § XI, at 1376.
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tification of the legal system do not coincide with those prevailing in the
West. 9 Traditional Western doctrines portray the law as emanating from
the people, thus according greater importance to the needs of the individual. 10 The Chinese idea of law is based on a set of norms which give clear
preference to collective needs. Under the Western scheme, a strong emphasis is placed on codifying the law with a view to minimizing arbitrary
conduct by power holders. By contrast, the PRC system distinguishes between 1i and fa (roughly translated as "customary norms of behavior" and
"enacted law" respectively) with 1i normally prevailing. 1
Perhaps the most significant practical difference between the attitudes of the two doctrines is that law is generally viewed in the West as a
variable reflecting rather than causing societal change, whereas Chinese
authorities perceive law as a political instrument of the State explicitly
designed to serve political objectives. This applies to international as well
as domestic law. As the Chinese scholar, Cho Fun-lan has elucidated:
International law in addition to being a body of principles and norms
which must be observed by every country is also, just as any law, a
political instrument; whether a country is socialist or capitalist, it will
to a certain12degree utilize international law in implementing its foreign policy.
Parallel views have been expressed by other well-known Chinese
writers. Scott cites Chu li-lu, for instance, as stating that if international
law is disadvantageous to the PRC, to the Socialist system or to the peace
of the whole world, it should not be relied upon." This instrumental conception of international law by the Chinese renders generalization about
Hong Kong's future status rather difficult. For the dominant ideology in
the PRC and the state/party interests, as interpreted by its ruling elite,
are in constant flux and not likely to remain static on a strategic issue
such as Hong Kong. Though one is compelled to grapple with elusive political variables, the PRC is in the process of moderating its practice of
bending the law to promote political goals.' "

IV.

THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY

Sovereignty is often employed indiscriminately and accorded different meanings by decision-makers and scholars alike. The reason for the

9. See generally Lee, Introduction to the Chinese Concept of Law, 60 MICH. L. REV.
439 (1962); Li, The Role of Law in Communist China, 82 CHINA Q. 66 (1970). On the PRC's
attitude towards international law, see, e.g., Chiu, Communist China's Attitude Toward InternationalLaw, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 245 (1966).
10. J.C. SMITH & D. WEIssrBu, THE WESTERN IDEA OF LAW 3 (1983).
11. Lee, supra note 9, at 448-9.
12. Quoted in G. SCOTT, CHINESE TREATIES: THE POST REVOLUTIONARY RESTORATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER

45 (1975).

13. Id. at 46.

14. Salinger, The Fifth National People's Congress and the Process of Policy Making:
Reform, Readjustment and the Opposition, 22 ASIAN SURV. 1238, 1242 (1982).
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vague and inconsistent usage of the term lies in the fact that sovereignty
is a highly emotive symbol which is, inter alia, relied upon to induce a
favorable response from the public in an era of nationalistic fervor. Two
basic distinctions may nonetheless be drawn.
First, a distinction exists between the political or philosophical notion of sovereignty and the legal one. In its political or philosophical aspect sovereignty is perceived as an ideal. Thus, sovereignty, in conjunction with independence and equality as the classical attributes of the
nation state, 5 is deemed by nations throughout the Third World (including China) as both the means of achieving national dignity and the measure of success in progressing towards this goal. The legal notion of sovereignty, however, hinges on a legal concept, or more precisely, a series of
legal concepts.
This raises the second distinction between sovereignty in the international sense (i.e., as a crucial characteristic of independent states) and
sovereignty as it is construed in the domestic law of any national entity.
These concepts do not fully overlap since they are governed by different
systems of law. Whereas the characteristics of a state as a member of the
international community are defined by international law, the internal
distribution of sovereignty of each state is determined by the rules of its
own domestic law (i.e., its constitution)."
This distinction is highlighted in a dictum of a High Court judge in
the local case of Winfat Enterprises(HK) Co. Ltd. v. Attorney General."
Mr. Justice Kempster stated that the New Territories Order in Council
1898 "formally vested sovereignty in and dominion over the New Territories in her Majesty."" This is a clear statement of domestic law which
does not affect the question of whether, as a matter of international law,
sovereignty over the New Territories is vested in the UK.
In essence, a legally sovereign state in the eyes of the international
community is one which is capable of exercising plenary powers in relation to its territory without being legally subordinate to the will of any
other state.'" However, given the evolutionary nature of international law,
sovereignty may be subject to modifications. Specifically, the scope of legal sovereignty in the international sense may expand or contract according to changes in the law. States are free to restrict their own sovereignty
by entering into treaty relationships including some comprehensive

15. M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-16 (4th ed.
1982).
16. For an elaboration of this distinction and its application in the Hong Kong context,

see Dicks, Treaty, Grant, Usage or Sufferance?: Some Legal Aspects of the Status of Hong
Kong, 95 CHINA Q. 427, 430-1 (1983).
17. [1983] Hong Kong L. Rep. 211 (High Court).
18. Id. at 217.
19. Basically, plenary powers are the sum total of jurisdicational and legislative powers
and correlative rights conferred on it by international law. See 1 D.P. O'CoNNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 283-85 (2d ed. 1970).
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schemes, such as the EEC. Indeed, there has been a trend since the end
of the Second World War towards a more restrictive interpretation of
sovereignty in the international context. This trend is reflected in the
adoption of legal restraints on the use of force,20 the enhancement of the
institutional role of the UN and other international organizations 2' and
the international protection of human rights. 2
At the same time, distinct groups of states object strongly to internationalism. In particular, the Soviet Union and its communist allies insist
on the inviolability and inalienability of national sovereignty. And not
surprisingly, this interpretation of sovereignty has also been favored by
the PRC. In fact, sovereignty is deemed by the PRC as the core of all
fundamental principles of international law and, furthermore, as the legal
foundation on which institutions and norms are grounded.2 3 Chinese writings on the Charter-based international order emphasize the traditional
positivist notion of sovereignty. 2"' PRC experts have emphatically stressed
that sovereignty is the most important principle of international law and
the most valuable characteristic of the state. Any attempts to subvert,
dilute or transfer sovereignty through such devices as "world law" or
"transnational law" have consistently been dismissed as contrary to international law.
In the same vein, Chinese representatives have denied a legal personality to the UN by challenging the notion that international organizations
could become subjects of international law. They have contended that the
UN is merely an international organization among sovereign states and
not a world government." These representatives have also repudiated the
idea that individuals might enjoy a similar status. Such extensions of the
concept of international legal personality are frowned upon by the PRC
lest they devalue the supremacy of state sovereignty.26
This rigid Chinese view of sovereignty has manifested itself through
criticisms levelled by PRC commentators against the role of the UN in
the maintenance of international peace and security. These commentators

20. U.N. CHATER art. 2, para. 4.
21. For example, the Convention of the International Labor Organization, Oct. 9, 1946,

38 U.N.T.S. 3.
22. Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213

U.N.T.S. 221.
23. See generally, Shao-Chuan, Chinese Law, in

SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THE LAW 242-67
(1965). See also, T'ao Ying, A Criticism of Bourgeois InternationalLaw Concerning the
Question of State Sovereignty, in 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMEN-

106-110 (J.A. Cohen & H. Chiu eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as 1 PEoPLE's
CHINA]; Hsin & Chien, Expose and Criticize the Imperialist Fallacy Concerning the Ques-

TARY STUDY

tion of State Sovereignty, in id. at 110-17.
24. See generally 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA, id.

25. It should be noted in this connection that Chinese scholars have long maintained
that General Assembly resolutions are not legally binding but are merely recommendatory.
See 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra note 23, at 88, 97-8.
26. See S. KIM, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND WORLD ORDER (1979).
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have been adamant that the exercise of such a role by the UN is tantamount to interference in the domestic affairs of states in violation of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter.27 Indeed, China's sensitivity about international interference in domestic affairs is well documented. The UN
"interventions" in Korea, Hungary, the Congo (ONUC), Cyprus (UNFICYP), Vietnam, Tibet, Hong Kong and Macao were thus strongly condemned by the PRC as contraventions of the Charter's principles. 8
As indicated, Chinese resistance to encroachments on state sovereignty have also been reflected in its qualified approach to human rights
as an international concern. Most notably, the PRC has never endorsed
the UN General Assembly Universal Declaration of Human Rights nor
has it become a party to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. Chinese accession to the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination (on 29 December 1981) and the PRC vote
in support of General Assembly resolutions that condemned torture on
the basis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Convenant on Civil and Political Rights and other internationally articulated standards' are seen as the exception rather than the rule in this
respect. 30
In seeking to reinforce the traditional legal doctrine of sovereignty,
the PRC has not confined itself to negative measures, but has also actively pursued positive strategies. Prominent in this category have been
the steps taken to promote the principles of peaceful co-existence
adopted at the Bandung Conference in 1955.31 The PRC has also incorporated references to these principles in many of its international agreements and statements, including those made by Premier Zhao Ziyang
during Prime Minister Thatcher's visit to China in September 1982. Mr.
Zhao took the opportunity to reiterate the relevance of the principles as a
basis for problem-solving in the context of Sino-British relations." The

27. See documents and discussions in the second volume of 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra
note 23, at 1322-61 (1974).
28. Id.
29. G.A. Res. 3059, 28 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/PV 2163 (1973); G.A. Res. 3218, 29
U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/9031 (1974).
30. Some possible explanations for this uncharacteristic step are referred to - but not
given credence to - by Cohen, Reflection on the CriminalProcess in China, 68 J. CGRIM.
L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 323, 353-4 (1977).
31. Five principles of peaceful co-existence were expressly agreed to by India and the
PRC in the Preamble of the Treaty of Tibet signed in Peking on April 29, 1954. These were:
(1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual nonaggression; (3) mutual non-interference in each other's affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful co-existence. A year later in Bandung, Indonesia, the Asian Conference
expanded the list to ten principles.
32. Two principles emphasized in relation to Hong Kong were the assertion of sovereignty over territory on the basis of historic - particularly precolonial - claims, and the
principle that existing treaties were invalid because of their "unequal" character. Reported
in the South China Morning Post, Sept. 24, 1982, at p. 1; Asian Wall Street Journal, Sept.
24, 1982, at p. 1.
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unyielding Chinese position on the issue of sovereignty had also been apparent throughout the negotiations by the two parties and is mirrored in
the agreement itself.
On the British side, of course, the claim to sovereignty over the territory has always been implicit in the factual and legal circumstances of
Hong Kong. It may easily be inferred from the constitutional and legal
practices adopted by the UK for governing the territory.33 The PRC, on
the other hand, has consistently emphasized that although the UK has de
facto control over Hong Kong, it does not accept any British claim to
permanent possession or sovereignty. There have been many official and
semi-official statements to this effect. For example, the Chinese ambassador to the UN, in an address to the Chairman of the Special Committee
on Colonialism seeking to remove Hong Kong and Macao from the list of
territories falling within the Committee's terms of reference, stated that:
"... Hong Kong and Macao are part of Chinese territory occupied by
the British and Portuguese authorities. The settlement of the questions
of Hong Kong and Macao is entirely within China's sovereign right and
does not at all fall under the ordinary category of colonial territories
"34

This, again, highlights the distinctive attitude of the PRC with regard to sovereignty. As a leading Hong Kong commentator observed, although the Chinese request was successful, that in itself did not indicate
the acceptance by UN members of the claim that the Hong Kong question rested exclusively within China's jurisdiction.35 Indeed, many of
those members have treaty relations and other interests with the UK with
respect to Hong Kong.
It may be argued that the notion of "divided sovereignty," which is a
recognized norm of international law 3 could have been applied to the
sovereignty of Hong Kong by the PRC. Such a concept is employed to
describe a state of affairs whereby the sum total of powers accorded by
international law to a soverign state are exercised in respect of a territory
by two or more states. Thus the UK, which clearly exercised in Hong
Kong the kind of extensive powers that are the principal attributes of
territorial sovereignty, may be said to possess what O'Connell calls "effective" sovereignty while China may be deemed to have the "titular" or
"residual" sovereignty (i.e., the ultimate power to dispose of the

territory) .3

33. Dicks, supra note 16, at 437-39. On the constitutional structure of Hong Kong in
general and a useful list of references, see Wesley-Smith, Hong Kong, in CONSTITUTIONS OF
DEPENDENCIES AND SPECIAL SOVEREIGNTIES (A. Blaustein & E. Blautsein eds. 1985).
34. 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra note 23, at 384.
35. Dicks, supra note 16, at 436 n.28.

36.

O'CONNELL,

37. Id.

supra note 19, at ch. 10.
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Hong Kong's Status under the Laws of the PRC

Notwithstanding the Chinese concept of an indivisible sovereignty,"8
in practice the PRC has treated the Hong Kong government as the lawful
government of the territory." Among many examples, China extends recognition to foreign consular representatives who are accredited by the
British government in Hong Kong.40 The PRC has not expressed any misgivings about the fact that the UK has consistently concluded bilateral
and multilateral agreements on behalf of Hong Kong and represented the
territory and its inhabitants in relation to third states. The Chinese authorities have also acknowledged the right of the UK to issue currency in
Hong Kong (one of the most important attributes of sovereignty). Furthermore, for certain administrative and economic purposes the PRC legislation treats Hong Kong as a separate territory and the boundary between Hong Kong and China as an international frontier. Finally, the
PRC also recognizes many legal and judicial acts which have taken effect
under the law of Hong Kong, including, marriages, divorces, inheritances,
incorporation and registration of companies. As might be expected, however, references to Hong Kong in Chinese legislation are made in such a
way as to exclude any implication that the territory falls within the cate41
gory of foreign states.
The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Future of Hong Kong
gives concrete expression to both the narrow conception of sovereignty on
the part of the PRC and its proclivity towards pragmatism in approaching problems at the tactical level. It is also an attempt to reconcile the
conflicting notions of sovereignty held by the Chinese and British governments. Thus, the Chinese declare their decision to "resume the exercise of
sovereignty over Hong Kong," whereas the British declare that they will
"restore Hong Kong to the PRC". The pragmatic solution offered by the
contracting parties, within the parameters set by China, is to accord the
territory a quasi-autonomous status while reintegrating it into the PRC.
Specifically, Section I of Annex I stipulates that the Hong Kong SAR
"shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy," except in foreign and defense
affairs which will be the responsibility of the Central People's Government. According to the agreement, the Hong Kong SAR will be vested
with "executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including
that of final adjudication. 4 2 It "will retain the status of a free port and a

38. Accord, Ch'in Fu, Restoring Hong Kong is Perfectly Valid in InternationalLaw, 4
J. INT'L STUDIES 3, 3-8 (Kit-yee Cheng trans. 1983).

39. Dicks, The Position of Hong Kong and Macao in Recent Chinese Legislation, 4
HONG KONG L. J. 151 (May 1974).

40. Id. For a full account, see Dicks, supra note 16, at 439-41.
41. See, e.g., Interim Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control of the People's Republic of China, art. 8 (1980) in which Hong Kong is listed seperately from Macao in a way that
indicates it is not a "foreign" country. Reprinted in 1 FOREIGN LANGUAGE PRESS, CHINA'S
FOREIGN ECONOMIc LEGISLATION 118-38 (1980).
42. The Draft Agreement, art. 3(3), supra note 1, at 1371.
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separate customs territory ' 4 and will continue to serve as an international financial center with its foreign exchange markets, free flow of capital and convertible currency." The agreement also envisages for the Hong
Kong SAR a quasi-autonomous status with respect to finances and
taxes,' 5 as well as a capacity to participate in relevant international orga6
nizations and international trade agreements.4
The formula of "one country, two systems" is the vehicle by which
the PRC seeks to exercise its sovereignty over Hong Kong and at the
same time ensure the territory's prosperity and stability. This novel
scheme is by no means perceived as a restriction on Chinese sovereignty
since no concessions are granted to any other power. Rather, it is a form
of domestic delegation of power, broadly similar to that extended to various sub-national entities (e.g., special economic zones) and in line with
Article 31 of the Constitution of the PRC which provides that "[t]he state
may establish special administrative regions when necessary. '
A rather idealistic interpretation of the "one country, two systems"
concept is furnished by Yan Ziaqui, who considers it as a viable model for
solving certain types of international conflicts by peaceful means. He contends that within this flexible framework Hong Kong would in fact wield
more power than member states in federal countries, and thereby deduces
that the proposed national configuration is vastly superior to any feasible
48
alternative.
Opposing interpretations support the view that the Sino-British
Joint Declaration affords no solid foundation for Hong Kong's future as a
quasi-autonomous legal entity. Five arguments have been raised by Chiu
in an article which constitutes the first critical scrutiny of the document
4
by an international legal scholar. 1
The most glaring threat to the "durability and credibility" of Hong
Kong's future quasi-autonomy identified by Chiu, lies in the fact that
both the legislative and interpretative powers of the Basic Law for the
Territory are in the hands of the PRC's National People's Congress
(NPC). Here, Section I, Paragraph 1 of Annex I of the Joint Declaration
stipulates that the NPC "shall enact and promulgate a Basic Law of the
Hong Kong SAR of the PRC" and, in addition, under Article 67 of the
Chinese Constitution the Standing Committee of the NPC has the power
to interpret the Constitution and those political bodies governed by it.
The corollary is that the Basic Law will be subject to interpretation by

43. Id. art. 3(6), at 1372.
44. Id. art. 3(7).
45. Id. art. 3(8).
46. Id. art. 3(9).
47. FOREIGN LANGUAGE PRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(1983)[hereinafter cited as THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION].
48. Yan Ziaqui, Concept Points to Reunification, 14 Beijing Rev. 22, 22-23 (Apr. 1985).

49. Chiu, The 1984 Sino-British Agreement on Hong Kong and its Implications on
China's Unification, 21 IssUEs & STUD. 13, 17-19 (Apr. 1985).
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the same external body which endorses the Constitution.
The second argument regarding Hong Kong's future quasi-autonomy
pertains to a statement in the Joint Declaration which provides that the
"law previously in force in Hong Kong
any that contravene the Basic Law. . .

. .
."

. shall be maintained save for
Given the fact that under the

Chinese Constitution the Standing Committee of the NPC has the right
to "interpret statutes," the laws of Hong Kong may be subject to annulment by this body, on the ground, real or otherwise, that they contravene
5
the Basic Law. 1

Chiu's third argument is an extension of the second. He points out
that the Chinese Constitution authorizes the Standing Committee of the
NPC "to annul those local regulations or decisions of the organs of state
power of. . . autonomous regions.

. .

that contravene the Constitution,

the Statutes or the administrative rules and regulations," thus imposing
further potential contraints on the legislative power of the Hong Kong
legislature.52
Another possible threat to Hong Kong's future quasi-autonomy is inherent in the Chinese Constitution which entitles the State Council "to
alter or annul inappropriate decisions and orders issued by local organs of
state administration at different levels."53 This may render the executive
organ in the territory vulnerable to administrative interference from
structurally higher levels of government within the PRC.
The last argument advanced by Chiu focuses on the decisive role to
be played by China in the appointment of the Chief Executive of the
Hong Kong SAR.5 4 While prior local election or consultation are envisaged, it is questionable to what extent a measure of independence would
be retained in the face of control by the Central People's Government.
Chiu's arguments, while not groundless, are open to counter-arguments. To begin with, the question of the interpretation of the Basic Law
has not yet been authoritatively resolved and it is conceivable that an
arrangement will allow the local courts to exercise this function, at least
with respect to "purely" internal matters.5 5 Indeed, even within China
proper, the Standing Committee of the NPC is no longer the sole authority relied upon to interpret the Constitution and related legislation, for
50. The Draft Agreement, annex I, § II, para. 1, supra note 1, at 1373.
51. THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION, supra note 47, art. 67, para. 4.
52. Id. art. 67, para. 8.
53. Id. art. 8, para. 14.
54. The Draft Agreement, annex I, § I, para. 3, supra note 1, at 1373.
55. According to a delegation of local lawyers who recently returned from China, Hong
Kong courts will be granted the "judicial power" of interpreting the Basic Law in deciding
cases after 1997, whereas the NPC will retain the "legislative power of interpretation,"
namely, the power to amplify laws by legislative edict. It should be noted that Hong Kong,
being a common law jurisdiction, based on the doctrine of precedent, exercises a judicial
power of interpretation. The PRC on the other hand, follows a system whereby the power of
interpretation rests with the legislature and has to be laid down in laws.
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some of this responsibility has recently been delegated to subordinate
bodies. 5 e Furthermore, it should be noted that the Standing Committee of
the NPC seldom makes use of its interpretative powers and consequently
those powers do not constitute a real threat under normal circumstances.
It is also becoming increasingly evident that Hong Kong will be given
the opportunity to provide a tangible input into the drafting of the Basic
Law, rather than having the document imposed upon it in a one-sided
fashion. To the extent that the Basic Law will serve as a legal framework
for the territory, the role of the Standing Committee of the NPC in shaping this framework can be defined in "duopolistic," instead of "monopolistic" terms.
The relationship between the Basic Law and municipal legislation is
another domain in which a more sanguine outlook is warranted. Arguably,
the Basic Law could merely replace the existing Letters Patent and the
local courts will retain their formal power to declare laws as ultra vires to
the supreme constitutional documents.
The third point raised by Chiu is the consequence of misreading the
Chinese Constitution. Given the restricted meaning accorded to "autonomous regions" under Chapter 3, Section VI of the Constitution, it should
not be seen as applying to special administrative regions such as Hong
Kong. As the Chinese Law on Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationalities confirms, "autonomous regions" are designed to enjoy less autonomy
57
than the special administrative category.
A similar observation may be made with respect to the putative constitutional power of the State Council to review measures taken by "local
organs of state administration." Local organs are dealt with under special
provisions of the Chinese Constitution (Chapter 3, Section V), which
seem not to encompass the special administrative region phenomenon. It
may also be added that any State Council intervention in the internal
affairs of Hong Kong could be construed as an infringement of the Sino-

56. According to a resolution on Strengthening the Work on Statutory Interpretation
adopted by the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's congress at the 19th
Meeting of the Standing Committee on June 10, 1981, the following bodies are authorized to
interpret the laws, in addition to the NPC's Standing Committee: the Supreme People's
Court (to provide explanations on questions relating to the concrete application of the law
in the courts' adjudicatory work); the Supreme People's Procuratorate (to provide explanations on questions relating to the concrete application of laws in procuratorial work); the
State Council (to provide explanations on questions relating to the concrete application of
laws which are not within adjudicatory or procuratorial work); the Provincial People's Congresses (to interpret and clarify or supplement local regulations made by them); and the
Provincial Peoples Government (to provide explanations on questions relating to the concrete application of local regulations). CouEaCTiON OF LAWS (1981) (translated from Chinese
by Albert Chen).
57. The Law on the Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationalities was adopted in the
Second Session of the Sixth National People's Congress on May 23, 1984. See Chen, Further
Aspects of the Autonomy of Hong Kong Under the PRC Constitution, 14 HONG KONG L. J.
341, 345-7 (1984).
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British Joint Declaration and presumably the Basic Law.
Chiu's final point is perhaps the most valid from a procedural standpoint. It is clear that, unlike states in a federal country, Hong Kong
would not be able to freely elect its Chief Executive. Yet, the formal arrangement envisaged under the terms of the Sino-British Joint Declaration provides the Central People's Government with a weaker control
mechanism than Chiu implies. Specifically, it provides for a veto power
rather than the direct positive power of appointment.
In the final analysis, Hong Kong's future as a separate entity hinges
on the willingness and ability of the PRC to treat it as such and, to a
lesser degree, on its own willingness and ability to contribute towards this
goal. As stated previously, China is not inclined to allow legal constraints
to impede its policies and neither the Sino-British Joint Declaration nor
the Basic Law should be deemed as the principal variables likely to determine the extent of local autonomy. Needless to say, the success of the
"one country, two systems" formula also depends on the recognition and
support of third parties.
B.

The Role of the PRC

Of these imponderable factors, Chinese willingness to grant Hong
Kong a high measure of autonomy is the most difficult to analyze. It is
not easy to draw inferences about attitudes prevailing within the PRC's
hermetically closed system of policy-making and, to compound matters,
one is often left with the impression that this rather chaotic system is
inherently incapable of formulating coherent long-term policies.58 The
constant shifts in policy and the dialectical ambivalence of the statements
accompanying them, belie the claims that firm societal steering and control are a feature of post-Mao decision-making in China.
Short-term intentions, nonetheless, are open to informed speculation.
It appears that the PRC is contemplating a more limited form of delegation of power than the most favourable reading of the Sino-British Joint
Declaration would suggest. The type of autonomy envisaged could be best
described as "controlled" or "guided autonomy", which is a configuration
entailing a subtle command relationship between the Beijing center and
the Hong Kong periphery.
Chinese intentions in this respect rest on a number of assumptions
which are presently valid, but may, of course, prove invalid through the
course of time. The PRC is assuming that the form of authoritarian control, as exercised by the colonial government, can be substituted by another without unduly affecting the prosperity and stability of the territory (a goal to which the PRC is committed to for reasons of selfinterest).,9 Still, the Chinese have not completely realized that the au-

58. Until 1972, the only published legislative texts available outside of the PRC were in
1966. Dicks, supra note 39, at 152.
59. Hong Kong provides, regularly, about one-third of China's hard currency earnings
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thoritarianism practiced by the colonial government is coupled with a
wide array of freedoms which underpin prosperity and stability. These
freedoms, which give economic agents the kind of extensive choices that
are conducive to utility maximizing behavior, are apparently an anathema
to the PRC.
The Chinese authorities, who are increasingly inclined to learn from
experience, 0 may become aware of the tradeoff between rigid control,
prosperity and stability. Under such circumstances, they might be willing
to moderate the strong emphasis on control and bring the intentions attributed to them more in line with local expectations of prosperity and
stability. Sensitivity towards the interests of third parties, particularly
those of the United States and Japan, could have a similarly beneficial
effect.61
The PRC may also prove reasonably sympathetic to Hong Kong's aspirations so long as the Taiwan issue remains unresolved. Until now, the
Nationalist dominated island has flatly rejected all Chinese overtures for
reunification, and the PRC is militarily too weak to impose its will by
force in the foreseeable future. While China has not relaxed its iron grip
over "autonomous" Tibet, 2 it may in the future display a more accommodating attitude towards Hong Kong with a view to signalling unequivocally to Taiwan that reunification need not adversely affect the latter's
freedoms and way of life.
Greater willingness, however, on the part of the PRC to tolerate an
autonomous Hong Kong may not be matched by its ability to achieve this
in practice. The limitations of the central decision-making apparatus in
China lie in deficient policy implementation, as well as inadequate policy
formulation. The commands emanating from Beijing are often distorted
in the process of top-down communication. 3 The temptation to gain control over Hong Kong, and the enormous personal benefits which may be
derived therefrom, could motivate cadres assigned to the territory to
tighten the grip over the local polity, irrespective of the original intentions of Beijing. The wide cultural gap between these cadres and the territory's strategic elites may further exacerbate the situation by creating
mistrust, tension and conflict.
Indeed, the potential for conflict extends beyond the territorial confines of Hong Kong. Given the disparity in the standard of living and

and serves as its offshore financial and information center. Jao, Hong Kong's Role in Financing China's Modernization, in CHINA AND HONG KONG: THE ECONOMIC NExus 1 (A.
Youngston ed. 1983).
60. See, e.g., POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN THE POST-MAO ERA (D. Lampton ed. 1986).
61. O'Leary, China's Foreign Relations in CHINA SINCE THE "GANG OF FOUR" 231-274
(B. Brugger ed. 1980); CHINA'S ECONOMIC REFORMS (Lin Wei & A. Chao eds. 1982); MODERNIZING CHINA (A. Barnett & R. Clough eds. 1986).
62. See, e.g., S. CLOUD, AUrrONooM TmEr (1983).
63. See, e.g., Lampton, supra note 60.
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values between the PRC and its capitalist enclave," ill will might develop
and undermine the vision of autonomy reflected in the Sino-British Joint
Declaration. Factions in the Communist Party which are not well disposed towards the "one country, two systems" formula and the overall
modernization drive in China could exert a particularly disruptive influence in this respect.6 5
On the positive side, however, it should be noted that a continuing
commitment on the part of the PRC to rapid economic growth through
the liberalization of the economy6 6 might work to the advantage of an
autonomous Hong Kong. A liberalized economy generally breeds decentralization and the territory could be in a better position to avoid rigid
central controls in a decentralized environment consisting of multiple
control points. The question, of course, is whether China is likely to have
progressed far enough, if at all, along the liberalization/decentralization
path by 1997.
The substantial developmental gap between Hong Kong and the
PRC, while problematic in most respects, also has a positive dimension.
The fragile policy-making machinery in China could come to rely partly
on its sophisticated Hong Kong counterpart for a wide range of informational inputs. Since information is an important source of power, this potential asymmetry of the relationship should marginally widen the scope
of maneuvers available to local decision-makers.
C.

The Role of Hong Kong

The balance of the "one country, two systems" formula for autonomy
hinges on the willingness and ability of Hong Kong to play its part in the
scheme envisaged, as well as PRC cooperation. Unlike many other former
colonies, the territory is endowed with a remarkable wealth of talent and
abundant economic resources. Yet, questions arise about the long-term
commitment of both the human capital and financial assets to Hong
Kong, and the determination of the territory to administer itself effectively in the face of potential Chinese heavy-handedness.
Empirical evidence on this subject is scarce, but there are indications
that Hong Kong's economic elites and professional classes have little de64. According to studies by the World Bank, China's nominal income per capita is only
one-thirteenth that of Hong Kong, and the average annual growth rate of Hong Kong's GDP
per capita is nearly twice that of China. For documentation and analysis of the economic
gap between Hong Kong and China, see Jao, Hong Kong's Economic Prospects After the
Sino-British Agreement: A Preliminary Assessment 51-2 (April 24-27, 1985)(unpublished
manuscript presented to the Annual Meeting of the Western Social Science Association).
65. See, e.g., L. PE, THE DYNAmcs OF CHINESE POLMCS (1981).
66. See generally, the following articles in Vol. 10 of CHINA Q. (Dec. 1984): Yeh,
Macroeconomic Changes in the Chinese Economy During the Readjustment, at 691; Field,
Changes in Chinese Industry Since 1978, at 742; Walker, Chinese Agriculture during the
Period of Readjustment 1978-83, at 783; Kueh & Howe, China's International Trade;
Lardy, Consumption and Living Standards in China, 1978-83, at 849.
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sire to live under communist sovereignty and are actively exploring the
"exit" option. 7 While the territory could eventually generate new valuable human and financial resources, the short and medium-term effects of
large-scale migration will manifest itself in a diminished capacity for selfgovernment and less incentive for the PRC to allow substantive
autonomy.
Hong Kong is now in a process of developing its representative institutions.68 These institutions, if allowed to mature, could theoretically
serve as a barrier to excessive Chinese intervention, although fears have
been expressed that they might give rise to polarization of the community, and hence immobilism. The extent to which the PRC leadership,
with its proclivity towards "backdoor politics," would be inclined to encourage the partial democratization of Hong Kong is impossible to assess
accurately.6 9 However, one cannot dismiss the possibility of a Chinese attempt at far-reaching infiltration and domination. A significant number
of influential PRC decision-makers still cling to the view that direct controls are preferable to indirect ones, in spite of evidence that the latter
are more effective.7" A decision to implement direct control over Hong
Kong might sap the territory's vitality, and seriously detract from its willingness and ability to govern itself.
D.

The Role of Third Parties

The position to be adopted by third parties is another significant factor in assessing the prospects of an autonomous Hong Kong. The SinoBritish Joint Declaration has been received with much rhetorical approval from members of the international community. Eventually, however, self-interest might prevail and support for the thriving economic entity from actual and potential competitors could wane and turn into open
obstruction. The rising tide of protectionism is a particularly
ominous de71
velopment on the horizon of the Hong Kong SAR.

67. I. Scott, The Sino British Agreement and Political Power in Hong Kong (Apr. 19,
1985)(unpublished manuscript presented to the workshop on The Future of Hong Kong,
University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre on Modern East Asia).
68. See Green Paper: The Further Development of Representative Government in
Hong Kong (July 1985); White Paper: The Further Development of Government in Hong
Kong (Nov. 1984) The reforms basically aim at developing a quasi-parlimentary democracy
based largely on indirect elections. For a thorough analysis and critique of the changes in

Hong Kong's political and administrative structure, see Siu-KAI

LAU, POLITICAL REFORM AND

(1984).
69. See Sui-KAI LAU, supra note 68; G. Hicks, Hong Kong on the Event of Communist
Rule 19-26 (April 24-27, 1985)(unpublished manuscript presented at the Annual Meeting of
the Western Social Science Association); Walden, Hong Kong Chases a Democratic Mirage,
Asian Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1985, at 6.
70. See Salinger, supra note 14, at 1238.
71. Thus, in view of the fact that textile and clothing industries account for about 41
percent of Hong Kong's total industrial workforce, and 40 percent of its total domestic exports, any attempt by an importing country to abolish Hong Kong's independent quota (and
merge it withthat of China's) would have serious repercussions and could well be disasPOLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN HONG KONG: DILEMMAS AND CHOICES
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Nevertheless, the attitude of third parties toward the Territory could
have a positive influence on the PRC. If China is genuinely committed to
maintaining Hong Kong's prosperity and stability, it must respect its status as a separate economic entity, otherwise international recognition
might be withheld.7 2 The territory's external predicament can thus be
viewed both as a threat to its envisaged independence and as a constraining factor upon the PRC.
From a broad legal standpoint, changing notions of sovereignty
should facilitate the recognition of Hong Kong's status as an international
legal person by the international community. Given the fact that states
now tend to admit non-state actors, such as international organizations
and multinational corporations, into the international legal system, legitimate expectations have been created for extending a similar recognition
to autonomous regions which enjoy a particularly high degree of international exposure. It is possible to draw analogies here with other configurations recognized in international law," such as federal states (e.g., Basque
country, Catalonia, Eritrea, Greenland, United Arab Emirates), internationalized territories and territories of particular international concern
(e.g., the Free City of Danzig, the Free Territory of Trieste, the International Settlement of Shanghai, the Memel territory), associated states
(e.g., Cook Islands, Niu, Puerto Rico, Toklau) and "unincorporated territories" (e.g., Guam, Netherlands Antilles, U.S. Virgin Islands). An analysis of these configurations suggests that the degree of international legal
personality accorded is the function of three factors: control over (national) defense, control over foreign relations and competence to enter
into international agreements, with or without the consent of the central/
sovereign government.74 The greater the freedom exercised in the above
domains, the more likely is the recognition of a dependent territory as a
discrete entity with a measure of international legal personality.
While the conduct of foreign affairs remains the most conspicuous
symbol of sovereign power, the conduct of economic exchanges with other
national entities, for all practical purposes, acquired greater significance.7 5
On this basis, the considerable formal power to be retained under the
Sino-British Joint Declaration by the Hong Kong SAR in relation to
"transnational or external affairs" (as distinct from "foreign affairs"
which encompass basically national security and territorial integrity)
should be granted due international recognition.7 6 The Sino-British agree-

terous if such a tactic was widely followed. See Kayser Sung, Trading On from 1997, with
Special Reference to Hong Kong's Textile Agreements, in STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 30524.
72. See Jao, Hong Kong's Economic Prospects, in STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 49.
73. See generally, Hanum & Lillich, The Concept of Autonomy in InternationalLaw,
in MODELS OF AUTONOMY 215 (Y. Dinstein ed. 1981)[hereinafter cited as AUTomoNY].
74. Id. at 232-6.
75. See generally id.
76. This distinction has been raised and developed by Yiu Chu Liu in a paper on the
Scope of Foreign and Defense Affairs, presented to the Future of Hong Kong Study Group
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ment stipulates that "the Hong Kong SAR may on its own maintain and
develop economic and trade relations with all states and regions.""' Of
particular importance are the provisions granting to Hong Kong the authority to determine its own fiscal policy, manage its financial resources
and monetary system, regulate international travel and commerce, emigration and immigration, exercise control over importation of foreign
goods and flow of capital, maintain and develop cultural relations, and
conclude relevant agreements with states, regions and international organizations. Thus, it appears that under the agreement China, in effect, retains a residual power which is "nothing more than that part of the SAR's
transnational or external relations which cannot be conducted by the
SAR in the name of 'Hong Kong, China' due to the SAR not being a
nation-state." 78
From a legal standpoint the residual power determined through the
the text of the agreement cannot be the exclusive determinant of the balance of power between the central and local authorities. 79 This point finds
judicial expression through the Permanent Court of International Justice
in the Interpretationof the Statute of Memel Case8" and the Lighthouse
in Crete and Samos Case.81 As may be inferred from both judgments,
notwithstanding any autonomy arrangement and regardless of the extent
of power transferred, sovereignty of the central government is not diminished and its residual power "may prove to be of tremendous importance
when the matter is put to the test." 2
The above observation should not detract from the local entity's
claim to recognition as an international legal person. Given the current
emphasis on the ability and effectiveness of the self-governing institutions,8 3 the Hong Kong SAR has a strong claim for recognition in this
respect. Obviously, its case could gain widespread support from a Chinese
declaration to that effect in the UN. Such a step seems, however, unlikely
at this juncture since the PRC has resisted all along any attempt to internationalize the issue of Hong Kong. Hong Kong's claim for autonomy can
be enhanced by third parties' attitude. At present, it appears that most
other parties would be prepared to contribute to the maintenance of
Hong Kong's unique status as an autonomous entity. Yet, as indicated,
their position may undergo a radical change in the future. This is why
prompt action by Hong Kong in this matter is essential. By securing early
recognition of the territory's international personality by other relevant

on May 29, 1985.
77. The Draft Agreement, art. 3(10), supra note 1, at 1372.
78. Liu, supra note 76.
79. Dinstein, Autonomy, in AUTONOMY, supra note 73, at 291, 296.
80. Interpretation of the Statute of Memel Territory (Merits), 1932 P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B,
no. 49, at 35 (Hudson ed. 1938).
81. Lighthouse in Crete and Samos, 1937 P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, no. 71, at 243 (Hudson ed.
1943).
82. Dinstein, supra note 79, at 300.
83. Hannum & Lillich, supra note 73, at 250-1.
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external actors, Hong Kong could, with the assistance of the UK, render
subsequent reversals less likely.
V.
A.

THE ISSUE OF TREATIES

The PRC Concept of Treaties

Treaties are the major instruments for facilitating interactions within
the international legal system. They are also an important source of international law, creating norms of international law and establishing obligations and rights of contracting parties. By concluding a treaty, the contracting parties apply the most significant norm of customary
international law, 4 namely the rule of pacta sunt servanda (treaties must
be observed), which in fact is the underlying rationale of the binding
quality of treaty obligations.
It is interesting to note that this principle is hailed by the PRC
which, like other communist countries, deems treaties as the primary
source of international law. 5 It should be observed, however, that China
only regards "just" or "equal" treaties as legitimate sources of international law. Generally, the PRC considers as "unequal" all treaties imposed on China in the 19th and early 20th centuries (i.e., those concerning consular jurisdiction, unilateral most-favored nation treatment,
restrictive tariff regulations, territorial cessions or leases, including the
treaties relating to Hong Kong).86 While the treaties alluded to involved
many instances of extreme inequality, both in terms of the bargaining
power of the parties and the benefits and burdens created by the treaties
themselves, other treaties exist which are to all appearances acceptable to
the PRC. Nevertheless, such treaties undertaken by the parties cannot be
described as truly "equal" and consequently, the meaning of "unequal
8 7
treaty" remains obscure.
Students of Chinese politics have contended that "political considerations, apparently more frequently than legal ones, motivate the PRC in
the application of the [unequal treaty] concept" and that the Chinese
have conveniently constructed a legal machinery "in order to extricate
themselves from difficult or unmitigable situations." 8 With reference to
these critical comments, Scott remarks that "this does nothing to set the
PRC apart from other states which may be champions of the Western

84. The rule is restated in article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which provides that "every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and
must be performed by them in good faith." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May
23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969)[hereinafter cited as 1969
Vienna Convention].
85. For a discussion and further references, see G. ScoTT, supra note 12, at 59-61.
86. HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF TREATIES 60-71
(1972). See also W.L. TUNG, CHINA AND FOREIGN POWERS: THE IMPACT OF AND REACTION TO
UNEQUAL TREATIES (1970).
87. G. SCOTT, supra note 12, at 92-6.
88. Id. at 96-7.
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system of international law" 89 and that Western states also often use international law merely to cloak otherwise questionable acts in a mantle of
legality. Scott identifies what he perceives to be a "politically parallel
concept in Western international law," namely, rebus sic stantibus. This
concept, which is incorporated in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties,9" allows termination of or withdrawal from a treaty where
there has been a "fundamental change of circumstances." Scott maintains
that the rebus sic stantibus clause often becomes the basis for politically
motivated change in the status quo.
The unequal treaty concept, while enjoying support among third
world countries, cannot be said to have gained general acceptance as a
rule of international law. The Law of Treaties,"1 to which China has not
acceded, goes no further than to stipulate that a treaty shall be void if
procured by force contrary to the principles of international law embodied in the UN Charter.92 There is no reference to economic inequality in
bargaining power, which the PRC appears to include in its doctrine of
unequal treaties.9 Nor are the equality or inequality of obligations assumed by the parties taken into account in regulating treaties. Attention
should be drawn, to the non-binding Declaration on the Prohibition of
Military, Political or Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties,
adopted by the Vienna Treaty Conference, 94 which "solemnly condemns
the threat or use of pressure in any form, whether military, political, or
economic by any state in order to coerce another state to perform any act
relating to the conclusion of a treaty in violation of the principles of the
sovereign equality of states and the freedom of consent."
The divergence between Western and Chinese views on "unequal
treaties" has clearly manifested itself with regard to Hong Kong. While
the PRC deems the treaties relating to the acquisition of Hong Kong as
unequal and hence null and void, 95 the UK has asserted that the doctrine
amounts to no more than a political principle which may justify a moral
condemnation of historical events but has no binding legal effect.96 In any
event, the debate concerning the relative strength of the respective claims
by the two sides must now be relegated to the academic realm. The more
pertinent question is whether the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the
future of Hong Kong constitutes a valid international treaty which is
binding on the contracting parties. This question has attracted considerable attention on the part of general commentators, without the emergence

89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 97.
1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 84.
Id.
U.N. CHARTER art. 52.

93.

HUNGDAH CHIU,

supra note 86.

94. The declaration is annexed to the Final Act of the United Nations Conference on
the Law of Treaties. 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 84, at 733.
95. See P. WESLEY-SMITH, UNEQUAL TREATY 1898-1997: CHINA, GREAT BRITAIN AND
HONG KONG'S NEw TERRITORIES (1980).
96. See Dicks, supra note 16, at 434-5.
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of a clear consensus.
B.

The Validity of the Joint Declaration

On balance, the position held that the agreement is a valid international treaty has greater merit, insofar as formal aspects of treaty making
are concerned. This conclusion rests on the fact that the Joint Declaration falls within the established definition of an international treaty as
incorporated in Article 2 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. This definition equates a treaty with "an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
'97
related instruments and whatever its particular designation.
Since the PRC is not a party to the 1969 Vienna Convention, it is
important to emphasize that the above definition codifies, to a large extent, customary international law with respect to treaties.98 Chinese nonaccession to the Convention is merely a "technicality" which should have
no direct bearing on the status of the agreement as an international
treaty.
Given the relevance of the definition, the designation of "Joint Declaration" rather than "treaty," does not detract from its validity as an
instrument compatible with the Convention criteria. As elaborated by
many international authorities, 99 the designation of a treaty is of no great
significance (although it may indicate certain procedural differences or
degrees of formality). A treaty may thus be labelled "protocol," "arrangement," "statute," "declaration," "final act," "general act," etc. and enjoy
equal international legal validity.
The fact that the Joint Declaration consists of several documents' 0
does not dilute its force as a binding international treaty. As the definition states, the number of documents is not of any relevance. Furthermore, the agreement itself stipulates that both the Joint 'Declaration and

97. 1969 Vienna Convention, art. 2(a), supra note 84, at 680-1.
98. See Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J.

INT'L L. 495 (1970);
Sinclair, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 19 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 47 (1970). It is

clear that the Convention's provisions constitute presumptive evidence of general international law rules. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf [Germany v. Denmark and The
Netherlands], 1969 I.C.J. 3, 13; and Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 3, 18. In
respect to rules concerning the termination of treaties, for example, it was confirmed by the
International Court of Justice that they "may in many respects be considered as a codification of existing customary law on the subject." Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 47 (advisory op.).
99. See, e.g., The International Law Commision's Commentary, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 188.
100. The Draft Agreement, supra note 1, contains the Joint Declaration, three annexes
and one exchange memoranda. It also includes a lengthy introduction on the British Government's position and other explanatory notes.
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In addition, the Sino-British Joint Declaration is the product of a
process throughout which the contracting parties have meticulously followed the established practices regarding treaty-making. These include
the accreditation of persons who conducted the negotiations, negotiations
and adoption of the text (26 September, 1984), authentication, signature
and exchange of instruments (19 December, 1984), ratification, entry into
force (27 May, 1985) and, finally, registration with the United Nations in
accordance with Article 102 of the UN Charter (13 June, 1985).
C.

The Implementation of the Treaty

It is not possible, at the present juncture, to assess the parties' exact
intentions with respect to the final phase of the treaty-making process,
namely, application and enforcement. This normally entails some form of
incorporation of the treaty provisions into the domestic law of the parties
and actual application of the provisions along with implementation of the
administrative arrangements agreed upon. Administrative arrangements,
in the context of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, include the establishment of the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group and the Land Commission,
the details of which are provided in Annexes II and III of the Agreement.
The application of a treaty raises the wider issue of the position of
treaties in domestic law and, at a higher plane, that of the relationship
between international law and municipal legislation. The British position
in this regard mirrors the "transformation," as distinct from "incorporation," theory whereby international agreements are transformed into domestic law by means of appropriate constitutional law.10 2 According to
this theory, treaties cannot operate of themselves within the state but
require the passage of enabling statutes. The Crown in the UK retains
the right to sign and ratify international agreements, yet is unable to legislate directly. Hence, before a treaty can become part of English law an
Act of Parliament is essential.103 In line with this approach, the Hong
Kong Act of 1985 was passed by Parliament, stating that "[a]s from 1st
July 1997 Her Majesty shall no longer have sovereignty or jurisdiction
over any part of Hong Kong" 1 " and included provisions on the three crucial matters of nationality, amendments to the laws of Hong Kong and

101. The Draft Agreement, art. 8, supra note 1, at 1372.
102. Mann, The Enforcement of Treaties by English Courts, 44 TRANSACTIONS GROTiUS
Soc'y 29 (1958-59). See generally A.D. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES (1961).
103. There are three exceptions to this practice. For example, treaties relating to the
conduct of war or to cession of territory do not need an intervening act of legislation before
they can be made binding upon the citizens of the country. By the same token, relatively
unimportant administrative agreements which do not require ratification also apply automatically, provided of course, they do not purport to alter municipal law. Generally, however, where the rights and duties of British subjects are affected, an Act of Parliament is
necessary to render the provisions fo the particular treaty operative within the United Kingdom. Mann, supra note 102.
104. Hong Kong Act, ch. 15, 1985.
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the granting of diplomatic privileges to Chinese members of the Joint Li1 5
aison Group. 0
The PRC doctrine on the relationship between international and domestic law is rather ambiguous. The Chinese Constitution (1982) furnishes no guidelines in this respect and Chinese writers seldom address
this question. An outside expert has expressed the view that in order to
implement a treaty in the municipal law of the PRC, laws or decrees need
to be enacted.' 0 6 As a matter of practice, some treaties are indeed included in China's official Collection of Laws and Regulations and presumably have the same legal status as other legislation incorporated in
the collection. Informal discussions with scholars specializing in PRC law
suggest, however, that the American model, which differentiates between
"self-executing" and "non self-executing" treaties,10 7 is more applicable in
China than the British "transformation" theory. Indeed, this would dovetail with the PRC's tendency to blur the distinction between law and
policy.
The PRC has undertaken the incorporation of the Sino-British Joint
Declaration into a "Basic Law," which is to be drafted by the National
People's Congress.'0 " This document is intended to serve as the constitution of the Hong Kong SAR for a fifty year period following the transfer
of sovereignty. 09 The Basic Law will be regarded as the supreme legal
instrument in the territory, providing both an overall yardstick for evaluating the validity of local legislation and establishing the institutional
framework for an autonomous Hong Kong.
There appears to be little doubt that China will take the necessary
formal steps to implement the Joint Declaration." The PRC's reasonably good record of compliance with treaties lends support to this contention. As Lee has observed, China has been particularly careful in adhering
to the provisions and meeting the obligations of its trade agreements."'
He acknowledges that negotiations with Beijing are not an easy matter,
but asserts that once an unambiguous agreement is reached, compliance
2
normally follows."1

105. Id.
106. HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 87, at 7.
107. While the former are able to operate automatically within the domestic sphere
without the need for any municipal legislation, the latter require enabling acts before they
can function inside the country and within the American courts. The distinction is based on
the political content of the treaties, such as where a political issue is involved the treaty is
likely to be treated as non self-executing and vice versa.
108. The Draft Agreement, art. 3, para. 12, supra note 1, at 1372.
109. Id.
110. The Joint Liaison Group and the Land Commission were set up on May 27, 1985
with the respective aims of ensuring the smooth transfer of sovereignty and handling of
related land questions. A Basic Law Drafting Committee was established on June 18, i985.
111. L. LEE, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: A STUDY OF COMPLIANCE 119
(1969).
112. Id.
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In support of the above claim, Lee postulates that the Confucian emphasis on ch'eng (sincerity) and hsin (trustworthiness) seems to have
been extended from interpersonal to interstate relations and that this
may account for the generally satisfactory record of both the PRC and
Nationalist China in complying with treaty commitments.113 In the case
of the PRC, this compliance is not entirely consistent with the domestic
law practice of elevating 1i over fa. 1 4 One possible explanation for the
inconsistency is that the good external records reflects the weakness of
the PRC as an actor in the international arena, particularly vis-a-vis the
superpowers. " Another reason may lie in the Chinese sensitivity to their
external image and the resultant tendency to differentiate between international behavior and domestic application. 1 '
The formal implementation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration
does not appear to pose any serious problems in relation to the viability
of the arrangements envisaged for Hong Kong. However, a more critical
issue is that of interpretation. Given the wide disparities between the notions of law prevailing on both sides, the agreement is open to conflicting
interpretations. No procedure for solving interpretation disputes is provided under the Joint Declaration and this omission may be a source of
considerable difficulties in view of the PRC's reluctance to submit to
third party adjudication in the settlement of international disputes and
its non-acceptence of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
11 7
Court of Justice.
VI.

THE ISSUE OF STATE SUCCESSION

The change of sovereignty over Hong Kong gives rise to a host of
"succession" questions. Even though China contends that no transfer of
sovereignty is to take place, since it is to "resume" the exercise of sovereignty,"1 8 the situation effectively falls within the definition of "state succession.'' " 9 Under this definition, the replacement of one state by another
in the responsibility for the international relations of a territory is tantamount to state succession and, as such, subject to relevant international
legal regulation. The explanatory notes to the Annexes of the Sino-British
Joint Declaration and to the Associated Exchange of Memoranda explic120
itly refer to the imminent changes in the territory in equivalent terms.
Specifically, it is stated therein that "foreign and defense affairs which
are now the overall responsibility of Her Majesty's Government. . . will

113. Id.
114. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
115. L. LEE, supra note 111, at 129.
116. See generally CHINA AND THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY (J. Hsiung & S. Kim eds. 1980).
117. HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 49, at 15.
118. See supra note 20-24 and accompanying text.
119. 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, art. 2,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 80/31/Corr. 2, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1488 (1978)[hereinafter cited as
Convention on Succession].
120. The Draft Agreement, supra note 1, at 1382-87.
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with effect from 1 July 1997 become the overall responsibility of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China."''
Though the specific rules which govern state succession are not as
unequivocal, some underlying principles may be discerned from state
practice, judicial authorities and doctrine. Moreover, codified authority is
present in the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect
Succession of States in
of Treaties'"2 and the 1983 Vienna Convention on
22
Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts.
Whether any rights or obligations should pass upon external changes
of sovereignty is theoretically determined by considerations of justice,
reasonableness, equity and the interests of the international community.
As Starke emphasizes, however, state practice in this domain is "unsettled and full of inconsistencies" and these have not been resolved in the
recent conventions on succession referred to above. 24 Consequently,
states tend to deal expressly with possible succession questions within the
context of the treaty pertaining to the transfer of sovereignty. Any subsequent problems are reviewed in light of the intentions of the parties, relevant laws, treaties, declarations and other arrangements accompanying
the change of sovereignty.
25
The position of newly independent states is quite straightforward.
The emphasis here is on a modernized version of the "clean slate" theory.' As evidenced in the Vienna Conventions on Succession, and the
discussions leading up to their conclusion, little has been allowed to derogate from the right of newly independent sovereign states to decide which
bilateral and multilateral treaties will remain in force.' 2 7 At the same
time, the basic human desire for stability, reflected in the practice of concluding devolution agreements12 s and more recently the growing number
of unilateral declarations, 129 has prompted newly independent states to
retain many of the treaties in force.
The predicament of Hong Kong in this regard is unique, because of

Id. para. 4, at 1382.
Convention on Succession, supra note 119.
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 117/14 (April 7, 1985), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 306 (1983).
See J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 313 (9th ed. 1984).
See generally OKON UDOKANG, SUCCESSION OF NEW STATES TO INTERNATIONAL
TREATIES (1972).
126. CHEN, STATE SUCCESSION RELATING TO UNEQUAL TREATIES 15 (1974).
127. Convention on Succession, supra note 119.
128. Devolution agreements provide for the "assignment" or "devolution" upon a successor state, the treaty rights and obligations of the predecessor state. These agreements
were used widely by many former British terrritories in order to secure succession to treaties. Lawford, The Practice Concerning Treaty Succession in the Commonwealth, 1967
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 3.

129. Unilateral Declarations, commonly utilized by Central and East African ex-British
territories, generally provided that the treaty relationship will be maintained by the successor states for a limited period during which it will decide which treaties it wishes to retain
indefinitely and which to discontinue.
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the large measure of autonomy which it enjoys. The continuation of external ties, and hence international agreements, is the key to the territory's prosperity including the maintenance of its status as the third most
important financial center in the world. The PRC would presumably not
acquiesce to Hong Kong signing international agreements without authority or generally acting as if it were an independent sovereign state. Thus,
the objective, as expressed by a local government official, is to achieve
"maximum freedom of action consistent with China's international responsibility for Hong Kong."130 The problem is compounded by the fact
that the PRC is not a party to many of the international agreements presently applicable to the territory. Nor is China a member of many international conferences and organizations of which Hong Kong is currently a
member, either in its own right or as an adjunct of the British delegation
(when meetings are confined to sovereign states alone).
The Sino-British Joint Declaration has provided a formal mechanism
for consolidating the territory's external links. Specifically, international
agreements which are implemented in Hong Kong may remain with the
Hong Kong SAR, even if China is not a party. 31 One such contingency
expressly covered in the agreement is the continued application to the
SAR of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, not3 2
withstanding that the PRC is a signatory to neither."
On the other hand,
under the Joint Declaration, international agreements to which China is a
party may be applied to the territory, if so decided by the Central People's Government, in accordance with circumstances and needs of the
SAR Government and after seeking the latter's views.
The technical details of treaty succession will have to be worked out
by the Sino-British Liaison Group. The Group faces a daunting task,
given the multitude of multilateral and bilateral treaties applicable to
Hong Kong, and the fact that the consent of third parties must be secured. Several strategies have been considered by Hong Kong officials to
overcome this problem.' 3
One strategy is to guarantee the status of a separate customs territory to the SAR and ensure its autonomous participation in international
trade agreements such as GATT'" and MFA.' 35 Article XXVI 5(c) of the
GATT stipulates that a territory which possesses "autonomy in the conduct of external commercial relations . . . shall, upon sponsorship

130. Quoted in Tsang, Colossal Task of JLG to Forge a Sound Future, South China
Morning Post, May 23, 1985, at 2.
131. The Draft Agreement, annex I, § XI, supra note 1, at 1376-77.
132. Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
133. See Tsang, JLG Looks Set for a Long, Hard Slog, South China Morning Post,
May 24, 1985, at 2.
134. GATT, supra note 4.
135. MFA, supra note 5.
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through a declaration by the responsible contracting party establishing
'
[the fact of its autonomy], be deemed to be a contracting party."136
Such
a configuration should, under the optimistic assumption of third parties'
future cooperation, serve as a model and precedent for solving similar
issues.
A more prudent course of action would entail the scrutiny
of each
individual treaty and the formulation of an ad hoc solution in the light of
its specific circumstances. Such an approach may be dictated by the myriad of configurations by which Hong Kong, the UK and the PRC participated in various agreements, and the conservative attitude to problemsolving of Britain and China, although such a narrow strategy may prove
counterproductive and inefficient in the long run.
The most undesirable scenario is modeled on the Taiwan arrangement, whereby international obligations, commercial and others, would be
undertaken and fulfilled by the territory without its being externally recognized as an autonomous entity. Needless to say, explicit rather than
implicit recognition is essential if Hong Kong is to continue functioning
as a major international financial center.
Little is known about feasible scenarios that the PRC has constructed for its capitalist enclave. The success of the strategies contemplated by the Hong Kong Government hinges primarily on Chinese attitudes and behavior.13 7 The PRC enjoys greater leverage in its relations
with other actors in the international arena, but it remains to be seen
whether it would be willing and able to reconcile the conflicting domestic
pressures and exert influence on behalf of autonomous Hong Kong in order to render the succession of treaties as smooth as possible.
Another facet of the "state succession" issue is the succession of acquired private rights. International law requires that such rights be
respected by the successor state."'8 As held by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the well-known case of the German Settlers,"9
"Private rights acquired under existing law do not cease on a change of
sovereignty." "It can hardly be maintained," declared the court, that "although the law survives, private rights acquired under it have perished."'' ° The acquired rights rule only means that change of sovereignty
has no effect on private rights; it is not a rule for the perpetual maintenance of these rights. By implication, after the transfer of sovereignty,
the successor state may modify or even expropriate private property
14
rights. '

136. GATT, art XXVI 5(c), supra note 4.
137. See supra Part IV(B) for a more elaborate discussion of the Chinese role.
138. Settlers of German Origin in the Territory Ceded by Germany to Poland (Ger. v.
Pol.), 1923 P.C.I.J. ser. B, No. 6.
139. Id. at 36.
140. This principle was also confirmed in Certain German Interests in Polish Upper
Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 7.
141. Clearly, if as a result of a change of sovereignty the possessor has acquired the
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Insofar as the position of Hong Kong is concerned, the Sino-British
Joint Declaration stipulates that private property will be protected by
law, 42 that the laws which are currently in force in Hong Kong will remain fundamentally unchanged 4" and that all rights in relation to pre1997 leases of land extending beyond 1997 "shall continue to be recognized and protected under the law of the Hong Kong SAR."11 4 Yet, as
noted above, the continuation of such rights is subject to any alterations
made to the former municipal law by the Central Government of the
PRC. Thus, as observed by Wesley-Smith, if Annex III concerning "Land
Leases," is not incorporated into the Basic Law of the SAR or in any
other legislation, "a lessee of land who is aggrieved by government action
after 1997 will have no remedy in the courts." 1" 5 The obligations announced in the Joint Declaration would then be "obligations which want
1 46
the vinculum juris, although binding in moral equity and conscience.
The SAR government would be "bound in for conscientiae to make good,
but of which the performance is to be sought for by petition, memorial or
'1 4 7
remonstrance, not by action in a court of law.
It is hoped, therefore, that China would take the necessary steps to
convert the provisions of the Joint Declaration into effective domestic legal instruments. Indeed, the expectation is that the Basic Law might fill
the existing gap in this respect. However, doubts are likely to persist
about the PRC's willingness and ability to interpret the Basic Law in the
spirit of the Joint Declaration.
VII.
A.

THE ISSUE OF NATIONALITY

The Transfer of Nationality under InternationalLaw

International law accords states a high degree of discretion in the
conferment of nationality. The 1930 Hague Convention on Nationality
Laws states that "it is for each state to determine under its own law who
are its nationals" and that "any question as to whether a person possesses
the nationality of a particular state shall be determined in accordance

nationality of the successor state, the rule that his rights have survived is only relevant to
the extent to which domestic law protects them, for as a national he is at the mercy of the
legislative powers of the successor state. See Kaeckenbeeck, The Protection of Vested
Rights in InternationalLaw, 1936 BaIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 17. He states that: "a cession of
territory does not affect private rights is valid only as long as new legislation is not introduced which affects them . . . . [T]he introduction of such legislation is not prohibited by
international law, and is not in particular made by it dependent on payment of compensation." Id.
142. The Draft Agreement, annex I, § VI, para. 1, supra note 1, at 1374.
143. Id. annex I, § II, para. 1, at 1374.
144. Id. annex III, art. 1, at 1380.
145. P. Wesley-Smith, Act of State: Lord Diplock's Curious Inconsistency (unpublished
manuscript).
146. Id.
147. Id.
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with the laws of that state."'"" Nonetheless, there are some imposed limitations, such as the requirement that the nationality law of each state "be
recognized by other states so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality."""9 The Hague Convention, however,
does not specify the criteria to confer nationality that are recognized or
required by international law.
Furthermore, any such criteria must be inferred from customary
practice which has been limited to either or both of two major principles:
jus sanguinis (conferment of nationality by blood relation-descent) and
jus soli (conferment of nationality based on place of birth). It appears
that the so called "countries of emigration" tend to emphasize jus
sanguinis for the purpose of retaining the allegiance of descendents of
their nationals who have settled in various parts of the world, while
"countries of immigration" are inclined to emphasize the jus soli in order
to have the allegiance of persons born within their territories to alien parents. Traditionally, also, jus sanguinis is preferred by civil law countries
whereas the principle of jus soli, which is an outgrowth of the feudal system, is favored by common law countries. Presently, in most countries
one can find the two principles employed in varying combinations.'" s
Whichever of these two principles is relied upon, it is argued by McDougal, Lasswell and Chen that most of mankind has their nationality
thrust on them with little effective prospect for change (after all, individuals cannot choose their parents or their place of birth).15' Even though
consent is presently given greater emphasis in decisions concerning conferment of nationality after birth, involuntary naturalization is quite
common.
McDougal and his associates have made the controversial counterproposition that:
given the differential distribution of resources and opportunities for
value shaping and sharing about the globe, the instability and fragility
of the inherited organizations of territorial communities and the ever
increasing mobility of people and frequency of transnational interactions, every individual person should be free to effect a voluntary
change in his nationality and thus to identify with the political community of his own choice ....

As a matter of human rights every per-

15
son should be free to change his nationality. 2

148. 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, arts. 1 & 2, April 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89, reprinted in D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 555, 570 (3rd. ed. 1983).
149. Id.
150. Scott, Nationality: Jus Soli or Jus Sanguinis?, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 158 (1930).
151. M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & L. Chen, Nationality and Human Rights: The Protection of the Individual in External Arenas, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT
TO INTERNATIONAL IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 555, 570

eds. 1981).

152. Id. at 578.

(M. McDougal & W.M. Reisman
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Indeed, some recognition is accorded to this notion in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which proclaims that "no one shall be arbitrarily . . . denied the right to change his nationality."15 3

Of interest in the case of Hong Kong is the question of withdrawal of
nationality. 5 4 The common view among jurists is that in the absence of
treaty obligations states have an unlimited competence to withdraw nationality, though "general community expectations would today appear ' to
55
be moving toward restricting such allegedly 'unlimited' competence.'

Clearly, community policies in the field of human rights point to this
trend, including the policy of minimizing statelessness and the peremptory norm (jus cogens) of non-discrimination. " It is beyond doubt that
denationalization measures based on racial, ethnic, religious, or other re57
lated grounds are impermissible under contemporary international law.

While nationality is a matter for domestic law, it also involves concerns at the international level, particularly with regard to the question of
statelessness. The status of statelessness "entails a most severe and dramatic deprivation of the power of an individual . . . . The stateless person - who has been compared to a 'res nullius' - has no state to 'pro-

tect' him and lacks even the freedom of movement to find a state that is
willing to protect him."' 5' In other words, a stateless person has no avenue to act against a state which acts abusively towards him. Indeed, the
15
list of deprivations visited upon the stateless individual is very long.
Not surprisingly, the international community has sought to eliminate or reduce statelessness since World War I. The earliest effort was the
Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness signed on April 12,
1930, which was concerned with the avoidance of statelessness at birth.'eo
The wholesale denationalization of people during the Second World War
prompted international action in the form of Article 15 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights which stipulates that "[elveryone has
the right to a nationality" and "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of

153. 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, art. 15(2), U.N. Res. 217A (III), 3(1)

U.N. GAOR at 71, reprinted in , P. WEIss, NATIONALITY

AND STATFLESSNESS IN INrERNA-

264-9 (2d. ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Human Rights).
154. As we shall note later, the UK government in its memorandum attached to the
Sino-British Joint Declaration, has declared that all persons who on June 30, 1997 are British Dependent Territories Citizens (BDTCs) under the law in force in the UK will cease to
be BDTCs with effect from July 1, 1997.
155. McDougal, supra.note 151, at 569.
156. See Human Rights, supra note 153, at 125.
157. See P. WEiss, supra note 153 . After a study of state practice and judicial decisions on denationalization measures, he concluded that the right of a state to make rules
governing the loss of nationality is in principle unrestricted, although he nonetheless acknowledges the existence of a possible exception in the case of denationalization on the
grounds of race, etc. Id.
158. McDougal, supra note 151, at 605.
159. Id. at 605-7.
160. 179 L.T.S. 115, reprintedin 5 M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 364 (1937).
TIONAL LAW
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his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality." ' An international conference, convened by the General Assembly in 1961,
adopted a UN Convention on Reduction of Statelessness which came into
force in 1975.162 The Convention provides, inter alia, that a person who
would otherwise be stateless be given the opportunity to acquire the nationality of the country of birth, or of one of the parents at the date of
birth and that a loss of nationality be conditional upon the acquisition of
1 63
another nationality.
Similar principles have evolved in relation to the question of succession to nationality. Under international law there is no obligation imposed on the successor state to grant any right of option as to citizenship,
nor is there any corresponding obligation on the predecessor state to
withdraw its nationality from persons normally living or domiciled in the
transferred territory.
The position adopted by courts in the UK suggests that English law
deprives inhabitants of their nationality when the territory is lost, unless
they take steps to retain it.'" This rule, however, is predicated on the
acquisition by these inhabitants of the nationality of the successor state,
and that English law will not render a former national stateless as a result
of the transfer of sovereignty over British territory.
The question as to who constitutes an "inhabitant" is generally answered with reference to the concept of "substantial connection" with the
territory by citizenship, residence or family relation. The above rule may
be construed as a special aspect of the general principle of "real and effective link" confirmed in the Nottebaum case. 6 8 It possible to argue,
however, that for the individuals concerned at the moment of transfer,
the connection with the successor state is fortuitous, while a connection
with the territory is of great significance. 66 One should not view territory
as an "empty plot," rather, "territory connotes population, ethnic groupings, loyalty patterns, national aspirations" and so forth."6 ' Thus, to regard a population as related to particular areas of territory is "to recognize a human and political reality which underlies modern territorial
settlements."168 Indeed, this seems to be the basis of the self determination principle, which tends to create demands for changes in territorial
sovereignty. Employing the above reasoning, Brownlie concludes that
since the population has a "territorial" or local status, that is, the "population goes with the territory," it would be illegal for the transferor to

161.
162.
U.N.T.S.
163.
164.
165.

Human Rights, art. 15, supra note 153.
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 9/15, 989
175.
Id.
See, e.g., Murray v. Parkes [1942] 2 K.B. 123.
Nottebaum Case (Lich. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4.
166. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 661 (3rd. ed. 1979).
167. Id.
168. Id.
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retain the population as its own nationals, and on the other hand, it
would be illegal for the successor to take any steps to avoid responsibility
for the population, such as, by treating them as de facto stateless. This
conclusion, as well as the principles outlined above, should be born in
mind in evaluating those provisions in the Sino-British Joint Declaration
concerning nationality.
The status of persons who are now British Dependent Territorial Citizens (BDTC) are covered in two memoranda which were formally exchanged between the British and Chinese Governments on the same day
that the Joint Delaration was signed. The memoranda set out the respective positions of the two governments on this subject. "
The UK position was that since Hong Kong will no longer be a British dependent territory after 1997, it would not be appropriate for
BDTCs to retain this status. The affected people, the Government declared, would be entitled to a new status with an appropriate title, now
referred to as British Nationals (Overseas) (BNOs), that would not entitle
them to a right of abode in the UK (which they do not presently possess),
but would carry benefits similar to those currently enjoyed by BDTCs. °
Such a status, according to the UK Memorandum, is not transferable by
descent.17 ' There is also the condition that these BDTCs have possession
of or be included in passports of parents with the British passport before
July 1, 1997. This effectively excludes holders of Certificates of Identity
(CIs), who make up half of those people who possess some sort of2 a travel
document and who would not be entitled to the new passport.1
The Chinese Memorandum states that all Hong Kong Chinese are
Chinese nationals under the Nationality Law of the PRC.1 3 It allows Chinese nationals who hold British travel documents to continue to use them
after July 1, 1997 for the purpose of traveling to other states and regions.
The PRC Memorandum emphasizes, however, that these persons will not
be entitled to British consular protection in the Hong Kong SAR and

169. Before recounting the substantive aspects of the Memoranda, it should be emphasized that doubts have been expressed with regard to the binding force of the Memoranda.
Critics have alleged that they do not amount to a joint statement but simply constitute
declarations made by individual countries. The implication is that the effectiveness of the
relevant provisions depends on what measures each of the two states would take to render
its Memorandum binding. Report of the Independent Monitoring Team, Arrangements for
Testing the Acceptibility in Hong Kong of the Draft Agreement on the Future of the Territory (Nov. 1984) ch. 4, pt 4.
170. These benefits include entitlement to use British passports and to receive British
consular services and protection in third countries.
171. The Draft Agreement, supra note 1, at 1381.
172. The Hong Kong people at present hold one of two kinds of travel documents, a
British passport or a Certificate of Identity, which do not offer equal travelling rights.
173. While the PRC has integrated jus sanguinis with jus soli in its nationality law, it
clearly considers jus sanguinis as the first and primary principle. Thus persons may acquire
Chinese nationality through parent-offspring relations whether they are born in China or
abroad. Wau Keju, Basic Principles of the Nationality Law, 1982 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L.
220.
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other parts of China.
B.

The Fate of the Non-Chinese Residents of Hong Kong

While the Memoranda may have defined the position of most of the
territory's residents for fifty years after 1997, it has left doubts among
those who are neither Chinese nor expatriates holding foreign passports
as to their nationality status in post-1997 Hong Kong. These people are
at present BDTCs who will be entitled like others to the new British
passport, but whose position appears to differ from people of Chinese
race. The latter will be considered PRC nationals for whom the travel
document issued by the British Government will merely amount to an
"extra privilege," theoretically facilitating their geographical mobility.
Indeed, it is clear that the UK authorities did not mean to confer
nationality by the issuance of the new passport, for China would never
have agreed to dual nationality.1 7 4 While, arguably, a dual authorized
passport may be prima facie evidence of nationality, 175 there have been
judicial decisions to the effect that a passport is not conclusive proof of
nationality, except in conjunction with other evidence. 76 Basically, a
passport is an identity document for travel purposes and identity may be
certified by non-national as well as by national states. In fact, there is
nothing to prevent a state from issuing a passport to an alien. 177 Thus,
the mere fact that one holds a travel document issued by the UK Government would not, in the eyes of third countries, confer upon one the status
of a British national.
Based upon these assumptions, it follows that the minority groups in
question would in effect be stateless. Clearly, under the Sino-British Joint
Declaration, the next generation born to those BDTCs would be stateless
since the new status is not transferrable. However, according to the Joint
Declaration, such persons may have the right of abode (i.e., to enter, reenter, live and work) in Hong Kong by virtue of their continuous residence of at least seven years and the fact that they have taken the territory to be their place of permanent residence.1 7 8 Nevertheless, a right of
abode is quite distinct from the concept of nationality. Even if the child
of a non-Chinese BDTC acquires the right of abode, he can still be judged
stateless under international law if he does not possess nationality.

174. 1980 Nationality Law of the PRC, article 3. This article states: "[that the PRC
does not recognize dual nationality for any Chinese national." Non-recognition of dual nationality, or the principle of "one nationality for one person,"is in fact the major concept of
China's nationality law. The PRC attaches great importance to this question and has been
determined to eliminate dual nationality whether through its nationality laws or within bilateral treaties. 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra note 23, at 746. See also Ginsberg, The Nationality
Law of the PRC, 30 AM. J. Comp. L. 458 (1982).
175. See, e.g., Rv. Brailsford [1905] 2 K.B. 730, 745; Joyce v. D.P.P. 1946 A.C. 347.
176. J.G. STARKE, supra note 124, at 331.
177. Though for obvious reasons it would not normally do so, especially since a passport is the basis on which a person can invoke the protection of a particular embassy.
178. The Draft Agreement, annex I, § XIV, supra note 1, at 1377-78.
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As observed earlier, the international community has laid down certain rules in an attempt to eliminate or at least minimize statelessness.
Indeed, under the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,
Britain, as a party, is bound to grant nationality to people born in its
territory who would otherwise be stateless.17 It is also obliged, according
to this Convention, to use its best endeavors to include in any treaty
which it makes with a non-contracting state (such as the PRC), provisions designed to ensure that no person shall become stateless as a result
180
of transfer of sovereignty.
Forced into a difficult position by the uncompromising Chinese posture on the one hand (the PRC objected to the transferability of the new
status for ex-BDTCs) and its own international commitments on the
other, the UK Government has devised a typically awkward formula. It
has opted to sidestep the issue altogether by creating yet another form of
British nationality. The "status B" or the British Overseas Citizen (BOC)
will cover two categories of people: the post-1997 babies and what is expected to be a very small number of non-Chinese people who are BDTCs
on June 30, 1997 but who, for one reason or another, have by then not
succeeded to obtain a passport entitling them to the BNO status (for example, they might be in prison, hospital or for some other unforeseen
reason).
Both types of nationality are non-transferable, thus, there are no arrangements to prevent statelessness for children of BOCs. Likewise, both
BNOs and BOCs may use UK passports and enjoy British consular protection. The major difference, however, lies in admission to third countries, for BOCs would, in all probability, be perceived as stateless. Indeed,
the key question with regard to both these new types of passports is
whether third countries are likely to accept and recognize them. Proposals have been made to indicate in the new passports the holder's right of
abode in Hong Kong to facilitate acceptance by other countries.18'
There are additional gaps in the protection of ethnic minorities
under the Sino-British Joint Declaration. For one, it is not clear whether
they would enjoy British consular protection in the Hong Kong SAR
since they are not Chinese nationals, or what other consular protection
these people might be entitled to in the territory after 1997. On the question of repatriation, which country a non-Chinese BNO travelling on
BNO travel documents should be repatriated to is not clear. Obviously, it
should not be to the UK because he has no right of abode there. At the
same time, the British consul presumably helping the BNO would not be
able to repatriate him to Hong Kong, since he will have no jurisdiction
over the Hong Kong SAR.

179. Convention on Statelessness, art. 10, supra note 162.

180. Id.
181. Legislative Council Debate on Febuary 6, 1985. South China Morning Post, Feb. 7,
1985, at 10.
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In sum, the Joint Declaration falls short, both in terms of form and
substance, of prevailing international legal standards on nationality. A
sizeable minority of the local population is to be rendered effectively
stateless and, while informal assurances have been given by the UK authorities, they are not only vague but lacking in crediblity. This is especially true in view of the fact that British attitudes towards admission of
minority groups into the UK are likely to grow more, rather than less,
hostile.
This situation extends beyond the legal matter of creating a stateless
minority. The transition from British to Chinese control is unprecedented, in that it entails the transfer of a substantial population from a
relatively benevolent rule to one which may prove to be difficult to endure. There are hopes that the PRC would continue to pursue a more
enlightened path, but these hopes might easily crumble. By Western criteria, China remains an essentially oppressive country and the Hong
Kong people, most of whom may be seen as refugees from communism,
are likely to be denied the power to choose their nationality.
Whether the UK could have provided such a choice is a moot point,
yet one is inclined to argue that the British are mistaken in perceiving
people as a liability rather than an asset. An infusion of a large number of
industrious and entrepreneurial Chinese would have done much to revitalize their sagging economy. It is not realistic to expect the UK to modify its narrow attitude, but it is conceivable that other countries, particularly the United States, would prove more forthcoming in this respect.
Indeed, the availability of a potential exit option to local business people
and professionals might prompt the PRC to be more accomodating vis-avis Hong Kong.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

British rule over Hong Kong will come to an end in 1997 after a century and a half of colonial control in the Western mold. The gradual disengagement by the UK and the eventual departure of its official representatives may turn out to be one of the most significant international
developments in the coming decades. One hopes that the assumption of
the exercise of sovereignty by the PRC will not disrupt the territory's
stable and prosperous existence, but a pessimistic scenario cannot be dismissed lightly. For this reason, it behooves international lawyers to scrutinize the Sino-British Joint Declaration with a view to determining its
viability as a foundation for the Hong Kong SAR.
The Joint Declaration has its share of detractors. As argued here, the
criticisms levelled at it are not always warranted, for it provides a sound
formal mechanism for territorial autonomy within the sovereign framework of the PRC. There are also significant reasons to postulate that this
document constitutes a valid bilateral international treaty, creating legal
rights and imposing legal obligations on the signatories. Some of its provisions, most notably those concerning nationality, may be inadequate, but
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its value as a formal basis for the preservation of the Hong Kong lifestyle
in a communist context cannot be questioned.
Needless to say, however, the implementation of the Joint Declaration hinges primarily on factors which lie outside the strictly conceived
legal realm. Future Chinese attitudes and policies, developments within
Hong Kong, and third parties' response are likely to exert a far greater
influence than the agreement itself. Sustained negative pressures from
the above sources might undermine the "one country, two systems"
formula and render the agreement effectively void.
The international community should not, therefore, be content with
the Joint Declaration as such, but should act in various ways to ensure
that its substance is not dissipated. It is imperative for the Hong Kong
issue to remain one of international concern and not be removed from the
international agenda. While the PRC is inclined to exclude any international involvement in what it deems to be an internal affair, subtle external pressure could be brought to bear upon it. The Hong Kong people
enjoy a wide range of rights, and the preservation of these rights falls
within the ambit of international law.
The Sino-British Agreement also calls for greater attention on the
part of international legal scholars, whether they are motivated by humanitarian considerations or otherwise. The "one country, two systems"
formula which it embodies is unprecedented and thus opens up new vistas in international legal research. Should the formula prove viable it
might constitute a model for the resolution of similar international
problems. Even if it fails to satisfy the expectations of interested parties,
the concept is doubtless an intriguing one and its various aspects ought to
be thoroughly explored.

The International Legal Status of the
Contractual Rights of Contractors Under
the Deep Sea-Bed Mining Provisions (Part
XI) of the Third United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea
BRADLEY LARSCHAN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

On December 10, 1982, the Third United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea' was opened for signature at Montego Bay, Jamaica, 2
fourteen years after the United Nations initiated this massive codification
effort.' The Convention enters into force twelve months after the sixtieth
ratification 4 and supersedes the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of

the Sea as between states parties.' The Convention was negotiated by
over 150 states' and consists of the treaty, accompanied by nine annexes,
which together embrace 446 articles.
The aim of the Convention is to establish a comprehensive regime
* M.A.L.D., The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, J.D. 1985, Boston College Law
School, Ph.D candidate, The Fletcher School. Mr. Larschan is an Associate with the law
firm Busby, Rehm & Leonard, Washington, D.C. The author wishes to thank the following
individuals for their comments on this article: Mr. Harvey Bines, Sullivan & Worcester,
Boston; Mr. Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, Council of State, Spain; Prof. Edward Gordon, Albany
Law School; Prof. Leo Gross, The Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy; Prof. Cynthia C.
Lichtenstein, Boston College Law School; Dr. Glen Plant, International Seabed Authority,
Montego Bay, Jamaica; Mr. Elliot L. Richardson, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy,
Washington, D.C.; and, most especially, Prof. Alfred P. Rubin, The Fletcher School. The
opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those
of the individuals acknowledged above.
1. Opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982)[hereinafter
cited as Convention].
2. Id. art. 320.
3. The Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean
Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction was established by the U.N. General Assembly in 1967. G.A. Res. 2340, 22 U.N. GAOR (1639th plen. mtg.), Supp. (No. 16) at 14-15,
U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967). The permanent Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed
and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, composed of 42 states, was
established the following year. G.A. Res. 2467, 23 U.N. GAOR (1752nd plen. mtg.), Supp.
(No. 18) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968). The Committee's work and recommendations led
the General Assembly in 1970 to convene the law of the sea in 1973. G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N.
GAOR (1933rd plen. mtg.), Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) and G.A. Res.
2750, 25 U.N. GAOR (1933rd plen. mtg.), Supp. (No. 28) at 25, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
4. Convention, supra note 1, art. 308.
5. Id. art. 311.
6. White House Fact Sheet, 82 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 54 (1982).
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governing the use of the seas. Some observers and governments, including
the United States, believe that in most respects the Convention reflects
customary international law. 7 Nevertheless, the addition of Part XI of the
treaty, which deals with the exploitation of minerals on the seabed, is
controversial and has, in large measure, led the United States to vote
against the Convention.8 Moreover, the United States has, under its cur-

7. Malone, Who Needs the Sea Treaty?, 54 FOREIGN POL'Y 44, 56, 60 (1984). See also
LAW OF THE SEA: U.S. POLICY DILEMMA 147, 148 (Oxman, Caron & Buderi eds. 1983); MacRae, Customary International
Law and the United Nations' Law of the Sea Treaty, 13 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 181 (1983); L.
SOHN & K. GUSTAFSON, THE LAW OF THE SEA xix-xx (1984); Breen, The 1982 Dispute Resolving Agreement: The First Step Toward Unilateral Mining Outside the Law of the Sea
Convention, 14 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 201, 220 (1984).
8. Part XI of the Convention seems to have played a major, if not decisive, role in the
United States' decision not to sign the text. See White House Fact Sheet, supra note 6, at
54-55. According to the White House Fact Sheet, dated Jan. 29, 1982, the United States
had eight general objections to Part XI which stood in the way of acceptance of the Convention. They are:
* Policymaking in the seabed authority would be carried out by a one-nation,
one-vote assembly;
* The executive council which would make the day-to-day decisions affecting
access of U.S. miners to deep seabed minerals would not have permanent or
guaranteed representation by the United States, and the United States would
not have influence on the council commensurate with its economic and political interests;
* A review conference would have the power to impose treaty amendments on
the United States without its consent;
* The treaty would impose artificial limitations on seabed mineral production;
* The treaty would give substantial competitive advantages to a supranational
mining company - the Enterprise;
* Private deep seabed miners would be subject to a mandatory requirement for
the transfer of technology to the Enterprise and to developing countries;
* The new international organization would have discretion to interfere unreasonably with the conduct of mining operations, and it could impose potentially
burdensome regulations on an infant industry; and
* The treaty would impose large financial burdens on industrialized countries
whose nationals are engaged in deep seabed mining and financial terms and
conditions which would significantly increase the costs of mineral production.
Id. at 55.
On July 9, 1982, President Reagan announced that the United States would vote
against adoption of the Convention. The President stated "that the deep seabed mining
part of the [C]onvention does not meet U.S. objectives. For this reason, I am announcing
today that the United States will not sign the [Clonvention as adopted by the conference..
• ." President's Statement of July 9, 1982, U.S. Votes Against Law of the Sea Treaty, 82
DEP'T. ST. BULL. 71 (1982)(emphasis added). President Reagan went on to list five specific
areas of concern to the United States:
* Provisions that would actually deter future development of deep seabed mineral resources, when such development should serve the interest of all
countries;
* A decision-making process that would not give the United States or others a
role that fairly reflects and protects their interests;
* Provisions that would allow amendments to enter into force for the United
States without its approval; this is clearly incompatible with the U.S. approach
to such treaties;

Oxman, Summary of the Law of the Sea Convention, in
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rent national policy, refused to become a party to the Convention. 9
This article examines the contractual rights of contractors 0 under
the Convention. The study begins with an analysis of the structure of the
International Sea-Bed Authority," the international organization solely
responsible for regulating the exploration and exploitation of the deep
seabed. It then examines the provisions relating to private contractors
within the Convention. These provisions will be reexamined in light of
Article 155 of the Convention, which provides for review after 20 years, to
determine whether commercial activities have resulted in the "equitable
12
exploitation" of the seabed.
While the Convention seemingly provides for the security of the con* Stipulations relating to mandatory transfer of private technology and the
possibility of national liberation movements sharing in benefits; and
* The absence of assured access for future generations of qualified deep seabed
miners to promote the development of these resources.
Id.
See also Malone, The United States and the Law of the Sea, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 785, 785-86,
789-90 (1984); Bandow, UNCLOS III: A Flawed Treaty, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 475, 477
(1982); Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference On the Law of the Sea: The Tenth
Session (1981), 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 10 (1982); L. SOHN & K. GUSTAFSON, supra note 7, at
xix.
9. See generally Malone, supra note 7 passim. The United States, Great Britain and
the Federal Republic of Germany are among 15 states which did not sign the Convention.
Sea Law Oddfellows, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 22, 1984, at 29-30.
So far, only 14 states have ratified the Convention. Gamble, Assessing the Reality of
the Deep Seabed Regime, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 779, 789 (1985). Sixty ratifications are
necessary for the Convention to enter into force. Convention art. 308(1), supra note 1. No
Western states and no Warsaw Pact states have ratified the Convention. Sea Law Oddfellows, supra, at 30. Further, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Great
Britain, France, the Soviet Union and Japan have enacted "interim" legislation, governing
the exploration and exploitation of the seabed, while Belgium and Italy are in the process of
drafting such legislation. See generally Mahayekhi, The Present Legal Status of Deep SeaBed Mining, 19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 229 (1985) and L. SOHN & K. GUSTAFSON, supra note 7,
at 176-77.
10. "Contractors" is used throughout the Convention to denote entities other than the
Enterprise that are approved by the International Seabed Authority to exploit the ocean's
mineral resources. Art. 153(2)(b) provides that contracts are to be made
in association with the Authority by States Parties, or state enterprises or natural or juridical persons which possess the nationality of States Parties or are
effectively controlled by them or their nationals, when sponsored by such
States, or any group of the foregoing which meets the requirements provided in
this Part and in Annex III.
The term "operators" appears to denote contractors whose final plan of work has not been
approved. See, e.g., id. art. 151(2)(a).
As is well known, the Enterprise and private contractors will mine (separate) sites in
what has come to be known as the "parallel system." Although agreements to be made between entities other than the Enterprise and the International Sea-Bed Authority resemble
license agreements in Anglo-American law, they are specifically referred to as "contracts" in
the Convention. See id. art. 153(3).
11. Id. art. 156 [hereinafter cited as Authority].
12. Id. art. 155(2). For a discussion of the Review Conference, see infra text accompanying notes 92-109.
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tractual rights of contractors,"3 there is reason to doubt whether, in the
event of a conflict between the overall purpose of the Convention 4 and
the maintenance of existing contracts, the contracts would remain unaltered.' 5 Indeed, the Convention provides for the restructuring of existing
economic relationships within the framework of the Review Conference. 16
The Review Conference is empowered to amend Part XI by a three7
fourths vote, with the amended Convention binding on all states parties.
It has been suggested that the purpose of the Review Conference is to
define the regime that will apply following the initial system of
exploitation.s
This article concludes by proposing a method of reconciling the Convention's Review Conference provisions with the objections stated by the
Reagan administration. 9 This proposal is aimed at avoiding a potentially
serious conflict in the future, if changes made by the Review Conference
were to affect adversely contractors' rights. It is suggested that the Convention and the International Sea-Bed Authority do guarantee the economic value of the mining contracts, even should it become necessary to
restructure the existing contracts for political reasons.2 If this thesis is
accepted, Western mining consortia could invest in this capital-intensive
area with the guarantee that their investments would not be jeopardized
by the Review Conference.
The method proposed to ascertain the economic value of the mining
contracts is to draw an analogy to general principles of United States
13. Art. 155(5) states: "Amendments adopted by the Review Conference pursuant to
this article shall not affect rights acquired under existing contracts." See also Convention
annex III, art. 18(1), quoted infra at note 85.
14. Art. 136 declares that "[tlhe Area and its resources are the common heritage of
mankind." Essentially, Part XI attempts to establish the legal right of all states to share the
benefits of the deep seabed. See also art. 153(1) requiring the Authority to ensure that
activities involving the deep seabed be carried out on behalf of "mankind as a whole". In
this way, "the longstanding demand of the developing countries for the new international
economic order is apparently recognized." J.S. PATIL, LEGAL REGIME OF THE SEABED 68
(1981).
15. See infra note 82. Contra Bandow, supra note 8, at 486.
16. See generally Convention, supra note 1, art. 155.
17. Id. art. 155(4).
18. Engo, Issues of First Committee at UNCLOS III, in THE 1982 CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE, 17TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

(Oslo, Norway) 33, 44 (1984).
19. See supra note 7.
20. Convention, supra note 1, art. 150(i). The question arises as to the outcome of a
perceived conflict between the goals and purposes of the Convention, i.e., to ensure the equitable distribution of the seabed's resources, with contracts whose sanctity is guaranteed by
article 155(5) of the Convention. Thus, there appears to be a built-in tension in the Convention based on ideological differences between developed and developing states. For an overview of these differences, see, e.g., Henkin, Politics and the Changing Law of the Sea, 89
POL. Sci. Q. 46, 53-55 (1974). This tension is underscored by the fact that "the [common]
heritage of mankind should be exploited only by an international operating agency, run by
the community of states on the basis of equal voting, with all the revenue going to develop
poor states." Id. at 63.

1986

CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS UNDER LAW OF THE SEA

bankruptcy law." With this method, if the International Sea-Bed Authority was seen as a "failed" enterprise at the time of the Review Conference, it could be reorganized. 2 Part of the reorganization process would
be to provide for the payment of creditors. It is here that the analogy to
U.S. bankruptcy law becomes helpful, as it provides a mechanism for the
valuation of creditors' claims.

II.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE AUTHORITY

The impetus for the Convention's regime governing the exploitation
of minerals on the seabed has been traced 2 to the government of
Malta's2 4 note verbale on August 17, 1967. This was sent to the United
Nations Secretary General, requesting consideration of a Declaration and
Treaty Concerning the Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of
the Sea-Bed and of the Ocean Floor, Underlying the Sea beyond the limits of present National Jurisdiction, and the Use of their Resources in the
Interest of Mankind.25 Part XI of the Convention concerns the "Area,"
which is defined as "the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.126 The Area is important because
it is where the polymetallic nodules2 7 are located. It is the Authority

21. If the contracts between the Authority and contractors are altered or abrogated,
this proposal is aimed at protecting creditors' rights to the greatest extent possible. See text
accompanying notes 147-156.
22. There is virtually no international precedent to support the adoption of municipal
bankruptcy principles to secure the economic sanctity of contracts with an international
organization. The analogy to U.S. bankruptcy law is intended to serve as an established and
readily accepted example of an institution of municipal law from which an international
solution to the present impasse might be drawn. As the U.S. Supreme Court has observed,
bankruptcy laws are "recognized by all civilized nations." Canada S. R.R. v. Gebhard, 109
U.S. 527, 539 (1883).
The international precedent which seems to provide the closest analogy to the potential
"reorganization" of the Authority is the transfer which took place between the League of
Nations and the United Nations in the summer of 1946. See generally The League Hands
Over, League of Nations Pub. Gen. 1946.1. This analogy, however, is of limited value in that
the transfer which occurred was done in a spirit of friendly cooperation. See, e.g., Minutes
of the 7th Plen. Mtg., 21st Sess., LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 194, at 57-58 (1946).
23. See, e.g., Larschan & Brennan, The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle in
International Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305, 306-312 (1983).
24. For a discussion of Malta's rationale in seeking international action, see Pardo, The
Emerging Law of the Sea, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: ISSUES IN OCEAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
33, 36 (Walsh ed. 1977).
25. 22 U.N. GAOR Annex 3 (Agenda Item 92) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967).
26. Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1)(1).
27. Polymetallic nodules are "one of the resources of the Area consisting of any deposit
or accretion of nodules, on or just below the surface of the deep sea-bed, which contain
manganese, nickel, cobalt and copper." Annex I, Resolution II(1)(d), Draft Final Act of the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121, at 27
(1982). These nodules were discovered by the Challenger during its expedition of 18731876. Prescott, The Deep Seabed, in THE M'RITmE DIMENSION 54, 55 (Barston & Birnie
eds. 1980). It was not until the last quarter century, however, that technology has advanced
to the point that industry has been able to consider commercial mining of this resource. L.
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"through which states parties shall . . . organize and control activities in
the Area ...
"28 This presents a unique situation in that an international organization may have at its disposal a substantial stream of revenue 29 not tied to state contributions, if the Authority and Enterprise can
be made to work. 0
The Authority is composed of three principal organs: the Assembly, a
Council and a Secretariat," and is loosely patterned after the United Nations.3 2 The Assembly is nominally the "supreme organ of the Authority
to which the other principal organs shall be accountable."33 The Assembly is to consist of one representative from each state party to the Convention.3 4 As in the United Nations General Assembly,3 5 each member of
the Assembly is to have one vote,36 with a quorum consisting of a majority of the Assembly's members.3 7 Thus, the Assembly, like the U.N. General Assembly, will likely be dominated by the developing states. 8 The
Assembly is intended to serve as the general policy-making organ of the
Authority, 9 to elect Council members, " ' and to appoint the Secretary-

SOHN & K.

GUSTAFSON, supra note 7, at 172-73. Since the 1960s the question of the ownership of these nodules has stirred considerable debate. Id.
For a discussion of the nodules and their potential strategic importance to the United
States, see 1 T. G. KRONMILLER, THE LAWFULNESS OF DEEP SEABED MINING 13-16 (1980).
28. Convention, supra note 1, art. 157(1).
29. Jones, The InternationalSea-Bed Authority Without U.S. Participation,12 OCEAN

DEV. & INT'L L. 151, 152-53 (1983).

30. The Authority is to obtain its initial operating capital through the traditional
method of assessing contributions from states parties in the same proportion that states
contribute to the United Nations. See Convention, supra note 1, arts. 171(a) & 160(2)(e).
However, once mining operations get under way, the Authority may become self-sufficient.
For instance, the Authority is to charge a $500,000 application fee for each mine site. Id. art.
171(b); annex III, art. 13. If the Enterprise becomes profitable, it is to make payments to
the Authority in the same way commercial ventures do. Id. annex IV, art. 10; art. 171(c).
The Authority may even borrow money. Id. arts. 174 & 171(d). Most interesting, perhaps, is
the fact that a one million dollar yearly rental fee is charged for each mining site, Id. annex
III, art. 13(3), and each venture is taxed at a relatively substantial rate. Id. annex III, art.
13(4)-(6).
31. Id. art. 158(1).
32. Jones, supra note 29, at 152. The U.N. Charter art. 7(1) mentions as a principal
organ the International Court of Justice, which has its equivalent in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Convention art. 186 & annex VI, art.1(1), supra note 1. For a
brief discussion of the Tribunal, see infra note 152 and sources cited therein.
33. Convention, supra note 1, art. 160(1).
34. Id. art. 159(1).
35. U.N. CHARTER art. 18(1).
36. Convention, supra note 1, art. 159(6).
37. Id. art. 159(5).
38. One representative of the American mining industry has stated that the Authority
"could be expected to vote the same way" as the U.N. General Assembly. Hearing before
the Subcomm. on Arms Control, Oceans, Int'l Operations and Environment of the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (statement of Marne A. Dubs,

Chairman, American Mining Congress).
39. Convention, supra note 1, art. 160(1).
40. Id. art. 160(2)(a).
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General.4 1
The Council is composed of 36 members, 42 with members elected to
four-year terms48 according to a formula" which assures the Soviet Union
and its allies three representatives, Western states between seven and
nine seats, and developing countries the remaining seats." Each Council
member has one vote,4 so that a two-thirds majority of Council votes will
likely be held by developing states.
The Council is the executive arm of the Authority, and is given a
47
mandate to implement the general policies established by the Assembly.
It appears that the most critical powers of the Authority will be lodged in
or acquired by the Council,' 8 for as a smaller group, the Council may be
able to acquire virtually all of the political and decision-making power it
chooses." This is especially likely if the Council is dominated by a group
of powerful individuals acting in concert or though an executive committee. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that while the Council may
function continuously, 0 the Assembly will meet only annually 1 with few
specific tasks52 other than its overall supervisory function."

41. Id. art. 160(2)(b).
42. Id. art. 161(1).
43. Id.
(3).
44. Id. art. 161(1)(a)-(c), 161(2).
45. Oxman, supra note 7, at 158. See also Comment, The InternationalSea-Bed Authority Decision-Making Process:Does It Give a Proportionate Voice to the Participant's
Interests in Deep Sea Mining, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 659, 672-73 (1983). Hauser contends
that the West can expect 8 seats, and the Socialist states 3-4 seats, with 24-25 going to

developing states. 7 HAUSER,

THE LEGAL REGIME FOR DEEP SEABED MINING UNDER THE LAW

41 (Dielman trans. 1983).
46. Convention, supra note 1, art. 161(7). Weighted voting in the Council was suggested
by Western states but encountered the "strong ideological opposition of the African group"
OF THE SEA CONVENTION

and other developing states. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea: The Ninth Session (1980), 75 Am. J. INT'L L. 211, 220 (1981).
47. Convention, supra note 1, art. 162(1).
48. Larschan & Brennan, supra note 23, at 322-23; Lee, Deep Seabed Mining and Developing Countries, 6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 213, 218 (1978-1979). See generally
HAUSER, supra note 45, at 45-46.
49. Convention, supra note 1, art. 161(5). The Convention requires only that the Council meet at least three times a year.
50. In the same vein, few specific powers are given to the President under article II of
the U.S. Constitution and yet vast powers (arguably belonging to the Congress) are acquired
by the President because of the Executive's ability to act quickly and decisively. See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 37-38 (1972). With funds at his
disposal, a Secretary-General will be in a far more independent position than his counterparts in other international organizations, including Director-General Amadou Mahtar
M'Bow of UNESCO. See, e.g., Bloody but M'Bowed, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 5, 1985, at 29-30;
The Battle for Unesco, AFRICA (No. 161) Jan. 1985, at 31-34; Quit Unesco Now, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 1984, at 12-13; Lewis, Western Efforts Thwarted at Unesco Parley, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 17, 1985, at 8, col. 1.
51. Convention, supra note 1, art. 159(2).
52. Id. art. 160(2)(a)-(e).
53. Id. T (1).
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The enormous potential power of the Council was recognized during
the negotiations and some difficulty arose over the decision-making procedures to be employed by its members.5 It was finally agreed that the
Council should operate by consensus," which means by unanimity,"' except in certain situations requiring a two-thirds57 or three-fourths" vote,
depending on the importance of the matter."
Finally, the Secretariat will be the administrative organ of the Authority.6" The Secretariat is to be headed by a Secretary-General"1 who
will be elected to a four-year term by the Assembly from among the candidates nominated by the Council.62 The power of the Secretary-General
is a source of uncertainty in the political dynamics of the Authority,
based upon the fact that the Authority may ultimately have access to its
own funds and not have to depend upon the contributions of state members,'3 thus giving the Secretary-General unprecedented power for an international organization.
The Secretary-General will certainly be responsible to the Council.
The Council, however, will probably be dominated by a developing state
majority.'4 A strong and determined Secretary-General could find support
for his action in this majority. Ultimately, the Secretary-General would
be responsible to the Assembly, but the Assembly will also be dominated
by a majority of Third World countries. The Secretary-General could,
therefore, emerge as the strongest political actor in the Authority's constitutional structure, accompanied by the financial support to implement
policies unpopular with or even hostile to the interests of developed
states.'5
The Authority will have international legal personality," and will be

54. Richardson, The Politics of the Law of the Sea, 11
(1982).
55. Id. at 17.
56. Convention, supra note 1, art. 161(8)(e).

OCEAN

Dv. & INT'L L. 9, 16-17

57. Id. art. 161(8)(b).
58. Id. art. 161(8)(c).

59. See id. art. 161(8)(a)-(d). See also Richardson, supra note 54, at 17.
60. Convention, supra note 1, art. 166(3).
61. Id. 1 (1).

62. Id. 1 (2).
63. Id. art. 171.

64. See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
65. One observer has noted that "[tihere is no reason to believe that the Authority will
ultimately march to a different drummer than does, say, UNESCO or the WHO." Jones,
supra note 29, at 153. See also Bloody but M'Bowed, supra note 50, at 29-30. Even this
assertion might fall short of the mark since both UNESCO and WHO depend upon the
contributions of state members for support.
66. Convention, supra note 1, art. 176. It is customary for international organizations
to be accorded some degree of international legal personality. K. AHLUWALIA, THE LEGAL
STATUS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
AND CERTAIN OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

65 (1964).
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empowered both to borrow funds67 and to issue securities. 68 The Authority is to enjoy state-like privileges and immunities throughout the international community.6 9 For example, the property and assets of the Authority are to "be exempt from restrictions, regulations, controls and
moratoria of any nature. ' 70 The property and assets of the Authority, as
well as the Authority itself, are to be immune "from legal process except
to the extent that the Authority expressly waives" such immunity. 1 Since
the Area and its resources are said to be the common heritage of mankind, 7' it is the Authority, acting through the Council, which has the
power to enter into contracts for the exploitation of minerals from the
deep seabed." It is this regime for the exploitation of the mineral resources of the Area that is the heart of Part XI. '
III.

PROVISIONS

RELATING TO THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF

CONTRACTS WITHIN THE CONVENTION

The Convention declares that no state or national 5 of a state may
77
exploit the seabed minerals unless under contract 7 ' from the Authority.
78
Contractors seeking approval of a plan of work must be sponsored by a
state party to the Convention. 79 The contract, however, is between the

contractor and the Authority."0

The Convention attempts to assure contractors, who would have to

67. Convention, supra note 1, art. 174(1).
68. This is implied by article 174 of the Convention.
69. Id. art. 177.
70. Id. art. 180.
71. Id. art. 178.
72. For a discussion of the common heritage of mankind principle, see Larschan &
Brennan, supra note 23.
73. Convention, supra note 1, art. 162(2)(j)(1) and annex III.
74. The Enterprise, established in art. 170, is to exploit the seabed on behalf of the
Authority and is to operate (functionally) in much the same way as a private producer. See
generally Convention annex IV (Statute of the Enterprise).
75. The Convention provides that contractors may be states, natural or juridical persons of a state, a group of states, persons of different nationalities, art. 153(2)(b) and annex
III, art. 4(3), or a joint venture between any of the foregoing and the Enterprise. annex III,
art. 11(1).
76. Id. annex III, art. 3(5).
77. Id. art. 153(2).
78. Id. art. 153(3).
79. Id. annex III, art. 4(3). The sponsoring state is under an obligation to ensure that
the private producer will "carry out activities in the Area in conformity with the terms of its
contract and its obligations under" the Convention. Id. subparagraph (4). The sponsoring
state does not, however, incur financial liability "for damage caused by any failure of a
[private producer] sponsored by it to comply with its obligations if that state party has
adopted laws and regulations and taken administrative measures which are, within the
framework of its legal system, reasonably appropriate for securing compliance by persons
under its jurisdiction." Id. It is not at all clear what the liability of a sponsoring state would
be if it failed to adopt the measures required by annex III, art. 4(4).
80. Id. art. 153.
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invest very large sums of money to exploit the seabed,"1 that contracts
with the Authority will be honored regardless of subsequent political developments.82 The question of subsequent political stability has not been
adequately explored, although there have been enough expressions on the
subject to raise serious questions for potential investors. There are two
primary aspects to the potential political instability: the Authority and
Enterprise may not generate (or may be perceived as not generating) sufficient revenue to meet the expectations of developing states or contractors may earn (or may be perceived as earning) more than a reasonable
return on their investment. In either event, this could present serious difficulties for the sanctity of contractors' rights during the Review

81. It was estimated in 1981 that the cost to develop the technology to mine the seabed
floor would be between one billion and 1.25 billion dollars. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Arms Control, Oceans, Int'l Operations and Environment of the Sen. Foreign Relations
Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (statement of William P. Pendley, Dep. Ass't Sec. for
Energy and Mines, Dep't. of Interior); Gillis, Exploration for and Exploitation of Deep
Seabed Hard Mineral Resources: A Deep Seabed Mining Industry Perspective, in PROCEEDINGS OF CONFERENCE ON DEEP SEABED MINING AND FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 44, 45 (Chen
ed. 1981).
82. For instance, one high ranking African government official, who was intimately involved in the negotiations leading to the creation of the Review Conference provisions of the
Convention, explained that the developing countries view mining by contractors:
as an experimental system which would be given a fair chance to see whether it
could provide a fair alternative during a reasonable period of the life of a
minesite - 20 to 25 years. After such a period a review of the system would be
held to establish whether the parallel system is indeed a viable system,
whether it should be changed or discarded, and if so what new system should
replace it on a permanent basis.
Njenga, The System of Exploitation and Exploration of the Deep Seabed Resources and

the Developing Countries, in

THE DEEP SEABED AND ITS MINERAL RESOURCES, PROCEEDINGS
6, 7 (1979) [hereinafter cited as THE DEEP SEA-

OF THE 3RD INTERNATIONAL OCEAN SYMPOSIUM
BED AND ITS MINERAL RESOURCES].

It has also been noted that,

[t]he developing countries understood the parallel system to mean a package
deal under which the private entities and State parties would be guaranteed
access to the resources of deep seabed [sic] while at the same time conditions
would be created to enable the Authority through the Enterprise also to engage
directly in deep seabed mining. This was absolutely fundamental for the acceptance of the parallel system, that the Enterprise shall not only have the
theoretical right to engage in deep seabed mining, but it would be guaranteed
of [sic] effective operations as a mining entity within the same time frame as
the private entities or State Parties during the initial period of the parallel
system.
Id. at 7. Thus, if the existing parallel structure, including the contractors' activities, are
seen as impinging upon the ability to equitably exploit the Area's resources, then the contracts might be altered as the existing system has failed in its fundamental political
purpose.
There are enough similarities between the mining of land-based resources in developing
countries and the mining of the deep seabed to raise questions over parallel outcomes for a
Review Conference dominated by developing states. See Kusumaatmadja, On the Negotiations of the Conference on the Law of the Sea Concerning the Deep Seabed, in UTILIZATION
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN: FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR INTERNATIONAL PACIFIC
COOPERATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE PACIFIC OCEAN

43 (1977).

40, 42-
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Conference.
Article 151(1)(c) provides that in attempting to further the political
aspirations of the Convention, "[tihe Authority shall act in a manner consistent with the terms of existing contracts . .
,,ss
Article 153(6) reinforces these contractual rights by providing for "security of tenure," as it
states that a "contract shall not be revised, suspended or terminated,"
except in certain circumstances."4
One of the circumstances in which the contractor's rights might be
modified under the Convention is Article 18 of annex III's penalty provisions.8 Pursuant to this article, the Authority may act through an administrative procedure to impose sanctions against a contractor."6 Once a
penalty is imposed, the contractor is given a "reasonable opportunity" to
pursue judicial remedies.8 7 Thus, contractors are to some extent dependent upon the goodwill and good faith of the administrative apparatus of
the Authority, which will probably be controlled by the SecretaryGeneral.8 8
More troublesome is Article 19 of annex III which contemplates the
need to revise contracts. It states:
1. When circumstances have arisen or are likely to arise which, in the
opinion of either party, would render the contract inequitable or make
it impracticable or impossible to achieve the objectives set out in the
contract or in Part XI, the parties shall enter into negotiations to revise it accordingly.
2. Any contract entered into . .. may be revised only with the consent of the parties.88

83. Convention, supra note 1, art. 151(c).
84. Id. art. 153(b).
85. Id. annex III, art. 18 provides in part:
Penalty Provisions:
1. A contractor's rights under the contract may be suspended or terminated
only in the following cases:
(a) if, in spite of warning by the Authority, the contractor has conducted his
activities in such a way as to result in serious, persistent and wilful violations
of the fundamental terms of the contract, Part XI and the rules, regulations
and procedures of the Authority; or
(b) if the contractor has failed to comply with a final binding decision of the
dispute settlement body applicable to him.
2. In the case of any violation of the contract not covered by paragraph 1(a), or
in lieu of suspension or termination under paragraph l(a), the Authority may
impose upon the contractor monetary penalties proportionate to the seriousness of the violation.
86. Id.
87. Section(3) of this article provides that "[e]xcept for emergency orders under article
162, paragraph 2(w), the Authority may not execute a decision involving monetary penalties,
suspension or termination until the contractor has been accorded a reasonable opportunity
to exhaust the judicial remedies available to him pursuant to Part XI, section 5."
88. See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
89. Convention, supra note 1, annex III, art. 19.
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While paragraph one mandates that both parties shall enter into negotiations to revise their contracts according to perceived inequities, paragraph two attempts to rule out unilateral revisions. It leaves unanswered,
however, the issue of what happens if negotiations are fruitless in bringing about an agreement. Further, the international legal significance of
the provision is unclear. It can be argued that the provision contemplates
situations which may arise in the future that necessitate the revision of
contracts, such as the Review Conference.9" Article 19 is, therefore, unclear and raises more questions than it solves. The Convention apparently
safeguards contracts between contractors and the Authority. The question remaining is the status of contracts twenty years after the first commercial mining begins when the second phase of the Review Conference is
held.91

IV. THE REVIEW CONFERENCE
Contained within Part XI is a provision requiring a Review Conference of all states parties to the Convention to reflect upon the provisions
of Part XI in light of experience gained over time, and to assess whether
the goals of Part XI have been or are in the process of being achieved.9
The concept of a Review Conference was originally suggested by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.93 The purpose of the Review Conference,
as envisioned by then Secretary Kissinger, was to evaluate "the methods
by which mining in the deep seabeds takes place and the apportionment
between various sectors could be periodically reviewed. ''94 This laudable
suggestion may not be entirely embodied in the Convention," as Article
155 provides that the Review Conference is to be held in two phases, the
first of which is to begin 15 years after the commencement of commercial
exploitation.9 In essence, states parties then have five years to reach
agreement by consensus as to what amendments, if any, are to be made in
Part XI and relevant annexes of the Convention. 97 If no amendment can
be achieved by consensus (unanimity) after the twentieth year of com98
mercial exploitation, the Review Conference moves into Phase Two.

90. See infra text accompanying notes 110-125.
91. Convention, supra note 1, art. 155.
92. Id.
93. Kissinger, Secretary Kissinger Discusses U.S. Position on Law of the Sea Conference, 75 Dai'T. ST. BULL. 395, 398 (1976).

94. Id. Kissinger explained that the U.S. had "taken into account the views that have
been expressed by some delegates that it might be premature to establish a permanent regime for the deep seabeds ... at the beginning of a process of technology and to freeze it
for an indefinite period of time." Id.
95. It seems clear that Secretary Kissinger believed the Review Conference was largely
aimed at ensuring the survivability of the Enterprise and to perpetuate it as a competitor to
contractors. Kissinger, Secretary Kissinger Meets With U.N. Secretary General Waldheim,
75 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 399, 400 (1976).

96. Convention, supra note 1, art. 155(1).
97. Id. (3).
98. Id. (4).
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During this phase, the Review Conference, acting as a constitutional
convention, has twelve months to adopt an amended Convention by a
three-fourths vote and to submit it to states parties. The amended text is
to be binding on all states parties twelve months" after ratification by
three-fourths of the states parties.'0 0 Presumably if three-fourths of the
states parties fail to adopt the amendment for ratification between the
beginning of the twentieth and twenty-first years, the Review Conference
provision lapses. If a state disagrees with the amendment, to avoid being
bound it must withdraw from the entire Convention, not just Part XI.10'
The Review Conference is to be held to "ensure the maintenance of
the principle of the common heritage of mankind,"' ' and to see to it that
the resources of the seabed are equitably exploited "for the benefit of all
countries, especially the developing States."10 3

99. The one year delay corresponds with the one year waiting period required for withdrawal under article 317's denunciation provision. Oxman, supra note 46, at 217.
100. Convention, supra note 1, art. 155(4). However, the Convention provides a somewhat more difficult general amendment procedure for provisions relating exclusively to activities in the Area in article 314, which also requires ratification by a three-fourths majority
to enter into force for all states parties. Id. art. 316(5). Under article 314, any state party
may submit an amendment to the Secretary-General who shall circulate it to all states parties and transmit it to the Council for approval. If the Council endorses the proposed
amendment, it is then sent to the Assembly for its approval. Article 314(2) provides that
"[b]efore approving any amendment. . ., the Council and the Assembly shall ensure that it
does not prejudice the system of exploration for and exploitation of the resources of the
Area, pending the Review Conference ....
The amendment is then considered "adopted"
but must be ratified by three-fourths of all states parties to the Convention. See art. 316(5).
Such an amendment enters into force for all states parties one year later. The primary distinction between the two amendment procedures, however, is that the Review Conference
provides a forum and political focal point for initiating change.
The concept of an amendment procedure binding all states parties, whether or not a
state ratifies the amendment, is not new in international law, but it goes beyond existing
practice. Article 108 of the U.N. Charter provides for amendments binding all states after
ratification by two-thirds of the states parties, including all of the permanent Security
Council members. Thus, in the United Nations, the U.S. (and each of the other permanent
members of the Security Council) can veto an amendment. In the law of the sea constitutional scheme, there is no such veto.
101. Id. art. 317. This would not mean that the state which denounces the Convention
could unilaterally continue to mine the Area, for the remaining states parties would undoubtedly contend that mining outside the Convention's regime was forbidden by customary international law. See HAUSER, supra note 45, at 130; Moore, Chartinga New Course in
the Law of the Sea Negotiations, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 207, 215 (1981). How any such
dispute would be resolved in practice is impossible to predict; it is not self-evident that
withdrawal from the overall regime voids a contract concluded prior to that withdrawal.
Indeed, as will be argued below, if amendments cannot affect rights acquired under prior
contracts, it is hard to see how the refusal by a state to accept these amendments can affect
these contracts (to which the state may not even be a party).
102. Convention, supra note 1, art. 155(2).
103. Id. The text of this article provides:
The Review Conference shall ensure the maintenance of the principle of the
common heritage of mankind, the international regime designed to ensure equitable exploitation of the resources of the Area for the benefit of all countries,
especially the developing States, and an Authority to organize, conduct and
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Article 155, which provides the constitutional framework for the Review Conference, contains two potentially conflicting principles: that contracts will be honored, and that the Review Conference will be guided by
the general purposes of the Conference. One observer of the Third
World's view of the Convention has noted that,
[t]he concept of the common heritage of mankind is considered by
[the developing states] as the point of departure in the creation of a
new law of the sea ....
Moreover, it is regarded as the starting point
in the creation of a more just and equitable system of distribution of
the resources of the deep seabed within the context of the New International Economic Order.'"
Of course, it is not precise to speak of the Third World as a monolithic bloc having a single voice, a common goal and a united position for
a future course of action. On the contrary, many differences exist among
Third World states' interests in the Convention.' 0 5 Nevertheless, there
are enough commonalities which have united developing states on the issue of redistribution of the wealth of the Area. 00
The Review Conference is considered by many Third World states as
an essential ingredient-the sine qua non-of the Convention. 0 7 These
states were concerned that the actual exploitation of the Area's resources
would not further their long-term interests.' 08 It is apparent that Third
World countries placed a premium on the ability to reshape the Convention to ensure equitable exploitation, and that this, in turn, is fundamental to the constitutional structure of the Convention. Thus, Western
states, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain and the
United States, cannot be criticized as being entirely without justification
for seeking assurances that their interests will be guaranteed in the
future.
If the Review Conference finds that the contracts entered into by the

control activities in the Area. It shall also ensure the maintenance of the principles laid down in the Part with regard to the exclusion of claims or exercise
of sovereignty over any part of the Area, the rights of States and their general
conduct in relation to the Area and their participation in activities in the Area
in conformity with this Convention, the prevention of monopolization of activities in the Area, the use of the Area exclusively for peaceful purposes, economic aspects of activities in the Area, marine scientific research, transfer of
technology, protection of the marine environment, protection of human life,
rights of coastal States, the legal status of the waters superjacent to the Area
and that of the air space above those waters and accomodation between activities in the Area and other activities in the marine environment.
104. Evriviades, The Third World's Approach to the Deep Seabed, 11 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 201, 215 (1982).
105. Juda, UNCLOS III and the New InternationalEconomic Order, 7 OCEAN DEv. &
INT'L L. 221, 222 (1979).
106. Y.S.

MATHUR, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF THE SEAS: CONFLICTS AND CO-OPERATIONS

21(1982).
107. Oxman, supra note 46, at 217; Nenga, supra note 82, at 7.
108. Njenga, supra note 82, at 7.
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Authority have detracted from the principle of the common heritage of
mankind and have resulted in inequitable exploitation, the question left
to be answered is whether these contracts may be abrogated or unilaterally modified. 0 9

V.

THE LEGAL STATUS OF CONTRACTS AFTER THE REVIEW CONFERENCE

The legal status of contracts between contractors and the Authority
was directly addressed in the final paragraph of article 155, which states
that "[a]mendments adopted by the Review Conference shall not affect
rights acquired under existing contracts."" 0 It is clear, however, that the
Review Conference has as its goal, at least in part, the implementation of
the New International Economic Order,"' as reflected in the provisions
mandating the exploitation of the Area for the "benefit of mankind"' 2 by
"equitable exploitation"" 3 of natural resources. This presents an interesting dilemma because sovereign attributes and important public purposes
may conflict with contractual rights." 4
The thorny question is the effect of amendments to Part XI which
could potentially require alteration of existing contracts between the Authority and the contractors. While Article 155(5) seems to hold inviolable
the rights acquired prior to the Review Conference, in fact this conclusion
is less than certain in view of the negotiating history of the provision and
the importance developing states place on the capacity of the Review

109. This might occur, for instance, if the Enterprise finds itself unable to compete
effectively with the contractors. See Larschan & Brennan, supra note 23, at 325.
110. Convention, supra note 1, art. 155(5).
111. One high ranking African government official who played a decisive role in the
creation of the Review Conference has explained that "[tihe developing countries make no
secret of the linkage as between the Common Heritage Concept [embodied in the Convention] and the New International Economic Order, both with respect to the goals to be
achieved and the rationale behind the two concepts." Njenga, supra note 82, at 7; See also
Juda, supra note 105, at 226; J.S. PATIL, supra note 14, at 68.
112. Convention, supra note 1, art. 140.
113. Id. art. 155(2).
114. This argument was forcefully presented by the defendant-appellees in Allied Bank
Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), withdrawn & reh'g
granted, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985), reprinted in 23
I.L.M. 742 (1984). In the original Allied Bank decision, the Second Circuit accepted the
decree of the Government of Costa Rica placing a moratorium on the remittance abroad of
foreign currency. 23 I.L.M. at 747. The court observed that Costa Rica was in a "severe
economic crisis" and was renegotiating its external debt. Id. at 744. The court likened the
repayment moratorium "to the reorganization of a business pursuant to Chapter 11 of our
Bankruptcy Code ...." Id. at 746. Thus, the court followed the principle set forth by the
Supreme Court in Home Builders & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), East New
York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945), Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas
Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983), and Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983),
by allowing the public policy purpose of Costa Rica to rise above the sanctity of that particular contract.
The bankruptcy analogy in Allied Bank has been criticized in a recent article. See
Zaitzeff & Kunz, The Act of State Doctrine and the Allied Bank Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 449
(1985).
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Conference to correct any perceived shortcomings in the operation of the
mining system. Third World states could argue that, to the extent Article
155(5) is perceived to be a self-contained set of prescriptions, the meaning of any individual provision must be read against the interpretative
background provided by Article 155(1)-(4) and Part XI as a whole."' The
dilemma lies in the language of Article 155 calling for the reassessment of
Part XI in light of equitable principles relating to the distribution of
wealth exploited from the Area. " '
The Review Conference may find itself confronted with a mandate to
reshape Part XI and a prohibition to leave untouched the contracts
which, arguendo, have resulted in the inequitable distribution of the benefits of the Area.11 7 In such a situation it is unlikely the Review Conference, composed of all states parties and thus dominated by Third World
countries, would feel itself bound by the proscription of Article 155(5).
This is especially so since the Council, which contracts with contractors
on behalf of the Authority and which is dominated by developing states,
will be the center of power in the Authority."'
It is quite clear that developing states conditioned their acceptance
of the Convention based on the fundamental assumption that the Area's
resources would be equitably distributed. 9 The Review Conference provision was created precisely to determine whether equitable distribution
was taking place. 20 Some developing states view the current regime for
mining of the Area as merely "experimental."'' This raises the question

115. See generally Separate Opinion of Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in Admissibility
of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 185-86
(Advisory Opinion).
116. Convention, supra note 1, art. 155(1)(a)-(f) & 2. Mr. Elliot L. Richardson, who was
for many years the U.S. ambassador to the Law of the Sea Conference, disagrees with this
interpretation. He observes that:
article 155(5) was viewed as absolutely fundamental by the U.S. and the prospective deep sea-bed mining countries. It was, in any case, declaratory of article 19 of annex III, whose provisions were firmly in place long before the definitive negotiation of article 155(5). The same is true of article 153(6). It was well
recognized by the Group of 77 that without these guarantees, no agreement on
a review conference - and no serious prospect of investment - would have
been possible.
Letter to the author of April 19, 1985.
117. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht has observed that there are cases where a "treaty - far
from giving expression to any common intention of the parties - actually registers the absence of any common intention ... or contains provisions which are mutually inconsistent
and which the creative work of interpretation must reduce to some coherent meaning." Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretationand the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpreta-

tion of Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 48, 52 (1949). In this event, he notes, the issue
becomes one of treaty interpretation. For a discussion of the forum which would be called
upon to interpret the Convention in the event of such a dispute, see infra note 152 and
sources cited therein.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 42-53.
119. See, e.g., Njenga, supra note 82.

120. Id.
121. Id.
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of whether the Review Conference can alter the constitutional aspects of
Part XI in such a manner as to require the Authority unilaterally to alter
or abrogate existing contracts, either by eliminating article 155's paragraph 5 or by inserting a specific set of constitutional guidelines which
would have the effect of forcing the cancellation or modification of some
contracts. Alternatively, the Review Conference could set up a successor
in interest to the Authority and require the transfer of contracts to the
new entity under significantly different terms. In either event, the international legal status of contractors' rights would assume a dominant role
in the resolution of the economic issues involved.
One useful way to attempt to analyze this question is by analogy to
American law; to compare the Review Conference's restructuring powers
to those exercised under United States bankruptcy law122 in a corporate
reorganization, and to consider the effect such action would have on contracts between the Authority and the contractors. Does the Authority
possess sovereign rights over the Area such as a sovereign state possesses
over its natural resources? 2 Does the Authority have rights as a trustee
for a public trust which, under general principles of international law,
would allow it to exercise the equivalent of permanent sovereignty over
the resources of the Area? 24 Can it nationalize the Area or exercise power
similar to eminent domain over the mine sites in order to provide a more
2 5
equitable distribution of benefits?

VI.

THE ANALOGY OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE TO CORPORATE

REORGANIZATION UNDER UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY LAW

One of the fundamental difficulties in analyzing the Convention is
that disputes arising under it must be addressed within the Convention's
framework and supplemented where necessary by general principles of international law. It is not only useless but potentially misleading to analyze the Convention (which is a unique, self-contained constitutional system), in terms of the United Nations and other international
organizations.12 6 A more appropriate analogy may be to corporate reor-

122. See generally Title 11, United States Code.
123. Convention, supra note 1, art. 157;. Cf. Reparations For Injuries Suffered in the
Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178-89 (Advisory Opinion).
124. See Brewer, Deep Seabed Mining: Can an Acceptable Regime Ever Be Found? 11
OCEAN D.v. & INT'L L. 25, 50 (1982); Varadhan, Management of Resources of the International Seabed: Recent Trends, in LAW OF THE SEA: CARACAS AND BEYOND 263, 274 (Anand
ed. 1978); Anand, Exploitation of Deep Seabed Resources: Interests of the Developing
Countries, in THE DEEP SEABED AND ITS MINERAL RESOURCES, supra note 82, at 25, 28.
125. Presumably the measure of compensation here would be that required by international law. For a discussion of the apparent international law requirement for compensation,
see American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 23 I.L.M. 1, 9-10 (1984).
126. The Convention is a constitutive treaty which has no equivalent. It most closely
resembles the United Nations Charter, but is sufficiently different in key aspects, such as
widely divergent functional purposes, lack of a Big Five veto provision and greater power for
the Secretary-General. See generally Gordon, The World Court and the Interpretation of
Constitutive Treaties, 59 Am. J. INT'L L. 794 (1965).
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ganization under United States bankruptcy laws, where the Authority is
treated by the Review Conference as a failed enterprise - if not in the
economic, then in the political sense. The bankruptcy analogy appears to
be appropriate because one of the primary purposes of the U.S. law is to
protect the rights of creditors while ensuring that insolvent essential industries, such as railroads, continue to provide service to the public.'
Thus, economic rights and the public interest are balanced and protected. 128 The bankruptcy analogy, of course, is merely intended to serve
as a model upon which consensus may be reached on the acceptability of
Part XI of the Convention. The analogy is used to demonstrate a principle of law which, although not necessarily a general principle of international law, 12 is recognized in the municipal law of many states. "
The United States bankruptcy laws are a privilege granted to persons
within American jurisdiction by the Congress under the authority of the
U.S. Constitution, "1 just as the Review Conference is authorized by Article 155 to reexamine the exploitation of the resources of the Area. Much
18 2
like the proceedings of the Review Conference under the Convention,
U.S. bankruptcy proceedings are grounded in equity." " The purpose of
corporate restructuring is to make a failed essential industry profitable.,"
This is most important in cases where the insolvent essential industry
serves an important public purpose. 3 ' The reorganization thus focuses on
the need to restructure the entity to allow it to continue to serve the
public interest. 3 6
The Review Conference will likely be most concerned with the effec37
tiveness of the regime in distributing the wealth derived from the Area.1
If the Review Conference concludes that the Authority has failed in its
political mission, and has resulted in the inequitable distribution of
wealth, the Authority could be likened to an insolvent essential industry
under the U.S. bankruptcy law. s In this event, the Review Conference
would act in a capacity resembling a constitutional convention, in the

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1165(1978).
Id.
See supra note 22.
Canada S. R.R., 109 U.S. at 539.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.

132. Convention, supra note 1, art. 155(1)(a)-(f) & 2.

133. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,
240 (1934); Matter of Commonwealth, 617 F.2d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 1980).
134. See, e.g., New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 432 (1970).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 111-113.

138. The analogy is not unthinkable. The purpose of a U.S. business enterprise serving
an important public purpose, as recognized by the bankruptcy law, is to (1) make a profit or
(2) continue to operate without incurring loss. See, e.g., New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399
U.S. at 432. The purpose of the Authority is to "ensure equitable exploitation of the resources of the Area for the benefit of all countries." Convention, supra note 1, art. 155(2).
See supra note 21.
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sense that the group was meeting to amend the constitutional structure of
the Authority. The Review Conference's mandate under Article 155(1)(a)(f) and (2) would be to revise Part XI to correct the regime's perceived
inequities. Thus, the possible actions open to the Review Conference are,
from an international legal perspective, actually wider than the language
of Article 155(5) suggests on its face.""9
In the event the Review Conference terminates the Authority and
liquidates its assets 140 after creating a new vehicle to manage the Area
and its resources,141 it appears that the terms of contracts previously entered into between the Authority and the contractors could continue in
force, notwithstanding Article 137(2)'s prohibition of the exploitation of
the Area's resources in the absence of the Authority's approval.' 42 Although it could be argued that the absence of the Authority would impose
a moratorium on mining by entities other than the Enterprise, this result
was explicitly rejected by industrialized countries during the negotiations
and was acquiesced in by developing states. 43 Thus, even if the Authority
were liquidated, the contractors could continue operating144 while making
payments to a liquidation trustee 45 until a new and acceptable 4 6 entity

139. It should be noted, however, that whatever actions are to be undertaken involving
the contractors, the principle of non-discrimination would be applicable as among classes of
them. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4)(1978); Convention, supra note 1, art. 152(1). But even this
latter provision does not guarantee non-discrimination, as a qualification was inserted in
article 152(2) which provides: "special consideration for the land-locked and geographically
disadvantaged among them, specifically provided for in this Part shall be permitted."
140. Certainly, the Authority's assets are of a different nature than those typically involved in corporate reorganizations. The Authority's assets consist of its physical plant and
offices worldwide, whatever equipment it may own either independently or in conjunction
with the Enterprise, as well as the rights to license mine sites.
141. There is no requirement that the Review Conference create a new international
organization to succeed the Authority or any of its constituent parts, but certain parallels
are apparent with the League of Nations Mandate system and the question of South West
Africa (Namibia).
142. Article 137(2) provides that "[a]ll rights in the resources of the Area are vested in
mankind as a whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act. These resources are not subject to alienation. The minerals recovered from the Area, however, may only be alienated in
accordance with this Part and the rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority."
143. Evriviades, supra note 104, at 222. Evriviades notes that the present Convention's
language in article 155 was modified "to allay the fears of some industrialized countries
which considered the possibility of a moratorium as potentially destructive to ocean mining
activities at a time when their dependence on seabed mineral resources would have increased significantly." Id. See also Oxman, supra note 46, at 217.
144. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1108, 1165(1978). This principle is also found in Spanish bankruptcy law, embodied in the commercial code, article 931 (dealing with railroads as an insolvent essential industry), which provides: "Por ninguna accion judicial ni administrativa
podra interrumpirse el servicio de explotacion de los ferrocarriles ni de ninguna otra obra
publica." Codigo de Comercio (Aug. 22, 1885) art. 931.
145. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(1), 1108(1978). This principle is also contained in Spanish
bankruptcy law. See Codigo de Comercio, art. 940.
146. Presumably, states which refused to join the successor in interest to the Authority
would not be bound by its decisions, just as states refusing to ratify the Convention could
not be bound by its terms under the guise of customary international law. See North Sea
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emerges to take the place of the Authority. In this way, the contractors'
rights would remain unchanged.
Two basic options are open to reorganized enterprises under U.S.
bankruptcy law with respect to the impairment of rights of parties in the
position of the contractors.1 47 Under the first alternative, the reorganization plan must not alter "the legal, equitable and contractual rights to
which such claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest."14 This option would appear to be inapplicable, however, in that it is
the contracts themselves which have led to the perceived failure of the
Authority.
The other alternative and the method proposed by this paper to reconcile the interests of industrialized and developing states is that the Review Conference interpret Article 155(5) to mean that the rights acquired
under existing contracts have a monetary value as their equivalent.'4 9 If
participation of the industrialized states in the Convention were conditioned upon acceptance of this interpretation of Article 155, the fears of
the mining consortia that contractors would receive short shrift at the
hands of developing countries might be allayed. At the same time, developing states will have achieved their primary objective, which is to retain
control over the resources of the Area in order to prevent their exploitation by a handful of highly industrialized states.1 50 The issue of valuation
would then be subject to negotiation'" as to the precise amount of compensation owed or, in the event of a deadlock, to the dispute settlement
mechanisms of the Convention. 2

Continental Shelf Case (Fed. Rep. Ger. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 25 (Judgment); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 26 & 34, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969),
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1979). But see Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16 (Advisory Opinion).
147. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1978).
148. Id. $ (1).
149. Id. $ (3). The question of valuation is beyond the scope of this paper. It should be
noted, however, that New Haven Inclusion Cases raises several possibilities for valuation.
399 U.S. at 435-482. Value may be based on (1) the physical assets of the enterprise sold as
scrap, or (2) the sale of the enterprise as a going concern, or (3) a combination of the foregoing. Id. For a recent case indicating that international law requires compensation for the
going concern value, see American Int'l Group, 23 I.L.M. 1 (1984).
150. See, e.g., Njenga, supra note 82, at 7.
151. This is consistent with U.S. bankruptcy law, which contemplates "that there shall
be some giving and taking by all concerned." In re Atlas Pipeline Corp., 39 F. Supp. 846, 848
(W.D. La. 1941).
152. See generally Convention, supra note 1, Part XI, § 5, arts. 186-191; Part XV and
annex VI. The Convention's dispute settlement mechanisms are extremely complex and may
not be entirely satisfactory to developed states and potential investors.
There are, theoretically, seven dispute settlement procedures which may be applied to
conflicts involving the Area: (1) the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, id. arts. 186-187 (Chamber); (2) the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea, id. annex VI (Tribunal); (3-4) special ad hoc panels of the Chamber, id.
art. 188(1)(b), or the Tribunal, id. art. 188(1)(a); (5) conciliation, id. art. 284 & annex V; (6)
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This approach is analogous to the U.S. bankruptcy law, which provides that, on the effective date of the reorganization plan, the holder of
such claim or interest receives, on account of such claim or interest, cash
equal to,
(A) with respect to a claim, the allowed amount of such claim; or
(B) with respect to an interest, if applicable, the greater of
(i) any fixed liquidation preference to which the terms of any security representing such interest entitle the holder of such interest;
and

(ii) any fixed price at which the debtor, under the terms of such
3
security, may redeem such security from such holder.'5
Under this alternative, the Authority could cancel its contracts with
contractors if the Authority provided compensation." The value of the
compensation would likely be determined by general principles of international law,' 55 taking into account the equitable interests'"6 of the con-

binding commercial arbitration, id. art. 188(2) & annex VII; and, (7) resort to the International Court of Justice, id. art. 287(l)(b).
It appears that despite the existence of these seven alternative dispute settlement procedures, the Chamber will play the principal, if not exclusive, role in resolving disputes
between contractors and the Authority. Id. art. 287(2). See Gaertner, The Dispute Settlement Provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea: Critique and Alternatives to the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 19 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 577, 584 (1982); But
see Burnhardt, Compulsory Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea Negotiations: A
Reassessment, 19 VA. J. INr'L L. 69, n.9 and accompanying text (1978).
While private parties to a dispute involving the Area may avoid the Chamber, see Convention, supra note 1, art. 287(3)-(5), difficulties may arise if the Chamber develops a biased
personality and the dispute involves the Authority. Gaertner, supra, at 591. In this case,
"the Authority may refuse to submit to alternative fora, thereby forcing the settlement of
the dispute into the nonobjective Chamber." Id. (citation omitted). See Convention, supra
note 1, art. 287(2).
This appears to be an unfavorable result since the Chamber will likely be dominated by
judges from developing states. The Chamber is composed of 11 members, chosen by a majority of the Tribunal's judges from among its ranks. Although there is no specific requirement regarding representation in the Chamber, Convention, supra note 1, annex VI, art.
36(2) "assures" that "the principal legal systems of the world and equitable geographical
distribution shall be assured." Thus, it is likely that the Chamber will be dominated by
judges from and sympathetic to the position of developing states.
153. 11 U.S.C. § 1124(3)(1978).
This principle is also embodied in the Spanish Commercial Code, see Codigo de Comercio, art. 883, and the Italian Commercial Code. See Regio Decreto, Marso 16, 1942, No. 267,
"Disciplina del fallimento ....
" art. 59.

154. The question of adequate compensation remains a controversial topic among governments. See, e.g., Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguaonese de la Came, 705 F.2d 250, 255 (7th
Cir. 1983); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 888-893 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 942 (1983). Although central to the issue of cancellation of
the contracts of contractors, the question of compensation is beyond the scope of this
article.
155. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal recently held that the appropriate method for valuation of an expropriated business under international law, at least in some circumstances,
is as a "going concern." See American Int'l Group, 23 I.L.M at 9-10.
For a different view of the currrent status of international law relating to compensation,

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 14:2-3

tractors. This provision is reasonable in the context of a reorganized essential industry which must be freed from burdensome contracts in order
to fulfill its fundamental public purpose and succeed, while recognizing
the contractual rights of private parties. This alternative makes even
more sense in the context of contracts between the Authority and contractors, where the contractors' rights might be reduced but not wholly
eliminated. It might be added that if agreement were reached a priori
between industrialized states and the developing states on this method of
valuation, it would pose a strong disincentive to abrogate contractors'
rights under the Convention because of the predictably huge cost of providing compensation. Thus, agreement on this principle could provide
moderation in the Review Conference, where the cost of such a decision
would have to be weighed. On the other hand, if such an arrangement
proved satisfactory to private mining consortia in the developed states,
their conduct might be influenced to the extent that they would be prepared to invest the billions of dollars necessary to begin commercial exploitation of the seabed. Once the investment was made, the contractors
would have a powerful incentive to remain on the best possible terms
with the Authority in order to prolong their tenure. On balance, this proposal is intended to diminish the dividing lines between north and south,
which were dramatically underscored during the course of the sometimes
arduous UNCLOS III negotiations.
VII.

CONCLUSION

1 57
Part XI of the Convention is the result of political compromise
which is nowhere reflected more clearly than in the provisions relating to
the exploitation of the resources of the Area. These provisions support
contradictory political, economic, and legal positions involving the international legal status of contracts between the Authority and the contractors. While the Convention appears adequately to safeguard the rights of
contractors for the first twenty years of commercial exploitation of the
seabed, it is not at all certain that contracts will remain unimpaired after
the Review Conference.

see Schachter, Compensation for Expropriation, 78 Am. J. INrT'L L. 121, 121-130 (1984),
Compensation Cases - Leading and Misleading, 79 Am. J. INT'L L. 420 (1985). But see
Robinson, Expropriationin the Restatement (Revised), 78 Am. J. INrr'L L. 176 (1984) and
Mendelson, What Price Expropriation, 79 Am. J. INT'L L. 414 (1985).
156. The equitable interests of the contractors include not only investment less depreciation, but also future income. Justice Douglas observed in Consol. Rock Prod. v. DuBois,
312 U.S. 510 (1940), that "[a] sum of values based on physical factors and assigned to separate units of the property without regard to the earnings capacity of the whole enterprise is
plainly inadequate." Id. at 526. This presumes, of course, that the sites are being operated
profitably by the contractors, and have not been allowed to sit idle or abandoned. Cf. New
Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. at 436 (Interstate Commerce Commission acted properly in
approving sale of bankrupt railroad with "'neither earning power nor the prospect of earning power'" based on the value of its physical assets).
157. See, e.g., Richardson, Seabed Mining and the Law of the Sea, 80 DEP'T. ST. BULL.
60, 60-64 (1980).
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This article has attempted to demonstrate that contracts between the
Authority and the contractors may be altered consistent with the Convention, despite the language of Article 155(5) providing for the sanctity of
contracts. This aspect of the Convention has received little attention and
could be a potentially important stumbling block to the participation of
the U.S. and other developed countries in the Convention. This article
suggested that one method for reconciling the differences between developed and developing states was to negotiate a compromise agreement to
protect the economic rights of contractors who participate in seabed mining. The method suggested is to find an analogy for the valuation of the
important interests involved, taking into consideration the need to provide security for the contracts and, at the same time, assuring developing
states that they would retain an acceptable measure of international control over the Area and its resources. This article suggested that such an
analogy can be found in U.S. bankruptcy law, in which the Authority is
viewed as a (politically) failed essential industry. It was suggested that
this analogy may be useful in narrowing the gap between developed and
developing states with respect to participation in seabed mining, and to
avoid the potentially serious consequences which could stem from the Review Conference. Whether the Review Conference will in fact require the
abrogation or alteration of these contracts will be determined by international politics and a world economy in the twenty-first year of commercial
exploitation of the seabed.

Two Models for a Rawlsian Theory of
International Law and Justice
DANIEL W. SKUBIK*

I.

INTRODUCTION

John Rawls' A Theory of Justice' is a massive, impressive volume. As
Barry notes in his critique, "[iut weighs in at over a quarter of a million
words-about equivalent to three books of the average length of modern
books devoted purely to analysis and argument. .

.

. [F]rom the first

page to the last it is simply crammed with arguments."' Yet, for all the
topics thoroughly investigated which inform the arguments for his theory
of justice as fairness, the book is just as crammed with assumptions,' caveats,' and questions which cannot be either (further) pursued or considered except in passing.5
This need not be a severe drawback on its face. Too many authors
implicitly incorporate these limiting devices without notice to the reader,
making analysis cumbersome and difficult. By being explicit, Rawls has
done his readers and critics valuable service. On the other hand, it is difficult to gauge the success of the over-all argument for justice as fairness
when the reader begins to accumulate a number of reservations. Just how
important are certain caveats or unanswered queries to Rawls' theory?
The purpose of this paper is to explore but one of these troublesome
areas of reservations and queries which arise with Rawls' full account of
his theory of justice and to chart the consequences of troubling these waters. The area of focus here selected is the intimated extension of justice
as fairness between societies to develop a theory of global reciprocity. Our
focus then, will be limited to the problems arising from Rawls' account of
international justice and the principles which can be derived from an
original position for a law of nations. It is in exploring this account that
we hope to analyze and to expand upon a number of the assumptions and
workings of the domestic theory of justice as fairness provided in the text.
* B.A., B.S., California Baptist College; M.A. (hons.) University of Melbourne; J.D.,

UCLA College of Law. Currently in private practice as a Legal and Political Risk Consultant in Canberra, Australia.
1. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)[hereinafter cited as TJ].
2. B. BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE 1 (1973).
3. Phrases such as "I assume," "it seems reasonable," "seems widely agreed that," and

"we may suppose," occur frequently throughout the work.
4. See TJ, supra note 1, sec. 42 at 265, opening remarks of sec. 42 on economic theory.
See also id. sec. 69 at 452.
5. Eg., closing remarks of sec. 59 on non-ideal theory. Id. sec. 59 at 391. See also opening remarks of sec. 18 on principles for individuals. Id. sec. 18 at 108.
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Although Rawls expresses the belief that his account of international
justice naturally leads to principles for a law of nations with which we are
familiar,6 it is not at all obvious that this should be so. In fact, we might
wonder at such an innocuous outcome being the ready result of extrapolations from domestic principles of justice which were themselves derived
from such controversial devices as maxims with no less controversial results like lexical ordering in the special conception. And we shall quickly
discover that analyzing these ready extrapolations will be extremely
troublesome. This is so for two reasons: (1) the treatment accorded the
derivation and application of principles for international law is so minimal as to be near lacking;7 and (2) the assumptions underlying this treatment and their consequences for international justice are never dealt with
systematically.8
Indeed, we shall find little guidance even in the mass of secondary
literature generated since the publication of Rawls' treatise. The few articles which do direct themselves to the account of international justice
tend to focus only upon preliminary questions of the theory's structure,9
usually relating to issue-specific applications like the assumption of selfsufficiency and the politics of the difference principle, 10 or the principle of
non-intervention and the politics of human rights.1" The questions are
then always pursued within a general framework of contemporary nonideal international relations.
While these articles raise significant questions, a theoretical frame-

6. Id. at 387
7. In fact, fewer than two full pages are dedicated to the discussion of principles of
international law. Id. at 377-79. These pages are within the general discussion of conscientious refusal in time of war. Id. sec. 58, at 377-82. Other references are mere notes that the
principles for the law of nations will not be taken up except in passing. Id. at 8, 108, 115.
8. In addition to the references cited in the previous note, an important paragraph for
our purposes occurs in id. at 457. There an assumption is bared but altogether this seems
precious little in 587 pages of dense text. Nonetheless, this lack of systematic discussion,
however curious, should not be taken to indicate that Rawls dismisses the issue. Two of
Rawls' subsequent articles in defense of his domestic theory also collaterally address the
issue of international scope, particularly as regards the nature of the basic structure he is
attempting to construct. See Rawls, The Basic Structure as Subject, in VALUES AND
MORALS, 47, 57, 70 (A. Goldman & J. Kim eds. 1978). [hereinafter cited as BSS]. See also
Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 524 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as KCMT], where he defends his notion of "self-contained national community". The
fact that he broaches the topic of international justice from the detailed framework of societal justice which he does provide indicates an expectation that his theory can be naturally
extended. TJ, supra note 1, at 377. Framing this extension and tracing its consequences are
the tasks of this essay.
9. E.g., D'Amato, InternationalLaw and Raws' Theory of Justice, 5 DEN. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 525 (1975).
10. Representative of this is the work by Beitz, Justice and InternationalRelations, 4

PHIL & PUB.

360 (1975). This article appears in revised and expanded for in C. Beitz,
(1979).
11. Wicclair, Rawls and the Principle of Nonintervention, in JOHN RAWLs' THEORY OF
SOCIAL JUSTICE 289 (H. Blocker and E. Smith eds. 1980)
AFF.
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work for an ideal strict compliance theory for international justice remains unexplicated, both by Rawls and his critics. It is this missing
framework and its applications which we shall attempt to supply in the
remainder of this essay. In fact, after uncovering some ambiguities and
questionable assumptions, it will become possible to develop clearly two
disparate models of well-ordered societies existing as subjects of international justice. It is argued that both models are consistent with Rawls'
overall treatment of justice and both receive the "Rawlsian" label. Model
1 is based upon the primary presentation found in A Theory of Justice;
Model 2 is that theory which develops from questioning some of the conceptual ambiguities of society and international law grounding Model 1.
As might be expected, the consequences of these models' developments and operations are quite dissimiliar. The subsequent part of this
essay will explore the development of these two models, detailing the special features of their original positions. Based upon their respective positions, an exposition is formulated detailing principles to be chosen from
behind their respective veils of ignorance. Here, Model 1 will closely follow the limited account presented by Rawls. Model 2, on the other hand,
will begin to diverge in the description of its original position, yielding
strikingly different principles than those acknowledged under Model 1.
Part III completes the substance of the essay with a close examination of some of the practical consequences of the operations of both models in three hypothetical situations of international import. Based on the
theoretical and practical analyses generated, the paper concludes with a
summary evaluation of the models coherence and stability under the
Rawlsian device of reflective equilibrium. The question proposed is:
"Which model more closely matches considerations of justice as fairness
in an international arena"? Let us proceed to develop an answer.

II.

THEORY

Rawls' aim is to present a sophisticated social contract conception of
justice. Being so framed, it is not surprising that his theory incorporates
familiar elements found in the social compact theories of Locke, Rousseau
and Kant. But, justice as fairness is an attempt to transcend these traditional conceptions by generalizing at a higher level of abstraction."2 Thus,
while one of the central features of Rawls' theory of justice is a description of an initial status quo in which participants meet to formulate and
agree (contract) s upon principles for establishing a well-ordered society
(a common central feature of social contract theories), no particular society or form of government is envisioned (as is usually the case). Rather,
general principles for ordering the basic structure of society (and,

12. TJ, supra note 1, at viii, 3 and 11.
13. See Hampton, Contractsand Choices, 77 J. OF PHIL. 315 (1980), where it is argued
that this initial status quo, Rawls' "original position," effectively eliminates altogether a
contractarian interpretation of the resulting theory of justice.
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thereby, any society) are in view.
Derivation of such general principles is made possible through the
careful structuring of a hypothetical initial situation which is fair towards
all. That is, based upon a philosophical anthropology familiar to Kant,
the hypothetical ought to be so structured as to respect the freedom and
equality of human beings as moral agents. Conversely, the hypothetical
ought to nullify the accidents of natural endowments and the contingencies of social circumstance. Man qua man is hereby represented in the
initial situation and general principles for (generic) society can be meaningfully sought.
That the description of this initial situation plays a prominent role in
the development of a conception of justice for Rawls is evident not only
in that his theory is contractarian, but is presaged in the very name of his
theory. It is the description, itself, of an "appropriate initial status quo
which insures that the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair.
This fact yields the name 'justice as fairness'." 4 Now, he admits that
there exist numerous characterizations of such an initial situation. Proffered interpretations will vary
depending upon how the contracting parties are conceived, upon what
their beliefs and interests are said to be, upon which alternatives are
available to them, and so on. In this sense, there are many different
contract theories. Justice as fairness is but one of these. But the question of justification is settled, as far as it can be, by showing that there
is one interpretation of the initial situation which best expresses the
conditions that are widely thought reasonable to impose on the choice
of principles yet which, at the same time, leads to a conception that
characterizes our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium. 6
Justice as fairness, it is argued, best satisfies these criteria. Considerations of fairness then will help shape the favored philosophical interpretation of the conditions which characterize this initial situation. Such conditions and their ramifications for principles of domestic justice are
discussed by Rawls under four headings: the circumstances of justice, the
formal constraints of the concept of right, the veil of ignorance, and the
rationality of the parties.1 6 The initial situation so characterized is what
Rawls designates the original position. What will constitute the focus of
our discussion in this part is the interpretation of the conditions noted
above, as given by Rawls, when extended to encompass the sphere of international justice as defined by our models.
A.

Model 1.

In beginning to develop an original position for our first model, it
should be noted that the conditions discussed by Rawls under two of the

14. Id. at 17.
15. Id. at 121.
16. Id. secs. 20-25, at 118-50.
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headings previously mentioned-the formal constraints of the concept of
right and the rationality of the parties-do not require extensive reanalysis and need not detain us. We can readily subsume the discussion on
generality, universality, publicity, ordering and finality within the international scope of Model 1. Since these constraints "hold for the choice of
all ethical principles,"' 7 they easily extend to our forum and are, in fact,
desirable conditions as given.
Likewise, his discussion of mutual disinterestedness (limited altruism), lack of envy, use of effective means and strict compliance, however
individually debatable,"8 can be incorporated without greatly influencing
development of our model. Indeed, desiring to develop a Rawlsian model,
Rawls' presentation should be adopted or incorporated wherever feasible.
As he has signalled no necessity to reevaluate these conditions when discussing international principles, the rationality of the parties shall also be
taken as given.
On the other hand, the remaining two headings-the circumstances
of justice and the veil of ignorance-and their conditions present some
difficulties. Within the framework provided by Rawls, the reader is signalled that modifications of these conditions are required when extending
the original position to encompass an international setting. Passing hints
are given concerning the substance of some changes.' 9 The extent of any
other modifications is less clear. Our interpretative task involves an analysis of all necessary modifications, their effects upon the participants and
any (new) constraints for international principles resulting from a modified original position. In an effort to chart these necessary modifications
and their effects, let us begin by reviewing Rawls' passing sketch of an
international original position, the changes he envisions, and the assumptions he invokes.
For Rawls, derivation of principles of justice for a law of nations is
the final choice problem in a three-item agenda for the participants in the
original position.20 The first choice problem focuses upon those principles

17. Id. at 130.
18. See, eg., Simson, Another View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 23 EMORY L.J. 473
(1974). See also R.P. WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS (1977), for a critical commentary on
these points.
19. It is assumed that those in the orginal position should act as representatives of their
nations to develop fundamental principles as between states; and that although still deprived of most specific information-such as the nation to which they do/will belong, its
particular circumstances and their own place in it-these representatives are to benefit from
a partial "lifting of the veil" and do know that (1) nation-states are the historical reality of
the day, and (2) these, like individuals-in-society, will have conflicts of interests. This thinner veil assumption is placed in relative time for us in TJ, supra note 1, at 109f; it lies
between the initial original position stage (no specific societal data injected into deliberations) of the four-stage sequence. Note that the former assumption appears to eliminate any
notion of an individual having a claim against a state. Neither apparently does a nation
which is not also a state have any such claims.
20. See the schematic diagram provided, id. at 109. Principles are to be chosen for (I)
social systems and institutions, (II) individuals, (IIa) natural duties, (IIb) obligations, (IIc)
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of justice which order the basic structure of individual societies. The solution to this problem is his two principles of justice as lexically ordered in
the special conception. Arriving at and defending this solution consumes
the greatest portion of his energies, as he argues for justice as fairness and
against competing conceptions like average utility.
The second choice problem concerns the various principles of obligation and natural duties as these apply to individuals. Although no complete or systematic account pertaining to this choice problem is offered,
that this problem is encountered as the second item on the original position agenda means
the choice of principles for individuals is greatly simplified by the fact
that the principles for institutions have already been adopted. The
feasible alternatives are straight-way narrowed down to those that
constitute a coherent conception of duty and obligation when taken
together with the two principles of justice."1
Certain examples and arguments disclosing the substantive nature of this
coherent conception briefly appear, in four widely separated sections,22
involving a principle of fairness coupled to various positive and negative
natural duties, including those of justice, mutual aid, mutual respect and
refraining from doing harm or injury.
Assuming this order of choice problems, when the participants reach
the end of this second agenda item of business, they will have agreed
upon a set of
principles of right as these apply to their own society and to themselves as members of it. Now at this point one may extend the interpretation of the original position and think of the parties as representatives of different nations who must choose together the fundamental
principles to adjudicate conflicting claims among states. 2
But before moving directly to a choice of principles, it will be necessary to
reexamine our initial situation. As previously noted, although no changes
in the understanding or interpretation of the original position were required as the argument moved from the first item of institutional principles to the second item of individual natural duty, differences in construction and interpretation of the original position are required as the
participants move to choice item three, the law of nations. These changes
occur in three categories: (1) our conception of the parties, (2) the circumstances of justice, and (3) the veil of ignorance.
The most straightforward change confronts us in the first category,
our conception of the parties. No longer do the participants represent
permissions, and (III) the law of nations. "The Roman numerals express the order in which
the various sorts of principles are to be acknowledged in the original position." Id. at 110.
21. Id. at 334 (footnote omitted).
22. Secs. 18 and 19 describe the principles for individuals. Id. secs. 18, 19 at 108-17.
Secs. 51 and 52 argue their acceptance as essential part of a conception of right.
23. Id. at 377-78
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continuing persons as mutually disinterested individuals. In addition, no
longer do the participants have in view the ordering of only the basic
structure of a single, undefined society. Rather, given that a society is
now assumed to be defined by the modern conceptual and actual boundaries of a nation-state, the participants find themselves representing different nations in an initial situation where they are to choose principles for
structuring the relations between these new, higher-order parties. 2' Thus,
it can reasonably be assumed (though it is not absolutely clear) that the
parties-the nation-states so represented, are all well-ordered societies
and that these well-ordered societies need (desire?) to choose principles
to order their interaction and to adjudicate any conflicting claims.
The second category of the circumstances of justice also incorporates
a number of changes. 26 In part, these changes in interpretation are due to
the change of forum, since we are now dealing with global cooperative
schemes or boundaries. However, not the least of the changes are in response to the shift in understanding of the conception of the parties inhabiting the original position. The circumstances require sufficient reinterpretation so that it makes sense to ask if, and how, they might apply to
well-ordered nation-states as parties. For example, the second circumstance of justice indicates that parties are expected (though certainly not
required) to have divergent fundamental basic beliefs. How are we to understand this expectation in relation to a number of well-ordered socie-

24. A number of interesting queries arise here, for example in fulfiUing their representative functions, do the participants actually come from different nations or merely reason
as if they are from different nations (rather like reasoning as if they were risk averse)? Id. at
172. This is unclear because the subsequent contractual arena, a constitutional convention
in the four-stage sequence, appears to involve the identical participants; yet clearly, only a
single society is there in view and the participants are once again only continuing persons.
Id. at 196. Is representation divided o allow one participant per nation, or more than one?
Might nation A have one representative while nation B has three? These questions may
seem trivial, but they are tied to the much more important issue of legitimacy of representation. By what authority or conception of right can the participants move from their status as
continuing persons to wholesale representatives of nations? As Rawls notes in reference to
his domestic principles of justice, "the hypothetical nature of the original position invites
the question: why should we take any interest in it, moral or otherwise"? Id. at 587, 21. An
attenuated representation in a hypothetical original position to encompass the international
forum would appear to enhance the difficulties in formulating an adequate response.
25. Rawls describes the circumstances of justice as the normal conditions which characterize the objective and subjective factors of human cooperation which confront individuals
in (or in formation of) a well-ordered society. He deals with these factors in some detail. Id.
sec. 22 at 126-30. These factors may be summarized in the following manner: (1) conditions
of moderate scarcity exist; (2) there is a divergence of fundamental interests and ends, and a
variety of opposing and incompatible beliefs; and (3) the scheme of basic institutions is a
more or less self-sufficient and productive scheme of social cooperation for mutual good.
"Society" is here viewed as a "cooperative venture for mutual advantage" Id. at 520. The
summary is culled from the enumeration of the twelve features involved in the concept of a
well-ordered society in Rawls, Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, 88 Q. J. EcoN. 633, 635
(1974), where they appear as conditions (8)-(10). For a critical discussion and comparison of
Hume's and Rawls' use of such factors when characterized as circumstances of justice, see
Hubin, The Scope of Justice, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1980).
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ties, all of which are ordered by the same coherent set of institutional and
individual principles?
Perhaps the best way to understand this circumstance in the immediate context is to distinguish two levels of meaning. At the higher level
of abstraction, it is certainly true that justice is the fundamental interest
of all well-ordered societies. In this there will be no divergence. But we
should not therefore conclude from this convergence that we are approaching an international society whose fundamental agreements belie a
need for principles of international justice. Rawls does, for example, present constitutional democracy as a type or structure which can conform
to his principles and, thereby, be just. But he never argues that only constitutional democracies are just. Similarly, ownership of the means of production could conceivably be private of public, capitalistic or socialistic,
in nature and still conform to the demands of justice."6
At a somewhat lower level of abstraction, then, it should not be surprising to see a variety of societal structures as each nation-state attempts to fulfill this interest of justice in differing forms. Based on these
type or structural differences, it should also not be surprising to discover
that two of more well-ordered societies, striving towards justice, develop
divergent goals and opposing beliefs. Thus, the focus of the question
posed by this circumstance is not whether disputes or conflicts will arise,
but on what basis they are to be resolved if and when they do. Interpreted in this light, the second circumstance of justice is readily incorporated into the new original position.
Unfortunately, the remaining two circumstances of justice pose more
difficult problems of reinterpretation and incorporation. They will not be
so easily maneuvered into place. Turning to the first circumstance, we
find the statement that conditions of moderate scarcity exist. While this
condition makes reasonable sense when individuals within a single society
are in view, it does not have any apparent application to and between
well-ordered societies of nation-states. Recall the numerous phrases employed to designate these boundaries of cooperation: "a closed system isolated from other societies"'2 7 . . . "self-sufficient scheme of social cooperation"" . . . " a closed and self-sufficient system of cooperation. 2 9 To the
extent that a well-ordered society is truly self-sufficient, a condition of
any overall level of scarcity has little meaning or application. If self-sufficiency and closedness holds, any principles of interaction or adjudication
that might be chosen would merely lie unused; no conflicts would ever
arise, for no reciprocal interaction would ever be necessary. Any contacts
which might occur would be handled simply on an ad hoc basis.
26. Id. at 195 and 280. This discussion assumes, of course, that it makes sense to speak
of nations as having distinctive goals and beliefs. Whether this assumption is legitimate is
examined in the discussion concerning the veil of ignornance, infra.
27. Id. at 8.
28. BSS, supra note 8, at 70.
29. KCMT, supra note 8, at 524.
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Presumably, Rawls is prepared to relax the supposition of self-containment when treating the law of nations.30 This is again not wholly
clear, but given such a relaxation a plausible reading of this circumstance
is that "moderate scarcity" might refer to the wide and uneven distribution of natural and other resources throughout the world. Being a matter
of general knowledge for the parties, this fact of uneven distribution
would be known and considered. Thus, every country might be expected
to be able to supply some, or perhaps even most, of its needs for a time.
Yet, no country could reasonably expect to perpetually supply all of its
needs from internal resources alone. Too may natural resources are nonrenewable and chances are that some natural and technological resources
will be lacking entirely. Sooner or later, the society will be required to
seek to supplement its own resources by reaching outside its territorial
borders. In such instances, principles of interaction and adjudication are
mandatory. This same line of reasoning applies as well to the internal
development of technological and other resources for use and export.
Principles of reciprocity as between states will then be needed to order
necessarily expanding contacts of state parties. If this interpretation
holds, the circumstance can be reworded or understood to state that conditions of unevenly distributed and limited resources exist as between societies of nation-states, giving rise to conflicting claims. Still, this interpretation remains only plausible.
The third circumstance of justice relates directly to the first and requires elucidation before the latter can be made firm. The third circumstance states that a scheme of basic institutions exists which is (more or
less) self-sufficient and productive for mutual good. Again, while this condition reads reasonably well when individuals in society are in view, that
such a scheme exists in the international forum is patently not the case.
(Emphasis here is on the lack of a pre-defined scheme of authoritative
institutions in the model; a debatable contemporary historical void is here
only of contingent and secondary interest or concern.) Even were the
wording modified to indicate that such a scheme "can" or "might" exist,
we would still run headlong into statements like those above which noted
self-sufficiency, or this capstone: "a well-ordered society is a closed system; there are no significant relations to other societies, and no one enters
from without, for all are born into it to lead a complete life.""' Understood definitively, no degree of relaxation short of repudiation will get
around such firm statements concerning the nature of the parties.
Nevertheless, the enterprise need not be abandoned just yet. One option remains. It could be maintained that a statement like "there are no
significant relations" simply recognizes the factual situation at the time
the parties enter this stage in the original position to organize institutional structures to administer principles of adjudication. If such a read-

30. TJ, supra note 1, at 457.
31. KCMT, supra note 8, at 536.

DEN.

J.

INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 14:2-3

ing were permissible, we could reinterpret this third circumstance to indicate that a scheme of basic institutions "needs" or "ought" to be
established which "can" order interaction and adjudicate conflicting
claims between parties, based upon fundamental principles yet to be contracted, due to the conflicts conceivably arising under the first two circumstances of justice as reinterpreted in the discussion above.
Of course, this is no longer, strictly speaking, a mere factual claim of
circumstance. It contains a normative element, as well. But such a reading should not come as a complete surprise or generate too great an apprehension, since the parties already have a significant set of institutional
and individual principles to hand. Breakdown in the original position
leading to statal egoism in the international forum would not likely be
deemed desirable by parties who are otherwise commited to and are striving for justice. If this "ought" is conceded, the understandings reached
should allow incorporation of these reinterpretations in an international
original position. This analysis should also complete our discussion of the
changes required in category two.
Only one category remains, the third category of the veil of ignorance. Like the change in the first category pertaining to the parties, this
presentation is relatively straightforward. But it also raises similar
problems of justification. Recall that during the first two agenda items in
the original position, no specific information is available to the
participants.
No one knows his place in society, his class position or social status;
nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and
abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does
anyone know his conception of the good ....
More than this, I assume that the parties do not know the particular circumstances of
their own society. That is, they do not know its economic or political
situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been able to
achieve. The persons in the original position have no information as to
which generation they belong."
This passage focuses upon the negative aspects of their position,
what they do not know. The only particular facts available are that the
circumstances of justice (and whatever these imply) apply to their society. Positively, other passages indicate that there are to be no limitations
on general information, such as political and economic theory, laws of
human psychology and the basis of social organization.3 3 While Rawls has
been severely critized for the thickness of the veil,- his response is firm.
The parties are not to be influenced by any particular information
that is not part of their representation as free and equal moral per32. TJ, supra note 1, at 137.
33. Id. at 137-138.

34. One of the strongest critiques is provided by Hare, Rawls' Theory of Justice, 23
PHIL. Q. 144 (1973).
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sons . . . unless this information is necessary for a rational agreement
to be reached. . . .Even if these [thinner veil] restrictions led to the
same principles, the thicker veil would still be preferable, since these
principles are then3 5connected more clearly to the conception of free
and equal persons.
Turning to the ever so slight lifting of this veil for the third agenda
item, we find the introduction of an assumption and its corresponding
particular information. The assumption is that societies of the participants are to be characterized as nation-states and this new bit of information is revealed to them in their representative capacities. Other restrictions being equal, "the original position is fair between nations; it nullifies
the contingencies and biases of historical fate.""6
Time will not be spent working out reinterpretations of all the restrictions noted in the preceding passages as they relate to nation-states.
Most are easily converted and understood in their new context. However,
it should be noted that the veil-lifting prescribed severely diminishes the
universal application of this original position. Since the formative rising
of the nation-state is a relatively recent political phenomenon, dating
back little more than 350 years,3 7 it can no longer be said that the parties
"have no information as to which generation they belong." Perhaps this
assumption is simply a calculated concession to the present era of world
history in which we live. But, when only 350-odd years of nation-state
contingencies are nullified . . . when the parties can reasonably assume a
recent time frame in world history, it is difficult not to conceive this concession as morally arbitrary in a model otherwise devoted to ideal theory.
This criticism does no damage to the actual operation of the model; yet, it
does appear to limit its effective moral range.
A more serious problem arises in the context of nation-state parties
which does affect the operation of the model. Unless some organic assumptions of society previously rejected are brought into play," it seems
extremely difficult to understand what it means to transfer the free and
equal moral status of persons to national societies. If, indeed, this transfer cannot be made, it is not clear that the argument for requiring a
thicker veil should prevail. On a thinner account, all particulars could be
known (e.g. the actual distribution of all resources and the stages of development-political, cultural and economic-of the nations represented).
Only the personal characteristics, including nation-state citizenship, of
the representatives would remain behind the veil to insure the requisite

35. KCMT, supra note 8, at 549-50.
36. TJ, supra note 1, at 378.
37. While scholars differ as to datings, there is little disagreement that the origin of the
modern state is tied to the neologism of "sovereignty," which concept began to flourish in
the early 17th century. For representative discussion see H. KRABBE, THE MODERN IDEA OF
THE STATE (Sabine & Shepard trans. 1922); see also A. D'ErREvs, THE NOTION OF THE
STATE 89-103 (1967).

38. TJ, supra note 1, at 264.
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level of fairness.
On the other hand, it can be argued that free and equal moral status
does pertain to society as a collective. Rawls' early rejection of an organic
conception of society is arguably a rejection of "organ-ism" and not the
concept of collective responsibility and accountability. His discussion of
community and use of phrases such as "legitimate interest" in possessive
relation to society bear out this interpretation. Although a full-account of
a philosophical sociology is lacking in his treatise, the following gloss is
consistent with Rawls' presentation.
The notion of moral or collective personality-in which "personality"
has a proper analogical value-applies to the people as a whole in a
genuine manner: because the people as a whole (a natural whole) are
an ensemble of real individual persons and because their unity as a
social whole derives from a common will to live together which
originates in these real individual persons.39
Based upon such an interpretation of collectivity, the transfer of free and
equal moral status can be made in the new original position with the result that the thicker veil would still be preferable.
Discussion of the veil of ignorance closes the account of original position modifications. To conclude this rather lengthy discussion, a summary
chart follows. The column on the left (headed I and II) notes the first and
second choice problems relating to domestic institutional and individual
principles. The column on the right (headed III) provides a summary of
those conditions reinterpreted in light of the third choice problem relating to principles for a law of nations. Having now developed the structure
for an international original position, we can begin to examine the solution to this third choice problem by indicating those principles which
would be chosen under the model. But before actually turning to these
principles of international justice, one analytic chore remains. It is first
necessary to briefly examine the constraints of choice, or derivation and
acknowledgement, as these apply to the reasonings of the parties in the
original position.

39. J. MARrrJN, MAN AND THE STATE 16 n.11 (1951).
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The first constraint resting upon the parties is that any feasible set of
alternatives embracing international principles must be narrowed such
that acknowledgment is consistent with the institutional and individual
principles already chosen. Just as the individual principles of the second
choice problem had to form a coherent conception when taken with the
constitutional principles of the first choice problem, international principles are to conform to the outlines of this previously established coherent
conception. Taken together, all three sets of choice-solutions should form
a coherent table of principles for a theory of justice as fairness.
The second constraint to be considered is based upon one of the conditions of the rationality of the parties. According to the condition of
strict compliance, the principles finally acknowledged will constitute the
basis for an ideal theory of international justice. That is, "the parties can
rely on each other to understand and act in accordance with whatever
principles are finally agreed to. Once principles are acknowledged the parties can depend on one another to conform to them."4 Because of this
constraint, the parties can be expected to concentrate on selecting those
principles of reciprocal advantage for well-ordered nation-states which
will become the foundation for the basic institutions of a well-ordered
society of nations. The stress on well-orderedness means that the parties
need not be overly concerned with developing rules for just wars or general sanctioning powers, save as these relate to the problem of assurance:
given human nature, a "stabilizing device" might be required to allay suspicion or lack of confidence between the parties due to the possibility of
the "free rider" problem when an otherwise ideal scheme is implemented. 4' This possibility ties the ideal theory envisioned to partial compliance theories and real-life conflict (thereby indicating the place and
value of ideal theory in a non-ideal world), but partial compliance is not
the theme of Rawls' work or our Rawlsian models. Since the parties are to
assume good faith, the problem of assurance need only be mentioned or
42
sketched in passing.
With these two constraints in mind, the parties can now consider the
principles required to solve the third choice problem of international relations. Indeed, assaying the very conception of the parties as free and
equal entities, the first principle of international justice to be acknowledged would be immediately apparent. This is the basic principle of
equality: "Independent peoples organized as states have certain fundamental equal rights. '48 This principle corresponds to the free and equal
status of individuals and is the consequence of the transfer of moral status of individuals to nation-states based upon the notion of collectivity in

40. TJ, supra note 1, at 145.
41. See Rawls' discussion of penal sanctions in a well-ordered society, id. at 240f, 267f
and 315.
42. Id. at 8f, 245 and 351. Some of the problems of application will be appraised in the
next part of this article.
43. Id. at 378.
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the original position.
Equality is a basic or fundamental principle in that contingent factors are not to affect recognition of this essential quality. This feature of
the principle of equality is also a familiar part of contemporary international legal thinking. An early international contract theorist, commenting on the moral equality of nations, notes that
just as the tallest man is no more a man than a dwarf, so also a nation, however small, is no less a nation than the greatest nation.
Therefore, since the moral quality of men has no relation to the size of
their bodies, the moral equality of nations also has no relation to the
number of men of which they are composed.
This same author also goes on to argue that the fundamental rights and
obligations of all nations are the same, even as between powerful and
weak nations, and that right is never to be measured by might. 4" A more
recent 19th century international legal theorist puts the case succinctly
when he writes,
equality cannot be affected by the casual qualities or attributes of a
State, such as antiquity, population, extent of territory, military
power, form of the constitution, title of its sovereign, state of civilization, respect which it enjoys, etc. No one of these considerations can
justify the least difference or the slightest distinction between nations
considered as moral persons.... 45
Lest there be any doubt, we might interpolate that "[nlo one or any combination of these considerations" affects the principle of equality as between states.
This principle of equality seems required by the very structure of the
original position and the constraints outlined above. What is not clear is
how this principle, once acknowledged, should influence further deliberation. Interpretation and extension of an egalitarian principle should proceed cautiously and in concert with prior principles.
Equality of the parties easily led in the first choice problem to a principle of greatest equal liberty in treating individuals-in-society,
[blut in the society of states the need is not for greater liberty for the
individual states, but for a strengthening of the social bond between
them, not for the clamant assertion of their rights, but for a more
insistent reminder of their obligations towards one another ....
[I]t
is not improbable, and it is certainly desirable, that there should be a

44. C. WOLFF, Jus GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM secs. 16-18 (1764);
original reproduced and translated in 2 volumes in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1516 (J. Scott ed., J. Drake trans. 1934). Though Wolff relies on, and Rawls denies, a selfevident natural law, both present contractual theories for international relations and justice.
45. 1 C. CALvo, DICTIONNAIRE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ET PRIVE 286 (1885).
Cited in full by E. DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 100-101
(1920); cited in part by Johnston, The Foundationsof Justice in InternationalLaw, in THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 122 (MacDonald ed. 1978).
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movement towards the closer interdependence of states."'
Granted the author is not here speaking to parties in a Rawlsian original
position, the caution is nonetheless legitimate. Although the parties
would be loath to acknowledge a principle requiring interdependence,
they would also be wary, given the model conditions outlined, of choosing
a principle or interpretation of equality which might hinder establishing
reciprocal relationships for mutual advantage. Rather, based upon these
model conditions, a principle of equality should be so interpreted to help
form the very basis of cooperation, not merely differentiation or hostility.
If interdependence in some from is probable, even desirable, then a
basic institutional structure is required to develop a framework for responsible interaction. A reciprocating equality in relations cannot reasonably be expected to evolve in an atmosphere of statal egoism. The principle of equality could not be preserved under such a scheme. To found a
reciprocal structure, two more basic or fundamental principles will need
to be acknowledged. The first of these is the basic principle of obligation,
know traditionally as the principle of pacta sunt servanda-treatiesor
agreements are to be observed. This principle is interpreted so as to encompass the individual analog of fairness, combined with the duty of mutual respect. 47 So rendered, the principle establishes the contours of reciprocity in statal relations.
The second of these additional principles which should be acknowledged or chosen is based, like that of equality, on the conception of the
parties behind the veil of ignorance. This conception requires the acknowledgment of continuing collective responsibility. That is, once collective responsibility is recognized and the transfer of free and equal status
is made from individuals to nations in the original position, accountability cannot later be shed."8 Nations must acknowledge and take responsibility for their international claims and actions.
These three principles form the basic triad for the international
structure of Model 1. They would be readily acknowledged as flowing

46. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS, 50-51 (6th ed. 1963). Brierly's text is Rawls' one
and only cited authority for international affairs. We are even told that Brierly's work "contains all that we need here" for the development of international principles of justice. TJ,
supra note 1, at 378).
47. Remember that at the time of the transfer of moral status, individual principles had
already been acknowledged. Unless the contrary can be cogently argued, such individual
duties as these will also have transferred. For purposes of discussion under this model, we
shall assume they do, in fact, transfer legitimately to states; counter arguments could not be
successful. Cf. the statal duties outlined in Schachter, Towards a Theory of International
Obligation, 8 VA. J. INr'L L. 300 (1968).
48. Not all legal theorists would agree. Eg., Kelsen argues that collective responsibility
is a characteristic of primitive peoples and primitive legal systems. As an international law
develops, he would hope to see collective responsiblity diminish. Only in this critical light
does he admit, that collective responsibility is one of the characteristics elements of international law. See H. KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 25-26 (1942). But
cf. Cheng, Justice and Equity, 8 CURRENT LEGAL PRORS. 185 (1955).
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from the combinations of principles, constraints and conditions facing the
parties. But, these principles also imply a second-order triad of corollaries: self-determination (linked to the principle of equality), self-defense
(linked to the principle of collective responsibility) and self-limitation
(linked to the principle of pacta sunt servanda). These three additional
principles are the consequence of holding the first triad as basic to international relations.
In this context, self-determination means that each nation's conception of the good, being based in equality, is deemed legitimate and of
equal worth. Given that the particularities of specific conceptions are unknown behind the veil, the parties could not reasonably agree to a principle which might allow ranking of conceptions, thereby possibly putting
their nation's conception in jeopardy. Any other principle permitting one
nation's predominance over or interference in the internal affairs of another state, due solely to differing conceptions of the good, could not be
acknowledged or tolerated.
The corollary of self-defense, in this context, signifies not so much
the violence of warfare or military sanctions (remember that the parties
are well-ordered states), but addresses in light of collective responsibility
the right inhering to press claims based upon a nation's conception of the
good. Since all conceptions are deemed to be equal in worth under selfdetermination, the claims based in these conceptions must be allowed to
equally compete for resources.49
Finally, the meaning of self-limitation, which in this context is linked
to the pacta principle is two-fold. It acknowledges that a state has the
fundamental right to (a) entirely withhold a claim or claim of value, and
(b) restrict the scope of any claims which it can otherwise put forward
under self-defense. This corollary recognizes the independence of each
party to operate on the basis of its conception of the good and no party
can require another to act in accordance with its interpretation of the
50
other's best interest.
Taken together, these six principles form a complete foundation for
erecting a basic structure of background justice in the international
arena. Such was their derivation that these principles also form a coherent set when aligned with the solutions and constraint of the first two
choice problems of the model. This result closes the section and completes our initial task for the first Rawlsian model of international justice.

49. Rawls' indication of the traditional principles and meanings of self-determination
and self-defense appear at TJ, supra note 1, at 378. But cf. French & Gutman, The Principle of National Self-Determination, in PHILOSOPHY, MORALITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
138 (Held ed. 1974), where "nation" and "state" self-determinations are differentiated.
50. These corollaries may appear somewhat trivial, but they become important considerations in later rule development and effectiveness. As such, they would be acknowledged
as principles in this original position. See Wildeman, The PhilosophicalBackground of Effectiveness, EsSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS 355 (Meijers & Vierdag eds.
1977).
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We have developed its original position for an international forum and
have acknowledged the principles to be chosen under this model. We turn
in our next section to the complementary task of developing an original
position for and acknowledging principles to be chosen under Model 2.
B.

Model 2.

Under Model 1, the original position agenda contained three items or
choice problems: principles were to be acknowledged for the basic institutional structure, the natural duty of individuals and finally, the law of
nations. These problems were to be solved in the order given, so that international principles could be selected only after a coherent set of institutional and individual principles had first been established. This coherent set of principles would, in turn, narrow the range of feasible
alternatives for international principles, so that, at the conclusion of all
choice problems, the three solutions could form a complete and coherent
table of principles for a theory of justice as fairness. That the choice
problems were so framed was largely due to an assumption incorporated
in Rawls' theory of society. This assumption operated so as to circumscribe the denotations of community and society, making both terms synonymous with the modern notion of the nation state.5 '
Model 2 is the outcome of an attempt to break free of these restrictions in accord with the Kantian emphasis so often acknowledged in justice as fairness. This model is based upon distinctive understandings of
the concepts of community and society. "Community" here designates a

51. TJ, supra note 1, at 457. We discover the assumption which has been implicitly
operating throughout his argument when in section 69, "The Concept of a Well-Ordered
Society," the reader is informed that he is to "assume that the boundariesof these schemes
[i.e., the complex of major social institutions]are given by the notion of a self-contained
national community." That this notion implies the importation into theory of the modern
concept of the nation-state is made clear in later writings where the concept of the basic
structure is refined:
Now by assumption the basic structure is the all-inclusive social system that
determines background justice. (Observe that I leave aside here the problem of
justice between nation.)
The reason for doing this is that, as a first approximation, the problem of social justice concerns that basic structure as a closed background system. To
start with the society of nations would seem merely to push one step further
back the task of finding a theory of background justice. . . . We are better
prepared to take up this problem for a society (illustrated by nations) conceived as a more or less self-sufficient scheme of social cooperation and as possessing a more or less complete culture.
BSS, supra note 8, at 57, 70 (footnote omitted). This approach is reiterated in Kantian
Constructivism:
I am leaving aside two important matters: [one being] questions of justice between societies (the law of nations). . . . I shall simply proceed on the idea
that we may reasonably begin with the basic structure of one society as a
closed and self-sufficient system of cooperation.
KCMT, supra note 8, at 524.
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factual description of the nature of man as man-in-the-world; "society"
characterizes those voluntary relationships which develop as an expression of this community within a fixed or definite territory. These distinctions are maintained by acknowledging the fact of community as being
prior to and therefore separate from the phenomenon of society, and that
which is [to be] regulated by major institutions (i.e. a basic structure) of
international (understood as global) scale is essentially the former fact,
not the latter phenomenon.
Rawls' own description of the sociability of man, coupled with his
Kantian emphasis, points to a narrower notion of society and a broader
notion of community.5 2 Consider the Stoic notion of a world-wide
cosmopolis:
The positive substitute wherewith the Stoics thought to replace the
ordinary relations of civil society was by a citizenship of the world. No
preceding system had been able to overcome the difficulty of
nationalities.

If human society ... has for its basis the identity of reason in individuals, what ground have we for limiting this society to a single nation, of feeling ourselves more nearly related to some men than to
others? All men . ..are equally near, since all equally participate in
3
5

reason.

Similarly, in emphasizing the freedom and equality of moral persons
(especially as rationally autonomous agents in the original position),
Rawls himself, following Humboldt, speaks of "the notion of the community of mankind."" If such a notion of the community of man is more
than mere wish-projection, then a corresponding concept of society
should be developed which is not tied to specific political structures
(whether ancient city-state or modern nation-state), but is rather derived

52. TJ, supra note 1. Just as "various conceptions of justice are the outgrowth of different notions of society against the background of opposing views of the natural necessities
and opportunities of human life," we can only fully understand any particular conception of
justice by making "explicit the conception of social cooperation from which it derives" Id. at
9-10. Detailed discussion of Rawls' notion of society is provided in section 79, "The Idea of
Social Union." Id. at 520. See also infra note 58.
53. REiCHEL, THE STOICS, EPicuREANs AND ScEmIcs 326, 328 (Zeller trans. 1962). For

further discussion, see E. ARNOLD, ROMAN SToIcIsM at 275 (1911), where it is argued that the
"world-state is held together neither by force nor statecraft, but goodwill." For examples of
primary materials, see 4 SENECA, DE OTIo 1; 8 SENECA, DE O'o 2; 1 EPIcTETus, DiscouRSEs
9, and 4 MARcus AuRELIus, MEDFrATIONs 4. Phrases such as "citizen of the cosmos" and
"fellow citizens of a common [read 'universal'] political community" frequently recur in
Stoic discourse on politics. By proceeding in this way, we can quite readily follow Kant
when he notes that "the idea of a cosmopolitan right is not fantastical, high-flown notion of
right, but a complement of the unwritten code of law--constitutional as well as international law-necessary for the public rights of mankind in general and thus for the realization of perpetual peace. E. KANT, PRPgrUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY 21 (Smith
trans. 1948).
54. TJ, supra note 1, at 523.
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from this notion of human community. This approach permits development of an ideal theory of international justice uninfluenced by historical
politics. International law and international justice, in this context, are
individual-oriented, working through particular societies. This runs contrary to the modern context and Rawls' own particular derivation of international law and justice principles which are nation-state oriented and
which deny individual standing. But just such a derivation seems much
closer to his intent and Kantian approach.
Given that in this second model only one basic community structure
is in view, we should expect the choice problems to be formulated differently. Indeed, being now unhindered by the assumption of societal nation-states with individuated basic structures, choice problem number
one (involving principles for an institutional or basic domestic structure)
and choice problem number three (involving principles for an international structure) logically collapse into a single agenda item. Thus, under
Model 2, the original position agenda contains but two items or choice
problems: principles are to be acknowledged for (1) the basic institutional
structure [of global community], and (2) the natural duty of individuals.
As to the order of acknowledgment, Rawls' defense for a hierarchy for
choosing principles for the basic structure prior to those for natural duty
remains valid here: "while it would be possible to choose many of the
natural duties before those of the basic structure," some natural duties
and obligations "presuppose principles for social forms. . . . That principles for institutions are chosen first shows the social nature of the virtue

of justice.

.

.

.

"'5

Principles for the basic community structure, then, will

still be acknowledged first.
As previously noted, a more definite structuring of an original position for our model is required before moving to the choice of principles.
Following our earlier format as a guide to development, analysis begins
with the conditions for structuring an original position as discussed by
Rawls under the four headings of the circumstances of justice, the formal
constraints of the concept of right, the veil of ignorance and the rationality of the parties.
Since we begin in Model 2 with the very first agenda item, there will
be no need to investigate multiple hierarchical original positions. But, as
we proceed, it will become desirable to juxtapose the two original position
descriptions detailed under Model 1 with the single original position of
Model 2. In fact, many of the conditions outlined for the first original
position for the first two agenda items under Model 1 (designated MIA
for discussion) will appear unchanged in the original position under
Model 2 (M2). Other conditions under M2 will synthesize some of the
additional features found in the original position for the third agenda
item under Model 1 (MIB). This should not be too surprising since we
are dealing with a choice problem in M2 which partakes of both Model 1

55. Id. at 110.
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elements. (This triple comparison will culminate in a chart detailing all
three original positions under both models.)
Turning now to the conditions which define the structure of the original position M2, it is again apparent that those of universality, generality, publicity, ordering and finality (viz. the formal constraints of the concept of right) can be readily subsumed as proper conditions holding for
the choice of all ethical principles. Likewise, though disagreement may
not have abated, those conditions of mutual disinterestedness (limited altruism), lack of envy, use of effective means and strict compliance (viz.
the conditions of the rationality of the parties) can be incorporated to
develop a Rawlsian model. Also, keeping with our model definition, the
conception of the parties poses no difficulty and is similar to the conception found in MIA: since individuals comprise the component actors of
international community, the parties are conceived to be individual participants acting as continuous persons; the participants are not acting as
societal or national representatives. Thus, the difficulties of representative justifications do not arise under Model 2 as they did under Model 1.
This quick overview allows a setting aside of three sets of conditions.
No real problems for incorporation in the structure of M2 confront us.
The only conditions requiring broader analysis are those falling under the
headings of the circumstances of justice and the veil of ignorance. To
briefly review, the circumstances of justice specify that (1) conditions of
moderate scarcity exist; (2) there is a divergence of fundamental interests
and ends, with a variety of opposing and incompatible beliefs; and (3) the
scheme of basic institutions is a self-sufficient and productive scheme of
social cooperation. How are these conditions to be understood in M2?
Regarding the first circumstance, synthesis is greatly simplified. Participants in M2, representing continuing persons, will readily understand
that conditions of moderate scarcity exist as between the parties: natural
and other resources are not abundant enough to meet every claim; additionally, not only are resource levels finite, but uneven global distribution
will skew the factor of availability itself. Nor will it be difficult to interpret and apply the condition of moderate scarcity to and between nonself-contained and non-self-sufficient societies established by individuals'
circumscribed collective relations in the world community. Given the parties knowledge of general facts, they will recognize that skewed individual
and societal access to unevenly distributed resources of limited store creates individual, intra- and inter-societal conflicting claims. Thus, the first
circumstance of justice in M2 can be read in the following manner: natural, technological and other resources are unevenly distributed and of limited store, yielding a condition of moderate scarcity as to and between
individual and societal claims. In short, conditions of moderate scarcity
exist in the world community.
The second circumstance of justice can be approached in similar
fashion. Once again, participants in M2 will have little difficulty in interpreting the scope of divergent fundamental interests and incompatible
beliefs as between the parties. Acting as "rational agents of construc-
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tion" 5 with a conception of the good (though they know not what the
substance of that conception entails-an element of the veil in all accounts), the parties can reasonably entertain the assumption that not all
conceptions are congruent. They would rather expect these various conceptions to clash and to produce many (though surely not all) of the conflicting claims recognized under the first circumstance of moderate
scarcity.
Societies would also be expected to have divergent interests, goals
and beliefs. Societies, arising from the collective relationships of groups of
individuals situated territorially in the world community, are bound to
take upon themselves, as collectives, the beliefs and aspirations of its individual members as communicated through societal organizational channels (whatever form these57 may take). Now this certainly does not mean
that any single society so described is necessarily homogeneous and must
develop a common belief or interest pattern which only conflicts with another society's incompatible singularly defined belief or goal. Organizational channels of communication being imperfect mechanisms at their
operational best, some level of internal conflict seems inevitable, even if
stability is never threatened. On the other hand, though societal heterogeneity might be the more common experience, it is just as certainly not
required. Two (or more) societies, more or less internally homogeneous,
might develop patterns which are incompatible and then come into contact and conflict. The point is that just as with claims to resources, conflicts can be expected under this circumstance at multiple levels. Consider
the following actors and the possible basic conflict situations:

56. KCMT, supra note 8, at 520.
57. The indefinite referent "these" is purpose fully ambiguous. Not only beliefs and
goals, but organizational channels, can be expected to take multifarious forms in M2 societies. Recall that the choice problem of principles for ordering any single society is not an
agenda item in M2. Here, only the basic institutional structure of community is of concern.
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Due reflection permits the incorporation of the second circumstance
of justice in M2 with but the addition of a clarifying phrase. The circumstance will now read that there is a divergence of fundamental interests
and ends, with a variety of opposing and incompatible beliefs as to and
between individuals and societies.
Before turning to the third and final circumstance of justice involving
the scheme of basic institutions, a brief review of the role of the basic
structure would be helpful. Recall that the basic structure is the closed
background system of major institutions which distributes fundamental
rights and duties and determines the division of advantages of cooperation. In Model 2, the basic structure is that closed system of major international institutions whose object is justice. This scheme of basic institutions distributes the fundamental rights and duties and determines the
division of advantages of communal (i.e. individual and societal)
cooperation.5 8
The difficulty arising in M2 with this third circumstance is alike to
the problem encountered in M1B-a prescribed scheme of institutions
does not appear to exist. Despite this superficial similarity, the problem
here is not so acute. Given Model 1 assumptions, a predefined scheme to
generate international community was lacking and could not be assumed.
It had to be supposed that the need for interaction would be recognized
and acted upon to aid resolution of the third choice problem. Under
Model 2 assumptions, international community, like the concept of socia-

58. This central point concerns the scope of the application of justice as fairness: that
is, determination of what size and sort of community or associative activity over which the
theory of justice extends-the realm of its operation. In Rawls' discussion of sociability, we
were led to the notion of social union. Kelsen, supra note 48. This notion might best be
understood in the context of coordinated activity of a group of individuals who share final
ends and common activities which are declared to be) intrinsically valuable. TJ, supra note
1, at 525. Since the group is of indefinite size, we can speak of families and friendships-as
well as familiar and larger associations of clubs, churches, universities, and professional or
trade unions-as forms of social unions. Accordingly, a well-ordered community "is itself a
form of social union. Indeed, it is a social union of social unions" TJ, supra note 1, at 527.
Yet, justice as fairness does not provide a general theory for evaluating or directing the
course of all social unions:
In many if not most cases these principles [of justice as fairness] give unreasonable directive. To illustrate: for churches and universities different principles are plainly more suitable. Their members usually affirm certain shared
aims and purposes as essential guidelines to the most appropriate form of
organization.
BSS, supra note 8, at 49. Such social unions are subjects of justice, but they are not the
subjects to which the theory addresses itself. Rather, its concern and the domain over which
the theory applies is the primary subject of social justice, and "the primary subject of justice
is the basic structure" of community. TJ, supra note 1 at 7; similar formulations are employed at 54, 84. The principles of social justice apply then to the "social union of social
unions" and "the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights
and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation" Id. at 7. That
is, justice is the object of the basic structure of a well-ordered community. Thus, while the
basic structure of Model 1 narrowly encompassed nation-state society, the basic community
structure of Model 2 encompasses global community. See Cheng, supra note 49.
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bility, is a factual description of the nature of man and interaction (with
interactive conflict) at all levels is reasonably assumed as a natural result
of this factual description. Put in slightly different perspective, just as
sociability "guarantees" collectives, community "guarantees" collective
interaction. This latter form of expression is somewhat misleading because it obscures our vision of individual characters. Nevertheless, it
makes clear that patterns of interaction and adjudication will develop
and it is the right of the basic structure to order those patterns of cooperation and adjudicate any conflicts which arise between parties. Thus, to
acknowledge principles for agenda item number one in M2 does not create ex nihilo a scheme of basic institutions; rather, given the facts of community and the first two circumstances of justice already noted above,
principles are to be chosen to order the scheme of basic institutions,
which structure is bound (as opposed to the "can" or "need" in MIB) to
arise, for the sake of justice.
In light of this analysis, it should be noted that the closed background system recognized by this third circumstance of justice leads to an
expansion of the chart of basic conflict situations previously outlined.
Three additions are necessary to complete the chart for M2:
Individual/Basic Community Structure (BCS) claims in conflict
(9) P v. BCS (individual societal member/BCS)
(10) S v. BCS (unassociated individual/BCS)
Societal/BCS claims in conflict
(11) A v. BCS (any society/BCS)
With this clarification in hand, the third circumstance in M2 should read
that for a scheme of basic institutions to exist for mutual advantage, principles must be chosen to order relations according to the dictates of
justice.
The final category of conditions requiring examination are those of
the veil of ignorance. As previously noted, the thickest veil possible is
desired; instead of starting with full information and then excluding just
enough to eliminate contingent factors, a Rawlsian veil excludes all information and then adds "just enough" so that rationally autonomous agents
can reach agreement. However, the factor of the thickness of the veil in
all situations is also directly related to the hierarchical position of the
agenda item being considered and its assumptions. Veil thickness in MIB
was greatly influenced by the fact that the choice of principles for a law
of nations was the third of three agenda items or choice problems. Incorporation of certain contingent factors at that point in the original position affected both the conception and knowledge of the parties, and compromised the ideal value of the theory.
Veil thickness in M2, on the other hand, is nearly identical with that
of MIA. Given that both deal with their respective number one agenda
items, this is an expected and desirable outcome. Behind these thick
veils, the parties in MIA and M2 are not influenced by any particular
information which can inappropriately influence their representation as
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free and equal moral persons. As a result, the ideal value of M2 is maintained. In fact, given the slight twist of interpretation required of some
factors due to the delineation between community and society, the veil of
M2 is nominally thicker than veil of MIA. Following is a partial demonstrative list of such veil conditions:
No one knows his place in society or if he is a member of a society
The parties do not know the particular circumstances of any society
They do not know any society's economic or political situation, or the
level of civilization and culture
They do not know any particular circumstances of international
community
They do not know the internationalcommunity's economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and culture.... 5
This analysis of the veil of ignorance concludes discussion of the conditions required to structure the original position under Model 2. All the
necessary elements have been considered. (Following is a comparative
chart detailing all three original positions formulated under both models.)
We can now deal with the M2 agenda item of choosing principles of international justice.

59. TJ, supra note 1, at 137. Emphasis supplied to indicate M2 additions.
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Once again, any constraints on choice solutions flowing from the conditions in the original position should be briefly covered before turning to
the derivation of principles, itself. To this initial coverage we turn below.
The discussion of the choice of principles under Model 1 opened with
an examination of two constraints which were laid upon the parties. The
task of acknowledging international principles to solve the third choice
problem was put under the constraints of coherence and strict compliance
and thereunder was the task discharged. But are these same constraints
to be found here?
Unlike the parties under the first model, participants in Model 2
should face no coherence constraints in their deliberations. Since the first,
not the third agenda item is being considered, no prior principles need be
taken into account; none exist. Only the basic assumptions or conditions
of the model confront the parties here. On the other hand, the condition
of strict compliance is a feature of all three original positions outlined in
previous discussion. As one of the present model conditions defining an
element of the rationality of the parties, the participants can reasonably
assume each other's good faith. That is, all can be expected to receive and
act in accordance with whatever principles are finally acknowledged.
Since the parties rely on this as a condition of the model, they will not be
generally concerned with sanctioning powers to induce compliance. Only
the psychological (motivational) problem of assurance in implementing an
ideal scheme is of any particular concern and this consideration should
solely affect the participants' reasonings in the subsequent operation of
the model, not while here acknowledging basic principles. Thus, the only
comparable operative constraint on reasoning towards international principles of justice under Model 2 is the model restriction that ideal, not
partial compliance theory is envisioned.
Turning to the actual choice of principles under the model, it might
be helpful to begin by taking a closer look at the conditions of the first
original position for Model 1 and the solution to its first agenda item or
choice problem, i.e. Rawls' domestic theory of justice as fairness. Given
the striking similarities between the structures of the original positions
MIA and M2, it would perhaps become possible to adopt some of Rawls'
reasonings or conclusions from the former domestic situation where similar conditions are met in our Rawlsian international model. In fact, by
taking this slightly discursive route, it becomes possible to argue that
Rawls' solution to MIA (viz. the general and special conceptions of domestic justice involving his two principles)" is also the solution-with a

60. The formulation of Rawls' general conception of justice rests upon the following
intuitive argument: Looking at the problem of the choice of principles from the viewpoint of
one of the participants, it would not be reasonable to expect agreement on a principle granting a greater than equal share in any division of the primary goods. Neither would it be
rational to put oneself at a (possible) disadvantage by agreeing to a principle distributing
less than an equal share. If this fairly states the case, the sensible thing to do is to initially
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few appropriate modifications-to M2.
How are we to understand Rawls' general and special conceptions as
possible solutions to M2? Turning to the conditions fo the structure for
M2, what differences exist and how might any difference affect the reasonings of the original position participants? If the solution to MIA is to
form a basic solution to M2, the hypothetical should be similarly
structured.
In fact, perusal of the original positions' comparative chart indicates
that the conditions outlined for MIA and M2 are nearly identical. Where
differences do occur, they are usually matters of phraseology, not of substance. The one difference which indicates more than mere turn-of-phrase
can be seen in the third circumstance of justice. In MIA, the scheme of
societal institutions comprising a basic structure is assumed to presently
exist. This scheme is a factor to be considered irrespective of the participants' time of entry. Although not pursued in previous discussions, this
assumption is an important one (and, of course, factually arguable in historical perspective), removing Rawls' theory from the mainstream of contract theories. This is evident in that Rawls does not attempt to create or
legitimate social union and basic schemes (something past theorists have
taken great pains to establish with their social contracts); rather, the
Rawlsian contract seeks only to order that which already exists for the
sake of justice.
The third circumstance of justice is rendered somewhat differently in
M2, with slightly different implications. Here, the scheme of institutions
comprising a basic community structure is only assumed to be assured of
coming into existence. Behind the veil, the participants cannot know

acknowledge principles of equality establishing equal liberty, equality of opportunity and an
equal distribution of income and wealth. These principles of equality lead to the formulation of a general conception of justice which can be expressed as follows: All social values-liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect-are to be
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage (TJ, at 62). The formulation of Rawls' special conception rests upon an
argument for ranking these primary goods which yield certain priority rules. These rules, in
turn, work to order the principles of justice. Without rehearsing all the arguments
presented, the final statement takes the following form: First Principle-eachperson is to
have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal liberties compatible with a
similar system of liberty for all. Second Principle-socialand economic inequalities are to
be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. First Priority Rule (The Priority of Liberty)-Liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty. There are two cases: (a) a less
extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of liberty shared by all, and (b) a less
than equal liberty must be acceptable to those with the less liberty. Second Priority Rule
(The Priority of Justice over Efficiency and Welfare)-The second principle of justice is
lexically prior to the principle of efficiency and to that of maximizing the sum of advantages;
and fair opportunity (2(b)] is prior to the difference principle [2(a)]. Id. at 302-03, statement of two cases in second priority rule omitted. (This is the final compilation of several
provisional forms developed during argument for the theory.)
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whether such institutions already substantially exist or are only in early
developmental or formative stages. The historical question is left open.
What they do understand is that principles are required to order these
institutions for mutual good under justice. Again, this Rawlsian contract
does not create social union, but it does recognize the imported normative
element of legitimation also found in MIB. That is, M2 explicitly recognizes the self-legitimating function of justice as a circumstance. MIA does
implicitly recognize such a function, but only under the rubric of Kantian
autonomy and self-realization.
Is this difference substantive, affecting the reasonings of the parties?
Not at all. At least, there should be no substantive difference when reasoning towards basic principles. The conditions of M1A and M2 are effectively the same, though terminology and categories differ in respect of
legitimation. Both sets of parties recognize that a basic structure is an
inevitable factor in their deliberations and both sets seek mutual good
under principles of justice. If this difference is to have any discernible
effect, it is only in that a breakdown in deliberations leading to an egoistic stated of nature is not an acceptable option for M2 parties as it might
be on some interpretatious of M1A. 6' Where substantive differences can
be expected is in the later interpretation of international circumstance.
There, conceptual divergence in our models is great (compare MIB with
M2). What is required here is only an interpretative discussion of the
principles of equality under the Model 2 framework. A few modifications
are suggested below. Note that these modifications are due not to any
hidden structural difference, but are related to the concepts of community and society under our second model definition.
Modification 1 - As is implicit in Rawls' own discussion, the "persons" entitled to the most extensive total system of basic liberties are not
only individual human beings acting as moral agents. Generally speaking,
social unions, evidenced for example in families, churches and trade councils, existing as individuated collectives having an organizational "personality" are also to be afforded political liberites. e2 Under Model 2, societies
are similarly viewed as second-order social unions ordered by the basic
structure of the social union of social unions, the international community. This community scheme distributes rights, advantages and duties to
all its members, individuals and social unions (including societies) alike.
With this explicit understanding, the first principle of equal liberty is easily adopted in M2.
Modification 2 - Similarly, the principles of equality of opportunity
and equal distribution of income and wealth are readily adopted with the
understanding that the subjects of these principles remain consistent
with the subjects of modification 1. Thus, Model 2 can speak of inter-

61. Id. at 136.
62. See, eg., id. sec. 35 at 216-21, "Toleration of the Intolerant," where political parties
and religious groups are under consideration.
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societal, not just intra-societal, social and economic inequalities in the
world community.
Modification 3 - Rawls notes that one of the elements of basic liberty is the principle of free association. 3 What is not clear is whether
there exists a freedom to disassociate, although it could be reasonably
argued that this latter freedom is implied in the former. So that there is
no misunderstanding, this modification makes explicit the freedom to disassociate, notably at the societal level, and to remain unassociated if willing and able. This freedom may be exercised contingent upon one factor:
any standing obligations legitimately incurred in association must be discharged. Such a constraint is only reasonable. Rational parties could not
otherwise be expected to agree upon a principle which could so consistently work to their detriment. The modification is not intent on providing
an escape route, but views social union (e.g. societal membership) as fluid,
rather than more-or-less fixed for life. So circumscribed, the freedom is a
valuable one in international community.
Modification 4 - One final modification and interpretation is complete. We have spoken of the need to recognize collective personality in
relation to specific social unions, but what of collective assets? If they
exist (and there is no reason to assume they do not, given acknowledgment of group person-hood), does the general community have any call
upon resources individually or collectively possessed? Does mere possession imply a duty to share on a broad scale, or is community sharing simply a good which can be designated the outcome of a supererogatory act?
To put the question squarely, should the parties in M2 acknowledge a
principle that everyone has duties reciprocal in nature within the community in which he develops? A proper answer would aid understanding the
factor of "legitimately incurred obligations" in modification 3 above."
To form a reply, we should note not only that emphasis on community in Model 2 leans in the direction of acknowledging such a principle;
Rawls himself suggests acknowledgment of an obligation when he writes,
"Now when the maximum criterion is followed, the natural distribution of
abilities is viewed in some respects as a collective asset." 5 That is, while
the result of the natural lottery is morally arbitrary, development of those
distributed assets in not. The community has some degree of right to see
those talents used for the benefit of the whole in reciprocal response to
community provision of an environment in which the talents can be developed for the benefit of the talents' possessors. Just how this right is to
be weighted against a right of personal liberty is ticklish, but that the

63. Id. at 328-29.
64. Though apparently intruding in some degree onto second choice problem territory
of selection of individual duties, the question of institutional obligations appropriately arises
here as part of an analysis of the basic structure, especially given the intimate link with the
third modification. Obligations linking individuals and institutions should not be expected
to necessarily take the same form as those arising between individuals. Id. at 335.
65. Rawls, supra note 25, at 647.
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obligation exists is difficult to deny. That "no man is an island" is no less
true because quaint.
Neither is it difficult to understand this obligation in terms of large
social unions like societies. In fact, it is much easier to understand an
obligation of sharing, for example, excess natural resources than the benefits of personal talents. Such an interpolation seems less a strain on liberty, as well. The participants might well argue in the following fashion:
Inasmuch as societies are understood to be combined in a supreme
community, the individual societies are understood to have bound
themselves to the whole, because they wish to promote the common
good, but the whole to the individuals, because it wishes to provide for
the especial good of the individuals. [Likewise,] if a society is established, individuals bind themselves to the whole, because they wish to
promote the common good, and the whole binds itself to the individuals, because it wishes to provide for adequate life, for peace and security, consequently for the especial good of the individuals."
Such obligations, then, are always reciprocal in nature. Being for the common benefit or mutual good, communal obligations would generally be
acknowledged by the parties as long as they are founded upon the reciprocity in the community obligation to provide for free and full development of its members.

67

In light of these four modifications, the parties in M2 would acknowledge the following triad of principles and general conception:
(1) principles of equality
(a) equal liberty
(b) equality of opportunity
(c) equal distribution of income and wealth
(2) principles of free association
(a) freedom to associate
(b) freedom to disassociate
(c) free to be unassociated
(3) principles of obligation
(a) individuals have duties to community
(b) individuals may incur duties in social union
(c) community and union have reciprocal obligations towards
members
General conception. All social primary goods-liberties, obligations
and opportunities, income and command over resources, and the bases
of self-respect-are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least
favored.

66. Wolff, supra note 44, sec. 12, at 13-14 (the terms "society" and "community" are
here inserted, replacing "nation" and "state" respectively.
67. Cf. art. 29(1). "Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and
full development of his personality is possible" and its context as drawn from the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).
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These principles and the general conception naturally flow from the
Rawlsian hypothetical, given the great similarities and minor differences
between MIA and M2. Although the participants could now proceed to
develop parallel arguments for a special conception, it should be noted
that the special assumption permitting adoption of a lexical order is not
obviously present in Model 2: it cannot be assumed that conditions will
admit effective realization of liberties. Priority rules may only come to the
fore after much work with a fully developed scheme. Suffice to say that
lexical ordering remains the long-run tendency of the general view here as
in Model 1. The result would again be nearly identical. But application of
a special conception will not be taken for granted.
It should also be noted that the natural duties mentioned above as
the solution to the second choice problem in MIA are just as easily assimilated as the solution to the second choice problem in M2. Indeed, natural
obligations of fairness, justice and refraining from harm naturally flow
from the solution to the first agenda item (specially taking the third principle of obligation into consideration). Taken together, they form a coherent set of Model 2 principles for development of a basic structure for a
scheme of just institutions. Acknowledgment of these principles and a
general conception for a structural foundation for our model completes
this part. We can now turn to the task of outlining in the next part some
of the models' practical and theoretical implications in application.
III.

PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES

In turning to analyze and compare the practical consequences of the
operations of our Rawlsian models, we shall focus discussion upon three
cases or situations which might conceivably arise in the international forum. In this way, the interaction of model principles to specify the parameters of a just resolution can be observed and any differences between
the models can be noted. The first two situations presented are types
which could occur under either ideal or non-ideal, but its type has been
all too common in our 20th century. The resolutions the models propose
as being just (especially in the final case) could bear significant weight in
relation to any considered judgments of fairness. In all cases, the proposed resolutions provide some insight into the relative strength of the
models heretofore developed.
Situation 1. The world economy consumes x tons of strategic mineral
y during an average annual productionschedule. All y at the present
time enters the production stream from land mining operations.
World reserves are estimated at 25x tons /- 3x tons, which is to say
that supplies will be exhausted within 22-28 years at current consumption levels. It is discovered that certain nodules from the deep
floor of the Alpha Sea contain significant amounts of y, along with
other valuable trace elements. Later research locates a sizeable field
of these nodules-estimatedyield of 5x tons /- .6 tons-situated at
roughly mid-point between bordering coastal societies A and B. Two
privately-owned companies (#1 and #2) located in prosperousA are
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prepared to attempt deep sea mining operations, either in concert or
with societal aid, if an adequate return on their investment can be
reasonably assured. The breakeven point is calculated at 3x tons,
which includes a 5-year lead time to develop the field and come online plus a 6-year mining schedule of .5x tons/year, leaving a marginal return on yields of 1.4x to 2.6x tons. One publicly-owned company (#3) in developing society B would like to work the field, but
requires economic and technical assistance or a partnershipventure
to do so. The breakeven point is here calculated at nearly 4x tons,
which includes a 7-year lead time plus a 12-year mining schedule of
.3x tons/year, leaving a marginal return on yields of .4x to 1.6x tons.
Assuming that technological and cost factors prohibit development of
more than one site in this field, who should begin mining, if anyone?
We shall not spend time working out questions of economic efficiency
in this or subsequent cases. The data bases are purposefully incomplete
for the benefit of generality, but they are also indeterminate for the benefit of justice. As Rawls notes, efficiency is a concern of the background
system of institutions to a lesser degree than the concern for justice. That
is, justice as fairness provides that the theoretically just parameters must
first be established; only then do concerns like efficiency intrude to order
the implementation of a solution." Thus, in narrowing analysis of these
situations to consideration of fairness, the primary concern of both models becomes the institutional and individual relationships engendered
with the case settings.
In this first situation, numerous relationships are in view and the
scope of the problem remains rather broad. Even in this simplified case,
upwards of ten basic ties and their permutations could be investigated.
Lest analysis become too cumbersome, intra-societal and other relationship ties will not be discussed; only the primary relationship between societies A and B are considered below.
Under Model 1, the configuration of basic and corollary principles
suggest the following parameters. Assuming A and B are nation-states,"'
B is equal with A (equality) and may of itself determine its need for y
and the desirability of mining nodules in the Alpha Sea (self-determination). It can decide its claim is of societal value (collective responsibility)
and press that claim in the international forum (self-defense), so long as
pressing the claim puts no prior agreement or treaty in jeopardy (pacta
principle). B may also later reserve, restrict or withdraw its claim (selflimitation) during any bargaining session. The same analysis pattern applies, pari passu, to A. What this analysis does not provide is a neat an-

68. TJ, supra note 1, at 9.
69. The model is limited to nation-states and does not appear capable of settling conflicts between non-statal conflicting parties. E.g., what if B were a non-statal nation or society? Neither does the model reach the question of "which company in A?" if the larger issue
of "which society?" is resolved in A's singular favor. Some other internal process or model
must then be invoked.
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swer to the question originally put, "who should begin mining? The
model does tell us that, other factors being equal (e.g. there are no applicable bi- or multilateral treaties or international agreements specifically
resolving issues of ownership or access to this Alpha Sea floor), A and B
should meet as equals at the bargaining table to work out a fair resolution
of conflicting claims. But the model cannot, indeed was never meant to,
declare a right result before negotiations even begin.
What is perhaps interesting is what arguments cannot be pressed by
the parties under Model 1 during a bargaining session. Assuming A and B
are both (relatively) well-ordered states, A cannot press B to withdraw its
claim or sell its interest at a pittance as a simple function of A's economic
superiority. That is not fair dealing for an otherwise just state striving
towards an international society based on reciprocal relations. Neither
can A press an argument of greater right or privilege founded on technological capabilities. However, A could stress the economic advantage to B
of investing in A's venture through company #1 and/or #2, and the diseconomy to both states if B secured the aid it required to go ahead
through its company #3.
On the other hand, B need not be persuaded by the force of economic efficiencies, alone. It might highly value technological linkage and
the benefit to the society as a whole if #3 could work the field for 12
years, though it might realize only a minimal return above the breakeven
point on an accounting ledger. B may insist on its view, but being wellordered and wanting mutual advantage of all.70 With the give-and-take of
a fair bargaining session, A and B should be able to weigh the relative
merits of their claims and strike a mining agreement for the nodules
which can be deemed just.
Under Model 2, a more complicated structure makes analysis of this
situation relatively more difficult as principle factors and relationships in
view necessarily increase. The additional primary relationship considered
here is that between the Basic Community Structure (BCS) and societies
A and B. This relationship will be discussed along with the other primary
relationship between A and B, as in the model above. However, the increase in complexity permits a more tightly drawn set of parameters
which looks not only to the process, but to some of the very elements of
the result, of what is deemed just. Unlike Model 1, specific resolutions
may be forthcoming as information is gathered on the parties and their
claims. To that extent, Model 2 works similarly to Rawl's domestic theory

70. We initially ignore here, though it is certainly relevant, the interest other societies
have in adding five years' supply of strategic mineral y to world reserves at stable prices.
The bargaining process is discussed as if it were between only A and B, but claims would
surely be advanced by all user-states; under the model, all have a right to be heard and have
the relative merits of their claims weighed in striking any final balance to reach agreement
in the forum. The simple addition of states and claims do not, however, result in any change
in the model's operation and need not be considered for sake of illustration of model
efficacy.
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of justice as fairness in that teleological judgments are taken into account
while travelling the deontological path of pure (or quasi-pure) procedural
justice.
The BCS is responsible to distribute fundamental rights and duties
and to determine the division of advantages of cooperation of and for its
members, based on the principles and general conception of justice as
fairness formulated in Part II. Societies A and B are two such members,
whose conflict also involves community advantage. Thus, while we could
initially ignore other societal input under Model 1, the BCS must observe
community balance from the outset to formulate any final resolution.
To this end, basic questions concerning the status of the societies
directly involved must be addressed. For example: what is the relative
market share in y of A and B, both as suppliers and users? How would
71
access affect these shares? Is mining y a highly profitable enterprise? If
so, how much value would actually flow to society A? Society B? Once
these and similar questions receive sufficient statistical input, analysis
under the general conception can begin: would access to the field reasonably aid B in attaining community parity (principles of equality)? If B
does develop the field, can it meet its community obligations (including
price stability and steady delivery over the mining schedule per principles
of obligation)? Turning to A, would access too greatly enhance its position in the community? Would this enhancement be offset by A's contribution to the community's least favored? If A were required to aid B, how
great a cost is incurred monetarily? How great a price in terms of liberty?
Finally, assuming that the field should be developed (an obvious,
though not necessary assumption, questions of conservation and price
stability could be addressed as well), what are the possibilities or ramifications of introducing society Z (a developing land-locked society) to the
field? In the alternative, what of establishing a central mining enterprise
with general community authority for deep-sea-mining operations which
would distribute the fruits of its business to societies in need? 7 Without
pretending to answer all the issues raised, it can at least be observed that
the resulting parameters tend to a much more centrally organized system
of cooperation than under Model 1. A and B are not sitting together at a
bargaining table alone or with minimal outside input to develop the
framework of an agreement. Community factors play a dominant role in a
Model 2 analysis. This is not to say that similar issues of organization
could not be raised under Model 1. Such questions well might occur with

71. This need not refer to monetary input, alone. It can profit a society to grow technologically and to be able to expand inter-societal contacts, as well.
72. See the operation of the Enterprise in the text of the Law of the Sea Treaty. The
Enterprise (art. 170ff) is the functional production organ of the Authority (art. 156ff), which
is an international council in control of the Area (pt. XI) of deep sea resources for the
benefit of mankind (art. 140) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 62/122, U.N. Doc. C/N.57(1983). See also, R. PLATZODER AND W. VITZTHUM (eds.),
SEERECHT-LAW OF THE SEA 69 (1984).
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even similar resolutions forthcoming as a result (e.g. Model 1 nationstates could agree on a central enterprise linked to private or statal investments). But the bases for centralized modeling will be quite distinct.
This difference is perhaps better illustrated in the next situation.
Situation 2. Society C has just harvested a bumper crop of winter
wheat far exceeding societal requirements. The goodly yield can be
attributed to a number of factors, including careful agricultural
management and beneficent weather patterns. At least one-third of
the current harvest can be expected to enter the export market, giving good additional return to producersand a boost to C's economy.
Nearby, society D is facing another harsh drought and basic foodstuffs are in short supply. With only a small industrialbase to draw
upon, D's treasury is rather limited and the relatively steep prices of
importing grain will keep the society from securing sufficient quantities to avert high levels of severe malnutritionor famine amongst the
populace.
What obligations, if any, does C have with respect to D and its people?
Under Model 1, there exists significant difficulty in defining the conflict involved within this particular case. It is clear that C's abundance
could timely aid D through any number of schemes, including lower
prices, extension of credits, long-term low-interest loans, grants and gifts,
or any combination of these devices. It is conceivably to C's advantage to
extend a helping hand now (C might suffer from a future drought and
need aid from D's goodly harvest). But there is no clear claim of right
that D can advance to secure C's help. Unless reciprocal factors historically exist (perhaps D extended agricultural aid to C in the past and has
yet to reap the advantage of that assistance), or some scheme of aid is
currently envisioned by treaty or agreement in the international forum
(perhaps C and D have a conventional or customary relationship whereby
each undertakes to aid the other in such distress), D appears unable to
insist on peremptory aid; it can only request supererogatory action from
C or others.
Now D can certainly make a general claim of right for itself and its
people. As a nation-state, it is equal with all other states and can press its
right to survive by requesting aid for its people (self-defense). It can recognize collective responsibility and incur long-term debts to this end and
even argue that mutual advantage in international society would be enhanced if a humanitarian assistance scheme were instituted. But what is
the relational tie being invoked? In what forum or against whom is this
right advanced? Can D perhaps invoke duty "to extend aid if it can do so
73
without excessive risk or loss to itself"?
It appears that until specific agreements or international schemes are
established to aid states like D, the right to assistance is an imperfect

73. TJ, supra note 1, at 114.
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right.7 4 In the absence of cooperative pacts, each nation will decide to
what extent aid can be rendered to others without neglecting internal
needs (self-determination), thus, each nation
must be allowed to abide by its own judgment in determining its action ... as to whether it can do anything for another without neglect
of its duty toward itself; consequently if that which is sought is refused, it must be endured.

...

75

In an international society striving towards just or reciprocal interaction,
we might well expect a scheme of aid to develop. It is not likely that D
would be allowed to collapse or its people die in famine. What is curious,
and somewhat troublesome, is D's apparent inability to force resolution of
the problem under the model. After presenting its case in all appropriate
fora, it must wait for others to decide to act. And if no one does?
Under Model 2, the community's obligation to aid a struggling member is never seriously in doubt. The reciprocal obligation inhering in the
relationship between the BCS and D (principle of obligation 3c) and the
requirements of the general conception necessitate a positive response to
the member's need. Aid will be provided for D and its people. 76 It would
thus appear that the models again begin to converge, the difference being
that Model 2 aid is certain, while Model 1 aid is only likely, though theoretically problematic. Neither model seems to recognize an enforceable
direct obligation that C aid D according to the extent of any excess supply of grain.

74. A perfect right carries with it a particularized duty. E.g., Q's perfect right to privacy
means that R has a corresponding duty not to invade that private sphere. An imperfect
right implies no such correlative determinate duty. Eg., R's imperfect right to sell does not
mean that Q has a duty to buy. In situation 2, D has the imperfect right of assistance, but
no correlative duty to extend aid from determine states can be implied.
75. Wolff, supra note 44, sec. 157, at 85. Wolff develops the distinction between perfect
and imperfect rights held by nation-states in ch. II, sec. 156ff. (For analysis of individual
relations, it could be useful to contrast Wolff's perfect and imperfect rights with Hohfeld's
analysis of jural correlatives and jural opposites, particularly a regards rights/duties and
privileges/no-rights, in Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YAL L. J. 16 (1913), and 26 YALE. L. J. 710 (1917).) Wolff goes on to

comment in sec. 158, "So, when the price of bread is high, no nation can compel another
nation to sell grain to it, even if it has ever so great a supply of grain, and is naturally bound
to sell." Compare the socially basic human rights defined in Luban, Just War and Human
Rights, 9 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 160, 177 (1980), which would permit D to declare a just war
against C if the latter refused to supply grain.
76. We ignore here, though it would need to be considered in a more detailed analysis,
the distinction between the societal organization (the local system of government and its
organizational channels of operations) and the people of the society. Individual members
will always have the right to call upon the BCS for help n such circumstances and that call
will always be considered in light of available resources. But, systems may be denied the
luxury of being propped-up after displaying dangerous ineptitude or (non-ideally) corrupt
practices (e.g., could the severity of the draught have been avoided under better administrative processes?). In fairness, questions like these could not be ignored. We do so here only to
simplify analysis and to keep the question in comparative focus.

1986

RAWLSIAN THEORY OF INT'L LAW & JUSTICE

Although this surface result of the models is similar, the bases for
any aid rendered are quite distinct. Under both models, the question
"what obligations does C have with respect to D?" only carries explicit
content if direct links between the societies can be demonstrated (e.g.
trading relations, bilateral pacts or social interchange between societal
members). If no direct relations or linkages exist, no direct obligations
can be inferred. This lack of direct linkage led to the relative uncertainty
of an imperfect right under Model 1: D had no one to address with a
perfect right of aid, so no one needed to respond with a correlative perfect duty. D was dependent upon another society (like C) to recognize its
mutual advantage and/or its natural duty and agree to provide the necessary grain.
What is singularly different about the certain resolution under Model
2 is that the right to aid is a perfect right from the outset. It need not be
transformed into a perfect right on the basis of subsequent recognition or
agreement. However, this perfect right to aid is not a function of relations, direct or indirect, between C and D. The conflict of this case cannot
be construed or framed in simple or even complex inter-societal terms.
Rather, the conflict is to be framed as existing between D and the BCS.
So framed, an appropriate resolution of this conflict might be worked out
in the following stages:
(1) D has a dire need. D addresses this need to the BCS in terms of a
perfect right based upon the reciprocal relation in community
membership.
(2) The BCS acknowledges the need and the right under which it is
advanced.
(3) The BCS calculates the costs involved in meeting D's need and
balances available options in light of its duty to the community under
the general conception (e.g., how much grain? At what price? From
which stores? Through what supply channels? Are other direct obligations involved?)
(4) The BCS invokes its right in reciprocal relation with C (and/or
others) to provide stores from its excess under the fair terms determined in stage (3).
(5) C responds to the BCS based on its community duty.
(6) D is supplied through appropriate distributional channels.
In this scheme, direct linkage is not forged (though it may develop) between members. But, interaction for the sake of individuals-in-community is facilitated as the institutions of the basic structure organize and
distribute community primary goods.
In turning to discuss the third and final case, we enter the arena of
non-ideal or partial compliance theory conditions. Time and space do not
permit an analysis of all the variables involved in translating ideal theory
into non-ideal settings, but some basic outlines will be drawn to provide a
sketch of the issues raised (or avoided) by the models.
Situation 3. Society E was once politically homogeneous. Internal
disagreements were rare and when they did arise, organizational
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channels easily absorbed this energy and directed it into constructive
avenues within the system. Recently, political dissent has increased
with a concomitant increase in minority opposition to some of E's
internal policies. The system is having difficulty coping with this
drive towards heterogeneity and has begun to suppress dissent.
When minimal jail terms for infractions of a limited free speech and
assembly provision proved ineffective in deterring opposition, prison
sentences were lengthened and labor camps were erected. Such internal exile has since become common and opportunities to leave the
society are severely restricted. Once relatively open, E is now a
closed society. Although the government of E denies it is attempting
to quell dissent n this manner, reports of these internal activities
continue to come to the attention of other societies.
What obligations, if any do these other societies have in respect of E and
its people?
Model 2 provides parameters which can readily be applied to the situation above. Being ultimately responsible for intra-societal, as well as
inter-societal, conflict, the BCS must provide a final authoritative forum
for this type of individual/societal dispute. If investigation confirms the
reports that principles of free association and obligation are being unjustly abridged (specifically, the freedom to disassociate and societal obligations of fairness), the societal system must answer for its unjust actions.
(Here, the distinction between the system of government and the people
comes to the fore.) As a minimal solution, internal reform acceding to a
formal heterogeneity seems required. In the alternative, two (or more)
separate social unions might be nurtured as homogeneous replacements.
If necessary, the societal form could be disbanded and reorganized along
entirely wholly new hierarchical channels. Whatever the solution justice
as fairness demands, it would indeed be done.
In such a non-ideal situation, force might be employed to secure the
reorganization if resistance were encountered. In this extremity, jus ad
bellum principles would need to be invoked and jus in bello principles
would need to be developed if not already to hand. A show of force is
perhaps problematic for the model, since ideal development ignored just
war theory and provided only for problems of assurance. But there is little doubt that principles for just armed conflict would not present an ineffable barrier in developing a partial compliance response.
On the other hand, Model 1 parameters are essentially lacking. Just
as the model could not even reach the question of "which company?" in
situation 1, the principle of equality and its corollary of self-determination can operate so as to peremptorily preclude interference or even investigation into the internal affairs of another equal, self-determining nation-state. How E treats its own people is its own affair, being between
that people and its system of government. Presumably, this shroud is of
negligible import when more-or-less just states are in view under an ideal
theory of strict compliance. But it is not at all clear that the shroud can
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be justifiably lifted even under reinterpreted or relaxed principles in a
partial compliance international society of Model 1 proportion or design." It seems that Model 1 nation-states have an extremely limited response indeed. Besides lecturing E for its apparent abuse, international
society can invoke no particular principle or duty of state relations to
chide E. Neither can the distressed people of E invoke any international
principles in a call for assistance or internal reform.
If E were simply an example of an errant, over-zealous or cruel administration in an otherwise just international society, a case might be
made that the principles informing international society should only apply to those states whose domestic arrangements (continue to) satisfy the
two basic principle of domestic justice (per choice problem number one in
the model's first original position). Since E is in obvious contravention of
the special (and apparently even the general) conception of justice as fairness, international statal equality and non-intervention (self-determination) principles need not apply. The state has placed itself beyond the
pale of legitimate invocation of principles of fairness as between states by
its own unjust (though internal) actions. Thus, other states desiring to
investigate and intervene on (supererogatory) humanitarian grounds
might fairly do so.7"
Unfortunately, this is a weak argument for at least two reasons. First,
intervention is still not required by any principles of justice. Those suffering injustice will have to wait (as did society D in situation 2, above) for
any aid. More importantly, why should international principles of justice
be deemed contingent given the nature of the model? Is a criminal offender in domestic society fairly dealt with if treated inhumanely (i.e.,
ultra vires principles of justice) when he breaks his tacit "contract" to
conform to certain societal laws? Granted the analogy is not perfect, but
an argument declaring that primary principles of reciprocal dealing can
be set aside if the (third-party) contract is (partially) broken leaves one
huge authoritative gap-who decides that a breach exists? and what sanctions apply? Without a recognized authoritative agency to guide the parties in a partial compliance situation, the principle that "principles can be
deemed inoperative" is systemically destructive. Such an argument is
even more dubious in an international society filled with partial compliance actors ("let he who is without sin cast the first stone"). Once the
assurance factors of an ideal theory reveal such insufficiency, the model
will begin to breakdown; it must then either evolve of collapse.

77. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."
78. As in situation 2, Luban is prepared to suggest that a war of intervention is justified
and even morally "urgent"; views which argue against intervention based upon a principle of
self-determination are labelled "obscene" or "perverse," as well as illogical "doublethink."
Luban, supra, note 75, at 178-81. Cf. Wicclair, supra note 11, at 298 and 300-01.
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Note that under Model 1, the principled inability to act is not directly related to enforcement ability. There is little question that international society could martial sufficient numbers to rout an oppressive regime; its might is sufficient. Neither is the problem directly related to or a
function of cost (though cost factors are involved and need to be considered). Rather, the problem lies in the absence of a formal mechanism capable of determining "rightness" in statal dealings under the model.
When basic disagreements between the parties result in statal impasse,
no authority exists which can cut the Gordian knot.
It might be argued that under Model 1, a more-or-less just international society would agree to precisely such an authoritative agency (like
a Security Council or International Court) to meet contingencies where
assurance factors are insufficient. Thus, the priorities of nation-state
equality and self-determination would be superceded by a principle of
community responsibility. But to the extent that states recognize this responsibility and establish a super-statal agency which has recognized, formal declaratory (and, perhaps, enforcement) power, the model has begun
evolving into a Model 2 structure with an international BCS.
We are not prepared to argue that Model 2 is the full and natural
outcome of modifying Model 1 to meet partial compliance conditions. But
with the relative strengths and weaknesses of the models now in view, it
is interesting that Model 2 principle seem to lead to practical applications
more consistently in accord with considered judgments of fairness formerly encountered. Although the model distinctions in situation 1 were
mere adumbrations of variances to come, operational differences began
more clearly to appear in situation 2 and are visible in full relief here in
situation 3. Having glimpsed some of these more important differences,
we turn next to consider the models under Rawls' device of reflective
equilibrium. In this concluding part of the essay, we consider what it
means to choose one of these models over the other on the basis of justice
as fairness.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Rawls' device of reflective equilibrium is not novel,7' but he employs
it in a deceptively powerful manner. Striving to establish a deductive connection between his two principles of domestic justice and his original
position (proposing that the former's conclusions be logically derivable
from the latter's premises), he reaches for a kind of "moral geometry with
all the rigor which this name connotes." 80 In working out this geometry,
the reader is asked to reflect upon his considered convictions of justice
and the conditions of fairness embodied in an original position. If the
principles which can be derived (deduced) from an acceptable initial situation of fairness match (yield) firm considered judgments, well and good.

79. TJ, supra note 1, at 20 n.7.
80. Id. at 121.
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If not, modify either the initial situation, or the considered convictions, or
both, until a match (equilibrium) is established. If this final coherent
view comprehends philosophically favored conditions for an original position, a procedure of justification for the conception of justice exists as
well.
This device is useful not only for developing conceptions of justice,
but also for examining conceptions offered as just solutions to the problem of social justice in a given context. For example, Rawls first employs
a reflective equilibrium to establish his original position and its two special conception principles; he then employs the same device to challenge
the value of average utility (finding it a relatively unstable conception) in
the societal arena.81 In similar manner, this part is devoted to applying
considerations of reflective equilibrium to the two models of international
justice which have been developed in this article.
Focusing attention on three hypothetical cases of international scope,
we have examined the questions which the models raised and the parameters or conclusions proposed in respect of coordinating cooperative efforts
for resource recovery (situation 1); coordinating relief efforts for the disadvantaged (situation 2); and coordinating response to deviation from
just norms (situation 3). In all three cases, Model 2 operated in equilibrium with considered judgments of fairness as it presented a coherent
conception of international justice. Coordination was not only just, but
other values like efficiency could also appropriately be accounted for in
the model's responses. In contradistinction, only in situation 1 did Model
1 similarly operate in equilibrium. As a conception of international justice, this model was found to be relatively unstable in situation 2 and
appeared wholly inadequate in meeting the demands of considered convictions of justice in situation 3.s 2
Can Model 1 be salvaged? Can we perform a reflective equilibrium
operation and save the patient? If this means modifying considered convictions so that the results noted above can be sustained, probably not.
Deeming the results in situation 2 acceptable is less problematic, but the
lack of response in situation 3 is difficult, if not impossible, to confirm on
reflection. On the other hand, if salvaging the model means toying with
the original position, two possibilities come to mind: (1) modify the motivational assumptions of the parties to reach more accommodating princi81. Id. secs. 27 and 28, 161-74.
82. Time and space will not be taken to formulate a full discussion but the inadequacies illuminated are arguably a necessary function of the introduction of a morally arbitrary
element defining the scope of Model l's first choice problem. See supra note 25, and accompanying text. Not only model consequences but model principles themselves are subject to
reflective equilibrium considerations. Without more, it seems undesirable if not ad hoc to
introduce a morally arbitrary delimitation into an otherwise basic, fair position. Thus, consequences aside, we may have strong reason to prefer Model 2's original position and principle over Model l's. Supporting argument would be analogous to discussion of thick v. thin
original position veils of ignorance and their reflection of a basic conception of free and
equal persons. See supra notes 16-17, 33-34.
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pies and results; or (2) modify the structural components of the initial
situation. If the first option is taken, it is more likely than not that a
Model 2 structuring will be the result. This is what occurred when a modification was attempted in discussion under situation 3, above. If the second option is considered, and pains are taken to avoid imitating Model 2,
an equilibrium can conceivably be achieved, but I dare say that the model
would no longer be Rawlsian in nature. In the great scheme of things such
a result is not devastating, but Rawlsian models are, after all, the theme
of this essay.
Should this analysis hold, sufficient data is now available to address
the interrogatory originally defining our project, "Which model more
closely matches considerations of justice as fairness in the international
arena"? On the basis of the findings presented above, we are bound to
choose Model 2 over Model 1 as that Rawlsian model of international
justice which best expresses a stable and coherent conception of justice as
fairness. Having such a model to hand, we, as fully autonomous moral
beings, are thereby philosophically justified in selecting that model as our
own. Vade, et tu fac similiter.

Countertrends in Financial Provisions For
the Protection of Corporate Creditors: The
Model Business Corporation Act and the
E.E.C. Corporate Directives
JEFF KEUSTERMANS*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Distributions and payments of dividends by corporations to their
shareholders are likely to cause a conflict of interest between shareholders
and general creditors of a corporation. Shareholders generally expect a
return on their investments as an enterprise earns profit, while creditors
desire that an enterprise have substantial assets available for so long a
time as their claims have not been paid.1
There are several alternative means to deal with the conflict. This
article will focus on one in particular: corporate law restrictions on financial distributions to shareholders.' The goal of this article is to articulate3
trends in the applicable laws of the United States and E.E.C. Countries.
An analysis of these laws indicates that two countertrends can be discerned in the main bodies of laws governing corporations in the United

States and the E.E.C. Countries. In particular, the second corporate
E.E.C. Council Directive (1976) contains 44 articles on the raising and
maintenance of share capital, 4 while the 1979 amendments to the final
* Participant, Foreign Lawyer Program, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, New
York, New York. L.L.M., University of California, Los Angeles, 1985; Lic. Juris, University
of Leuven (Belgium), 1984; Certificate of European Business Law, City of London Polytechnic, 1982; and Cand. Juris, Saint Ignatius University of Antwerp (Belgium), 1981.
The author would like to thank Stanley Siegel, Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles, and Arthur Rosett, Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles, for their valuable advice and suggestions. The author is also indebted to Koen van de

Cruys for his valuable research assitance in Europe.
1. B. MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPrrAL, 1-15 (2d. ed. 1981); Kummert,
State Statutory Restrictions on FinancialDistributions by Corporations to Shareholders,
59 WASH. L. REV. 185, 189-193 (1984).

2. Restrictions that result from the operation of the state's fraudulent conveyance rules
will be covered only where necessary. For a discussion of these restrictions see Clark, The
Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARv. L. REV. 505 (1977). See also
Kummert, supra note 1, at 266-282.

3. This evolution was primarily inspired by the Second Council Directive of 13 December 1976, on coordination of safeguards which are required by Member States of companies
within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty. 20 0. J. EUR. COMM.
No. 126, 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Second Council Directive].
4. Morse, The Second Directive: Raising and Maintenance of Capital, 2 EUR. L. REV.
126 (1977); Yates III, European Directives on Formationand Operation of Companies and
the Role of the Lawyer, in VA. LEGAL STUDIES, HARMONIZATION OP LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN
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provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) have eliminated "the outmoded concepts of stated capital and par value. '
This article will present an overview of the basic terminology and
operation of the statutory "legal capital" systems. The article will then
examine solutions adopted by the revisors of the MBCA, by the state of
California and other states that followed in the wake of these changes.
For comparative purposes, the requirements for the protection of creditors in the E.E.C. Countries will be discussed. It will be pointed out that
European legislators have created more severe requirements than their
U.S. counterparts for the raising and maintenance of a minimum capital,
which serves as a trust fund for the protection of creditors.
Finally, the author will propose a new solution to the conflict of interest between shareholders and general creditors of a corporation, following the examples of the California Corporation Code and the MBCA
in so far as they are based on financial ratio tests.

II. THE MBCA
The MBCA provides the basis for the corporation laws of a majority
of states within the United States. 6 At a meeting on December 8, 1979,
the Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association (Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law) adopted far-reaching revisions to the financial provisions of the MBCA which have been made

COMMUNITIES 113, 118 (1983).
5. Changes in the Model Business CorporationAct - Amendments to FinancialProvisions, A Report of the Committee on CorporateLaws, 34 Bus. LAW. 1867 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Amendments]. See text accompanying notes 44-55.
6. The Model Business Corporations Act has served as the basis for corporate codes in
more than twenty five states and was employed to a great extent in the drafting of the
corporate law statutes of about ten other states. 1 MODEL BUSIxNESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 2,
comment 4 (1971); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 1, comment 1 (1973 Supp.); MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 1, comment 1 (1977 Supp.); See Cohn, Capital Structure, Dividends and Redemption - Time for a Change to Florida'sCorporate Code, 56 FLA. B.J. 574,
577 n.2 (1982); Murphy, Redemption of Stock Under the Model Business CorporationAct
and the Virginia Stock CorporationAct, 14 U. RICH. L. REv. 311 (1981); Branson, Countertrends in Corporation Law: Model Business Corporation Act Revision, British Company
Law Reform, and Principles of CorporateGovernance and Structure, 68 MINN. L. Rav. 53,
57 (1983); Kummert, supra note 1, at 195; B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 73 and 165; The
Model Business Corporation Act was prepared by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the
Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association. A first
draft of a model business corporation act (1946) was patterned on the 1933 Illinois Business
Corporation Act. A version in 1950, which largely superseded the first draft, was given wide
publicity and may be regarded as the basis of the present Model Business Corporation Act.
For the text of the 1950 version, preceded by comments on the early drafts, see Garrett,
History, Purpose and Summary of the Model Business Corporation Act, 6 Bus. LAW. 1
(1950); see also Garrett, The Model Business CorporationAct, 4 BAYLOR L. REv. 412 (1952);
Harris, The Model Business CorporationAct - Invitation to Irresponsibility?,50 Nw. U.L.
REV. 1 (1955); Jennings, The Role of the States in CorporateRegulation and Investor Protection, 23 LAW & CONTEMn'. PROBS. 193, 197 (1958).
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part of the overall revision of the Act in 1984, after only minor changes. 7
To date, very few states have adopted the revised MBCA. The majority of
states have corporation laws based on the old MBCA and its
predecessors.
A.

Statutory "Legal Capital" Systems

The concepts of "legal capital," "par value," "stated capital," and
"capital surplus," contained in the modern corporation codes of most
states are the direct product of nineteenth century legal history.8 In the
nineteenth century, "par value" was the minimum value that a shareholder was required to have paid for each share of corporate stock. 9 The
product of the par value of each share times the number of shares of
stock issued and outstanding was called the corporation's "capital" or
"stated capital."' 0 If the shares were authorized at a low value, and sold
well in excess of it, they were called "low par stock.""' Consideration received in excess of the par value was separately disclosed on the balance
sheet as "capital surplus," "capital in excess of par value" or "additional
'2
paid-in capital.'
Par value is no longer an indication of the price at which shares are
issued. Today, the only important function of par value is that consideration at least equal to par must be paid in under the statutes. If the assets
paid in for shares are valued at an amount less than par, the shares are
called "watered stock."'" Most statutes permit a statutory obligation to
pay in par value to be enforced in some circumstances by creditors,"

7. Changes in the Model Business CorporationAct - Amendments to FinancialProvision, A Report of the Committee on CorporateLaws, 35 Bus. LAW. 1365 (1980); T. FIFLIS,

H. KRIPKE, P. FOSTER, AccouNTIN FOR BusINss LAWYERS, 431 (3rd ed. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as T. FIFLIS]; R. HAMILTON, CORPORTION FINANCE, 114 (1984); Murphy, Equity Insolvency and the New Model Business CorporationAct, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 839 (1981); Ralston, The 1980 Amendments to the FinancialProvisions of the Model Business Corporation Act: A Positive Alternative to the New York Statutory Reform, 47 ALB. L. REV. 1019,
1021-1022 (1983); B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 165; Kummert, supra note 1, at 187 n.4;
Cohn, supra note 6, at 578 n. 32; Murphy, supra note 6, 312 n.3; Amendments supra note 5.
The official text and comments of the 1984 overall revision of the Model Business Corpora-

tion Act were published in 1985 as the

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP.

ACT. Throughout

this text, the latest 1984 version of the Model Business Corporation Act is referred to as the
"MBCA." The version of the sections as they existed prior to the 1979 amendments is referred to as the "old MBCA."
8. Cohn, supra note 6, 574; The concepts and their history are discussed extensively in
B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 1-108.
9. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 20; T. FiFLis, supra note 7, at 426.
10. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 30; Cohn, supra note 6, at 574.
11. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 24.
12. S. SIEGEL & D. SIEGEL, ACCOUrTING AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE, 98-99 (1983) B.
MANNING, supra note 1, at 36; Cohn, supra note 6, at 574; Ralston, supra note 7, at 1023.
13. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 20; R. HAMILTON, supra note 7, at 66; T. FIFLIS, supra
note 7, at 426; S. SIEGEL & D. SIEGEL, supra note 12, at 97.
14. Hackney & Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. PITT. L.
REV. 837, 839 (1982); B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 46.
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shareholders, 5 or the corporation."'
Since the beginning of this century" more and more states have permitted the issuance of "no par stock" (i.e. stock with no dollar amount
printed on the share certificate). No par stock may be issued for whatever
consideration the board of directors determines." The statutes, however,
require that the board of directors "state" a capital number on the balance sheet.. 9 This number, whether or not it follows directly from the par
value of the shares is called the "legal capital" or "stated capital". Some
statutes prescribe a minimum initial capitalization;" which is typically a
requirement to pay in a small amount of money, very often $500 or
$1,000."1 Most of these pro forma requirements have been abolished during the last few years."
A shareholder has no financial obligation or liability to the corporation or its creditors with respect to his shares, other than the obligation
to pay the consideration for which his shares were issued." The legal capital required by law is designed to be a safeguard for creditors. 2 4 But in
some cases, particularly where the corporation is "grossly undercapitalized," this limited liability may be disregarded.' 5
Many states base restrictions on corporate distributions on the concept of legal capital. In effect, this concept asserts that a corporation, in
order to protect its creditors, should not pay any dividend to its shareholders if the result would be to reduce the corporation's assets below the
aggregate par or stated value of issued shares.' The problems involved in

15. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 53.

16. Id. at 56.
17. Id. at 25.
18. Cohn, supra note 6, at 574; T. FiLIs, supra note 7, at 427; S. SIEGEL & D. SIEGEL,
supra note 12, at 97.
19. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 26; Cohn, supra note 6, at 574; S. SIEGEL & D. SIEGEL,
supra note 12, at 97. Some statutes treat stated value like par: if the stated value is not
paid-in, it will be possible to enforce payment of the stated value. T. FIFLIS, supra note 7, at
427.

20. R. HAMILTON, supra note 6, at 56.
21. 2 MODEL BusIN'ss CORP. AcT ANN., 174, § 54, V3.03(7) (1971). Usually there was no
provision prohibiting an immediate return of this amount to the shareholders. B. MANNING,
supra note 1, at 17.

22. The old MBCA contained such a provision, but it was eliminated in 1969. 2 MODEL
BusINEss CORP. AcT ANN. § 54, V 3.03(7) (1971); Scott, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 24 Bus. LAW. 291, 300 (1968); R. HAMILTON, supra note 7, at 56; Branson,

supra note 6, at 77.
23. 1 MODEL BusINEss CORP. AcT ANN. § 25 (1971); Hackney & Benson, supra note 14,
at 839.

24. Hackney, Accounting Principles in CorporationLaw, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
791, 799 (1965).
25. See Comment, Limited Limited Liability, A Definitive Judicial Standard for the
Inadequate CapitalizationProblem, 47 TEMP. L. Q. 321 (1974); Hackney & Benson, supra
note 14, 837-901; see infra notes 127-130 and accompanying text.
26. Kummert, supra note 1, at 194; B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 30; T. FIFLIS, supra
note 7, at 432; Hackney, supra note 24, at 799.
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determining the legality of distributions under these statutes are generally seen as among the most confusing and complex in the entire field of
corporate law." The statutory provisions differ from state to state and
contain different tests. It will be useful to mention the most important
forms of state legislation which impose restrictions on corporate
distributions.
1. Insolvency Statute
Massachusetts appears to be the only state which has only one statutory limitation on distributions of assets to shareholders. The Massachusetts corporation statute imposes liability on directors of a corporation
who distribute dividends "if the corporation is insolvent or is rendered
insolvent by the making of any such distribution. . ."" This provision
is generally seen as the most lenient in terms of restricting distributions.
It dispenses entirely with concepts of capital, legal capital, par value, surplus or any other accounting terms. Most corporation laws of other states
contain similar provisions, but only in combination with one or more of
the tests discussed in the following sections.2 9
".

2.

Balance Sheet Surplus Statutes

The New York Business Corporation Law is a good example of a balance sheet surplus statute. Section 510(b) reads as follows:
Dividends may be declared or paid and other distributions may be
made out of surplus only, so that the net assets of the corporation
remaining after such declaration, payment or distribution shall at
least equal the amount of its stated capital."
The effect of this test is that dividends may be paid out of net assets
in excess of legal capital.3 1 These provisions rely heavily on accounting
concepts that determine whether there is a surplus.32
3.

Earned Surplus Statutes

According to these statutes, distributions of assets to shareholders

27. R. HAMILTON, supra note 7, at 84.
28. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 61 (West 1964); Current Issues on the Legality
of Dividends From a Law and Accounting Perspective: a Task Force Report, 39 Bus. LAW.
289, 304 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Task Force Report]. See also Colorado Corp. Code,
C.R.S. § 7-5-110(1) (1973).
29. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 59; Cohn, supra note 6, at 575; R. HAMILTON, supra
note 7, at 85; T. FIFLIS, supra note 7, at 441.
30. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 510(b) (Consol. 1982). More than fifteen states use this test
as the central restriction on distributions of assets. E.g. C.R.S. § 7-5-110(d) (1973); Kuminert, supra note 1, at 211. For a definition of stated capital see N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §
102(a)(12) (Consol. 1982); MICH. Coup. LAWS § 450.1109(3) (1970); 1 MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
ACT ANN. § 2(j) (1971).
31. T. FIFLIS, supra note 7, at 434.
32. S. SIEGEL & D. SIEGEL, supra note 12, at 99.

DEN. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 14:2-3

have to be limited to situations in which an enterprise has accumulated
earnings. The old MBCA is often described as an earned surplus statute."3 Section 45(a) of the old MBCA permits dividends to be declared
and paid in cash or property out of the unreserved and unrestricted
earned surplus. 4 Earned surplus consists of the accumulated and undistributed earnings of the corporation. 5
This limitation seems to provide adequate protection for creditors.
However, according to section 46 of the old MBCA, a corporation may
under certain conditions distribute cash or property out of capital surplus." This "exception" is probably based on the idea that it is only the
par value of the corporation's stock that serves to protect the creditors.3 7
Capital surplus which can be generated quite easily by a reduction of par
or other reduction of stated capital can be used as an offset to a deficit in
the earned surplus account.3 8
4.

Nimble Dividend Statutes

Section 170 of the Delaware corporation statute permits a corporation to pay dividends in situations where there will be no surplus. These
dividends are paid out of net profits for the fiscal year in which the dividend is declared and/or the preceding fiscal year. Dividends can be paid

33. Hackney, The Financial Provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act, 70
L. REV. 1357, 1366-1367 (1957); B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 73; Murphy, supra note

HARV.

6, at 315; T. FIFLIS, supra note 7, at 436.
34. 1 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 45(a) (1971).
35. For the complete definition see 1 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 2(1) (1971).
36. In part, section 46 of the old Model Act states:
(a) No such distribution shall be made at a time when the corporation is
insolvent or when such distribution would render the corporation insolvent.
(b) No such distribution shall be made unless the articles of incorporation
so provide or such distribution is authorized by the affirmative vote of the
holders of a majority of the outstanding shares of each class whether or not
entitled to vote thereon by the provisions of the articles of incorporation of the
corporations.
(c) No such distribution shall be made to the holders of any class of shares
unless all cumulative dividends accrued on all preferred or special classes of
shares entitled to preferential dividends shall have been fully paid.
(d) No such distribution shall be made to the holders of any class of shares
which would reduce the remaining net assets of the corporation below the aggregate preferential amount payable in event of involuntary liquidation to the
holders of shares having preferential rights to the assets of the corporation in
the event of liquidation.
(e) Each such distribution, when made, shall be identified as a distribution
from the capital surplus and the amount per share disclosed to the shareholders receiving the same concurrently with the distribution thereof.
1 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 46 (1971). See also Kummert, supra note 1, at 196;
Murphy, supra note 6, at 316 n. 10.
37. S. SIEGEL & D. SIEGEL, supra note 12, at 99.
38. See 2 MODEL BusINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 70 (1971); B. MANNING, supra note 1, at
72-75,125; Hackney, supra note 33, at 1381.
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out even if the deficits of previous years have not yet been eliminated.3 9
This approach can be risky for creditors because this provision allows
future dividends to be paid despite accumulated past deficits. However, it
does allow a corporation that has accumulated large losses to attract new
equity capital. If this new capital infusion can help a company avoid
bankruptcy, the creditors certainly would be better off. But even then, it
would be preferable to allow "nimble" dividends only up to a limited portion, such as fifty percent of the current earnings, and to require that the
other part of these earnings be used to reduce the existing deficit.
B.

New FinancialProvisions

The reformation of state statutes that regulate payments by corporations to their shareholders began with the adoption by the California legislature of the California General Corporations Law. '0 The fundamental
limitation on corporate distributions has been retained in Section 501 of
the California Corporation Code which provides that no distribution may
be made if the corporation is, or as a result of the distribution would be
unable to pay its debts as they mature."'
The California statute further prohibits any distribution to the corporation's shareholders unless: (a) the corporation has retained earnings
at least equal to the amount of the proposed distribution,"2 or (b) the
corporation, after the distribution, has (1) assets at least equal to 1 /4
times its liabilities, and (2) current assets at least equal to its current
liabilities. If the corporation's earnings for the two preceding fiscal years
before taxes on income and interest expense are less than its interest expense for those same years, its current assets must at least be equal to 1
/
times its liabilities.' These tests are in fact financial ratios used to

39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §170 (1980); see also T. FIFLIS, supra note 7, at 434; B.
supra note 1, at 76-77.
40. See Act of Sept. 12, 1975, ch. 682, 1975 CAL. STAT. 1514. The amendment of the
financial provisions was the most revolutionary part of an overall revision of the California
Corporation Code. The new California General Corporation Law took effect on January 1,
1977.
41. CAL. CORP. CODE § 501 (Deering 1977). This is called the equity insolvency test,
which is concerned with liquidity. Equity insolvency can be defined as the inability to pay
debts as they become due. The bankruptcy insolvency test is concerned with liquidation and
compares the total dollar amount of the assets with the total dollar amount of the liabilities.
There is bankruptcy insolvency if the total liabilities exceed the total assets. See Ben-Dror,
An Empirical Study of Distribution Rules Under California Corporations Code 500: Are
Creditors Adequately Protected?, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 375, 380 (1983); B. MANNING, supra
note 1, at 59-60.
42. CAL. CORP. CODE § 500(a) (Deering 1977).
43. CAL. CORP. CODE § 500(b) (Deering 1977). Assets are defined as "exclusive of goodwill, capitalized research and development expenses and deferred charges" and liabilities as
"not including deferred taxes, deferred income and other deferred credits." For more extensive discussions of these provisions, see 2 H. MARSH, CA. CORP. LAW AND PRACTICE, § 13.113.30 (1982); R. CLARK, 1 CA. CORP. LAWS, §§ 141-148 (1984); Ackerman, Jr., California's
New Approach to Dividends and Reacquisitions of Shares, 23 UCLA L. REV. 1052 (1976);
MANNING,
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determine the solvency of the corporation. The "revolution" started by
the California legislation was continued some years later when the financial provisions of the old MBCA were amended. Today's MBCA contains
44
comparable, but different provisions.
Shortly after the adoption of the 1979 amendments, the Committee
on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association began a major project to update, restate and revise all provisions of the MBCA. A final version was approved in 1984 and published in 1985. As mentioned earlier,
this revision contains no substantial changes to the 1979 amendment.4 5
Illinois, Montana and New Mexico have already enacted all or some of
the new provisions in their corporation law."'
The most important change made by the amendments to the MBCA
was the elimination of par value, stated capital and surplus.47 The use in
the articles of incorporation of provisions concerning par value (for
whatever purposes desired, not inconsistent with the statute) is optional. 48 The purchasing shareholder has no other obligation to the corporation nor to its creditors than to pay the consideration for which the
shares were authorized to be issued or which is specified in the subscription agreement.4" No certificate shall be issued for any share before the
board of directors determines that the consideration received or to be received for the shares is adequate. 50 There is no requirement of minimum
initial capitalization.
Central to the changes is the introduction of a new concept termed
"distribution," and the revision of the rules regulating dividends and
purchases by a corporation of its own shares and distributions in liquidations. According to the Act, stock dividends and stock splits are not "distributions." They are mere changes in the unit of interests. 5' Section
6.40(c) of the MBCA imposes a uniform test on all distributions. A corpo-

Dreyfuss, Distributions to Shareholders Under the New California General Corporation
Law, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 839 (1976); Kummert, supra note 1, at 226-242; Ben-Dror, supra
note 41.
44. See Ben-Dror, supra note 41, at 377 n.22 and 381-383.
45. See supra note 7.

46. Illinois,

ILL.ANN.STAT.

ch. 32P. § 9.15 (1985); New Mexico, N.M.

STAT. ANN.

§ 53-

11-44 (1983); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-711 (1983).
47. Amendments, supra note 5, at 1869-1872; See also supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
48. Amendments, supra note 5, at 1887. Of course, many charter documents will not be
changed and continue to contain references to par value.
49. REVISED MODEL BusiNEss CORP. AcT § 6.22(a) (1985). Compare with section 25 of
the old MBCA, see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
50. REVISED MODEL BusiNiss CORP. AcT § 6.21(c) (1985).
51. REVISED MODEL BusiNEss CORP. AcT § 1.40(6) (1985). A "distribution" is defined as:
"direct or indirect transfer of money or other property (except its own shares) or incurrence
of indebtedness, by a corporation to or for the benefit of any of its shareholders in respect of
any of its shares. A distribution may be in the form of a declaration or payment of a dividend, a purchase, redemption, or other acquisition of shares, a distribution of indebtedness
or otherwise."
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ration may not make a proposed distribution if either: (1) the corporation
would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course
of its business, or (2) the corporation's total assets would be less than the
sum of its total liabilities (unless the articles of incorporation permit otherwise) plus the amount that then would be needed to satisfy the preferential rights upon dissolution of shareholders whose preferential rights
are superior to those receiving the distribution."2 This test is in fact a
dual insolvency test which prohibits any distribution that causes either
"equity insolvency," or "bankruptcy insolvency. 5 3
Determination that a distribution may be made under section 6.40(c)
of the MBCA may be based on financial statements prepared on the basis
of accounting practices and principles, on a fair valuation, or on other
methods that are reasonable under the circumstances." Section 6.40(e)
also provides the effective date by which the distribution is to be
measured. 55
III.

CORPORATION LAW IN THE

E.E.C.

COUNTRIES

Corporation Law in the E.E.C. Countries is heavily influenced by
Community Directives. After giving an overview of the basis in the E.E.C.
Treaty 6 for the directives and their operation in general, we will discuss
in detail the different directive requirements protecting general creditors.
It will be clear that the European system is similar to the U.S. systems of
legal capital in many ways. However, the European system has more
stringent requirements for the raising and maintenance of minimum capital than its United States counterparts.
A.

Harmonization of Corporate Laws in the E.E.C.

One aspect of the E.E.C.'s goal to permit the free movement of persons, services and capital among Member States is what the E.E.C.
Treaty terms the right of establishment. This right comprises the freedom of a national company of any Member State to establish or maintain
a business in any of the other Member States. The E.E.C. Council of
Ministers has the power to issue directives to the Member States in order
to secure freedom of establishment by means of coordinating some aspects of the national corporation laws of the Member States.57 Although

52.

REVISED

MODEL BusiNEss CORP. AcT

§

6.40(c) (1985).

§

6.40(d) (1985).

53. See supra note 41.
54. REvisED MODEL BusINEss CoRP. ACT

55. For further discussion of the MBCA: B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 165-180; Kuminert, supra note 1, at 242-256; Cohn, supra note 6, at 576-578; Murphy, supra note 7, at
839-871; Ralston, supra note 7, at 1019-1049.
56. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done March 25, 1957, art.
85, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter referred to as E.E.C. Treaty].
57. Id. arts. 53(3)(g), 54(2). For a more detailed analysis of the legal foundation of these
measures in the E.E.C. Treaty, see Schneebaum, Company Law HarmonizationProgram of
the European Community, 14 LAW. & POL'Y. INT'L Bus. 293, 293-300 (1982); Wooldridge,
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directives are binding upon each Member State to which it is addressed,
"as to the result to be achieved," ' 8 the directives claim to leave the national authorities the choice of form and methods, but in practice they
often leave little discretion as to the manner of their implementation. 9
A plan of company law harmonization has been developed and partly
executed in the E.E.C. Countries. This plan covers diverse aspects of corporate operations including disclosure of information, capitalization,
mergers, public offerings of securities, qualification of auditors and relationships within "groups" of corporations.6 0 Those areas of law which are
not governed by implementation within the national laws of any directive
are still governed by the national laws and regulations of each Member
State."'
B.

The Second Council Directive

Distribution to shareholders in E.E.C. Countries is primarily regulated by the Second Council Directive. 62 The Second Directive applies
only to public companies and not to private companies."s The term "public company" is defined to include the public company limited by shares,
limited by guarantee and having a share capital (United Kingdom, Ireland), die Aktiengesellschaft (Germany), la society anonyme (France,
Belgium), de naamloze venootschap ( Netherlands, Belgium), la societa
per azioni (Italy) and aktieselskabet (Denmark)." Member States need
not apply the Directive to investment companies with variable capital nor
to co-operatives, which take the form of public companies, if they require
these companies to mention their special status in their business
documents.6 5
Although article 43 of the Second Directive requires implementation
of the Directive in the national law of each Member State within two
Harmonizationof Company Law: The Firstand Second Directives of the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community, AcrA JURIDICA 327, 327-328 (1978); Fr6d6ricq,
Harmonisatie van het vennootschapsrecht in de Europese Economische Gemeenschap,
hoever staan wij?, 43 RECHTSKUNDIG WEicLA, 1809, 1822-1823 (1980); Yates, III, supra
note 4, at 113-115.
.58. E.E.C. Treaty, supra note 56, art. 189.
59. Wooldridge, supra note 57, at 328.
60. See Nieuwdorp, Status Report on E.E.C. Company Law Harmonization,12 INT'L
Bus. LAW. 425-430 (1984); Schneebaum, supra note 57, at 301-321; Fr6d6ricq, supra note 57,
at 1822-1840.
61. Where the subject of this article is not covered by any E.E.C. Directive, or where
otherwise useful, this article will refer to the law of the E.E.C. Countries with which the
author is most familiar.
62. Second Council Directive, supra note 3. For the legislative history of the Directive,
see Schmitthoff, The Second EEC Directive on Company Law, 15 COMM. MKT.L. REV. 43,
43-46 (1978).
63. Morse, supra note 4, at 127; Wooldridge, supra note 57, at 334; Schmitthoff, supra
note 62, at 45.
64. Second Council Directive, supra note 3, art. 1.1.
65. Id. art. 1.2.
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years of its notification, many Member States have implemented it much
later.6 6 The delay stems not from ideological rejection, but from the fact
that in some Member States a more general revision of the code was proceeding simultaneously, in some cases provoked by the implementation of
7
the Directive.6
1. Provisions for CorporationDistributions to Shareholders
The Second Directive provides special rules for the raising and maintenance of share capital that are much stricter than any "legal capital"
system in the United States. Article 6 of the Second Directive requires
that a public company may not be incorporated or authorized to commence business unless a minimum capital of at least 25,000 European
Units of Account are subscribed." Member States often require a larger
minimum capital."9 Most E.E.C. Countries already had a requirement of a
70
minimum capitalization in their corporation law.
The Second Directive contains provisions to keep the minimum
amount, stated in the Directive and implemented in the national laws,

66. Schneebaum, supra note 7, at 304 n.46; Belgium, Law of December 5th, 1984,
MONrrEuR BELGE-BELGISCH STAATSBLAD, 15612 (Dec. 12, 1984); see Francois, van Bruystegem, Massage, van Hulle, Debrulle, Verhaegen, Olivier essays in LA MODIFICATION DU
DROIT DES Socm'rEs ANONYMES, REVUE DE Dsorr COMMERCIAL BELGE (special edition) (1984)
[hereinafter cited as LA MODIFICATION BELGE]; Glansdorf, Projet de loi sur les sociktks com-

merciales, 101

JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX

171-176 (1982); France, Law of December 30th,

1981, 1982 J.C.P. 111 52152; Coffy, Loi No. 81-1162 du 30 dcembre 1981 relative a
l'harmonisationdu droit des sociktks commerciales avec le lie. directive de la C.E.E. du 13
dicembre 1976, DALLOZ SiREY, CHRONIQUE 279, 279-292 (1982), and Guyon, La mise en
harmonie du droit francais des socistks avec la directive des Communaut~s Europkennes
sur le capital social, 1982 J.C.P. No. 1, 3067.
67. Massag6, Adaption des lois coordonnkes sur les socist~s commerciales a la Deuxi~me directive des Communaut~s Europkennes relative a la constitution de la sociktk
anonyme, au maintien et aux modifications de son capital, 96 JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 125,
125 (1981); Coffy, supra note 66, at 279.
68. The European Unit of Account is constituted by a "basket" of community currencies and has been replaced by the European Currency Unit (ECU) in all Community legal
instruments. See Council Regulation 3308/80 of 16 Dec., 1980, 23 O.J. EvE. COMM. No.
L345, 1 (1980). The ECU is also a basket of currencies defined in the same way as the
European Unit of Account, but subject to a revision clause. See Council Regulation 3180/78
of 18 Dec. 1978, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. No. L 379, 1 (1978). The value of the ECU was approximately $0.88 on Jan. 21, 1986, Wall Street J. Jan. 21, 1986, at 55.
69. E.g., France, 250,000 FF, and 1,500,00 FF if the corporation "goes public;" see Y.
GUYON, DRorr DES AFFAIRES 270 (3rd. ed., Paris, 1984); Guyon, supra note 66, at No. 9;
Coffy, supra note 66, at 284. Belgium, 1,250,000 BF, See Francois, LA MODIICATION BELGE,
supra note 66, at 14. In Belgium there are no extra requirements as to minimum capitalization when a firm goes public. The Belgian Commission Bancaire focuses especially on the
efficient disclosure to the prospective buyer. (Royal Decree nr. 185, July 9th, 1935); See
Geeraert, Keustermans, De openbare uitgifte van effecten, Recht en Praktijk, 19 JURA FALCONIs 315, 315-355 (1983). Germany, 100,000 DM, see, Hdffer, Harmonisierung des aktienrechtlichen Kapitalschutzes, 32 NEUB JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 1065, 1070 (1979).
70. E.g. France, art. 71, Law No. 66-537 of July 24th, 1966; Germany § 7 AKtG; Italy,
art. 2327 Codice Civile.
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adequate in the light of fluctuations of currencies and the economic and
monetary trends in the Member States 7 '
Shares issued for cash are paid at the time the company is incorporated or authorized to commence business, at not less than twenty-five
percent of their nominal value, or in absence of a nominal value, their
accountable par. Where shares are issued for a consideration other than
in cash, the consideration must be transferred in full within five years of
72
that time.
The subscribed capital may be formed only of assets capable of economic assessment. Excluded are undertakings to perform work or supply
services." s Articles 10 and 11 of the Second Directive contain special rules
for the valuation of capital contributions in kind, including a requirement
for a valuation report, before the company is incorporated or authorized
to commence business, by one or more independent experts appointed or
approved by an administrative or judicial authority.7 Because the guiding principle underlying this provision of the Second Directive is to establish the subscribed capital as the credit basis of the company for the protection of creditors, the articles concerning the maintenance of the
subscribed capital are as important as those concerning the raising of
capital.
Article 15 of the Second Directive is the core of the provisions enacted to maintain subscribed capital. Payments to shareholders of dividends and interest relating to shares, and the permission to acquire its
own shares and redemptions 75 are subject to the following test, which is
similar to the "Balance Sheet Surplus Test":
Except for cases of reductions of subscribed capital, no distribution to
shareholders may be made when on the closing date of the last financial year the next assets as set out in the company's annual account
are, or following such a distribution would become, lower than the
amount of the subscribed capital plus those reserves which .may not
76
be distributed under the law or the statutes.

71. Second Council Directive, supra note 3, art. 6.2 and 6.3.
72. Second Council Directive, supra note 3, art. 9; The reason behind this rule is to
avoid unneeded assets in the corporation. In the beginning there is often no need for all the
money (or other assets) promised by the shareholders. The "unused" money would be a
(temporary) negative investment. See, J. RONSE, ALGEMEEN DazL VAN HET VENNOOTSCHAPSRECHT, 306 (Leuven, 1975); Y. GUYON, supra note 69, at 271.
73. Second Council Directive, supra note 3, art. 7. In the United States most courts and
statutes have imposed a similar prohibition. An agreement for future services is not acceptable as a medium of payment to discharge the pay- in obligation of the shareholders. B.
MANNING, supra note 1, at 41.
74. In the United States, the board of directors has the responsibility for determining
the value of contributions in kind. According to most statutes their determination is (in the
absence of fraud) conclusive and determinative. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 44; Yates, III,
supra note 4, at 119.
75. Second Council Directive, supra note 3, arts. 15.1(d), 19.1(c), 35(b), 39(d).
76. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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Payments to shareholders of dividends and interest relating to shares and
redemptions are subject to a second test which is similar to the "Earned
Surplus Test":"
The amount of a distribution to shareholders may not exceed the
amount of the profits brought forward and sums drawn from reserves
available for this purpose, less any losses brought forward and
7 8 sums
placed on reserve in accordance with the law or the statutes.
The directives contain many other detailed provisions on the withdrawal of shares by purchase or redemption (for those Member States
where this is allowed), the reduction of subscribed capital and the maintenance of subscribed capital in general.7 9 Most of these are worth mentioning in order to give a more complete view of the provisions.
Article 17 of the Second Directive provides that the case of a serious
loss of the subscribed capital must give rise to a general meeting of shareholders. The shareholders at this general meeting must then consider
whether the company should be wound up or whether other measures
should be taken. 0
Article 30 of the Second Directive provides that a reduction in the
subscribed capital must normally take place by a two-thirds majority vote
of the shareholders in a general meeting.8 ' The creditors whose claims
antedate the publication of the decision to make the reduction shall be
entitled to have the right to obtain security for claims which have not
fallen due at that time, if the reduction is due to over-capitalization."2 If
the reduction is to offset losses incurred, or to include sums of money in a
reserve (maximum ten percent of the reduced subscribed capital) the
amounts derived from the reduction may not be used for making payments or distributions to shareholders or discharging them from the obligation to make their contributions. 8 Article 34 of the Second Directive
provides that the subscribed capital may not be reduced to an amount
less than the minimum capital.

77. Second Council Directive, supra note 3, arts. 15.1(d), 35(b), 39(d).
78. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. See also van Hulle, Wettelijke
beperkingen inzake winstuitkering - Limitations lgales en matire de distribution des
bnfficres, in LA MODIFIcATMON BELGE, supra note 66, at 31, and Hackney, supra note 33, at
1363-1366 for a comparison of this test and the balance sheet surplus test.
79. Schmitthoff, supra note 62, at 51; See also Second Council Directive, supra note 3,
arts. 18-42.
80. See Debrulle, La responsabilit6des administreursen cas de perte grave du capital,
in LA MODIFICATION BELGE, supra note 66 at 105.
81. The notice concerning the meeting must specify at least the purpose of reduction
and the way in which it is to be carried out. Second Council Directive, supra note 3, art. 30.
82. Id. arts. 32, 33.1.
83. Id. art. 33.2. This dichotomy finds its origin in the legal systems of Germany (Wooldridge, supra note 57, at 340), the United Kingdom (Id. at 340 and Morse, supra note 4, at
131) and French law concerning commercial companies, art. 216; AKtG, art. 229; Companies
Act 1948, § 67.
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Other Rules Governing Distributions

Under Articles 34.1(b) and 37 of the Fourth Council Directive, a corporation may not distribute dividends if the corporation has, where authorized by national law, included organization expenses or expenses of
research and development under 'assets,' unless these expenses have been
completely written off, or if the amount of the reserves available for distribution and profits brought forward is at least equal to that of the ex84
penses not written off.
In the United States, General Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) s5 prescribe that expenses for research and development have to
be deducted at once and must not be recorded as assets.86 Organization
expenses, however, may generally be carried as assets written off as expenses over a period not to exceed forty years.8 "
Some countries have national provisions which go further than the
minimum requirements of the Directives, for example, higher minimum
capitalization requirements. Other countries have imposed liability where
the corporation was undercapitalized. For example, article 35.6 of the
Belgian Consolidated Laws on Companies, assesses liability to the founding shareholders in the event of bankruptcy within three years of the incorporation, if the capital was obviously insufficient to cover the proposed
activities of the corporation for an initial period of at least two years. The
judge will generally base his decision on a financial forecast furnished by
the founding shareholders to the notary at the time of incorporation.ss
IV.

THE "CUSHION"

OR "TRUST FUND" DOCTRINE

In many E.E.C. countries the requirements for minimum capital as a

84. Fourth Council Directive of 25 July 1978 based on Article 54 (3)(g) of the Treaty,
on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. No L 222, 11
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Fourth Council Directive]. After implementation of the E.E.C.Directives these provisions and the provisions provided by the Second Council Directive are
part of article 77bis of the Belgian Consolidated Laws on Companies. See van Hulle, Wettelijke bescherming inzake winstuitkering - Limitations lgales en mati~re de distribution
des bn/fices, in LA MODIFICATION BFLGE, supra note 66, at 82.
85. General Accepted Accounting Principles [hereinafter referred to as GAAP] consist
of partially codified accepted practices of the accounting profession. The GAAP can be
found in the practice of the profession itself and in a collection of definitive publications,
e.g. by the American Institute of Certified Public Accounts (AICPA) and the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB). See S. SIEGEL & D. SIEGEL, supra note 12, at 6-7; T.
Finis, supra note 7, at 82-99.
86. Statement of Financial Accounting No. 2, Accounting for Research and Development Costs, V 12 (FASB, 1974).
87. See T. FIFLIS, supra note 7, at 258-259, 270; S. SIEGEL & D. SIEGEL, supra note 12,
at 71-72.
88. See generally Wymeersch, Oprichtersaansprakelijkheidbij inbreng van financieel
negatief vennootschapsvermogen, 22 RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD 2129, 2129-2146 (1979);
Breesch, Oprichting van N.V.'s en P.V.B.A.'s: enige cijfers en bedenkingen, 24 RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD 1625-1656 (1981).
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trust fund for general creditors have been increased by the implementation of the Directives. The idea of minimum capitalization has been completely abolished in the MBCA. This author suggests that a trust fund is
necessary for the protection of general creditors and that while some of
the existing solutions are promising, they all have defects. The use of financial ratio tests is proposed as a better solution. Economic matters, including valuation issues, however, must still be taken into consideration
when fixing the applicable ratios.
A.

The Doctrine

The principal object of the legal capital systems in the United States,
as well as in the E.E.C., is to afford a margin of protection for creditors,8 9
in view of the limited liability of the shareholders. 90 While most financial
or institutional creditors can protect themselves against insolvent debtors, 91 general trade creditors cannot, as a practical matter, similarly protect themselves. 2
Provisions for the raising and maintenance of minimum capital can
protect creditors by reducing the probability of insolvency or bankruptcy,
and minimizing creditors' losses if either occurs.9" The theory behind the
idea of capital as protection for shareholders is the "trust fund" or "cushion" doctrine.
The trust fund doctrine finds its origin in Wood v. Dummer." The
court in Drummer held that shareholders who received liquidating distributions from an insolvent bank had to return these corporate assets for
distribution to their creditors, because the shareholders' equity is a "trust
fund" for creditors, and distributions out of capital were therefore illegal.
Justice Story stated:
The individual stockholders are not liable for the debts of the bank in
their private capacities. The charter relieves them from personal re-

89. Dividend regulations often include some protection of other parties: Either of the
shareholders against a diminution of their investment, or of one class of shareholders
against another. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 73; Hackney, supra note 33, at 1365; Task
Force Report, supra note 28, at 303.
90. Ralston, supra note 7, at 1019; T. Ftiws, supra note 7, at 524; Task Force Report,
supra note 28, at 303; Ackerman, Jr., Sterrett II, supra note 43, at 1052; Ronse, Kapitaalbescherming bij de oprichting -van de N.V., in DORHOUT MEEs COLLECTION, VERZEKERING
VAN VRIENDSCHAP, RECHTSGELEERDE OPSTELLEN AANGEBODEN AAN PROF. MR. T.J. DORHOUT

MEEs, 183, 184-185 (1974); Tunc, A French Lawyer Looks at American Corporation Law
and Securities Regulations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 757, 764-768 (1982); Yates, III, supra note 4,
at 118-119; Schmitthoff, supra note 62, at 48; Guyon, supra note 66, at No. 7.
B.

91. E.g. by mortgage of real estate, pledge of securities or contractual limitations. See
supra note 1, at 94-107.

MANNING,

92. Marsh, Jr., Introduction, Symposium, The New California General Corporation
Law, 23 UCLA L. REv. 1035, 1045 (1976); B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 91-94.
93. Gibson, Surplus So What? The Model Act Modernized, 17 Bus. LAW. 476, 485
(1962).
94. 30 F. Cas 435 (C.C.D.Me. 1824) (No. 17, 944).
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sponsibility, and substitutes the capital stock in its stead. . . . If the
stock may, the next day after it is paid in, be withdrawn by the stockholders without payment of the debts of the corporation, why is its
amount so studiously provided for, and its payment by the stockholders so diligently required? ....
They [the stockholders] have the full
benefit of all the profits made by the establishment, and cannot take
any portion of the fund, until all the other claims on it are
extinguished.9'
Many states have enacted provisions which are premised on this theory to
protect creditors by limiting corporate -distributions to shareholders by
means of legal capital systems."6
B.

General Evaluation of the Trust Fund Theory

For many years criticism has been directed against legal capital systems. 97 The recent changes in the California General Corporation Code
and in the MBCA,9' were adopted because the general restrictions based
on legal capital were judged not to serve the original purpose of protecting creditors, particularly general trade creditors." The MBCA has reacted against the perceived malfunctioning of the statutory system by
abolishing most of it. 00 A study of the criticism against the old statutory
systems in the light of the new MBCA is helpful in evaluating the new
provisions.
A criticism often mentioned is that legal capital does not refer to any
assets which the corporation actually owns as of the date of the balance
sheet. Rather, it refers to an abstract number that is obtained by multiplying the number of shares by the par value of each share, or in the case
of no par stock, to the number "stated" by the Board of Directors. 1 ' Because this number is unrelated to any economic facts relevant to creditors, creditors prefer to rely on the assets and future prospects of the

95. Id. at 436.
96. Siegel, Accounting and Inflation: An Analysis and a Proposal, 29 UCLA L. Rav.
271, 318-319 (1982); Ralston, supra note 7, at 1021 and 1025; T. FIFLIS, supra note 7, at 432;
See supra notes 6-55 and accompanying text. In Europe, as well, capital is seen as a fixed
and "intangible" cushion for the protection of creditors. Tunc, supra note 90 at 768; J.
RONSE, supra note 72, at 299; Ronse, supra note 90, at 185-186; Massage, Capital social et
operationsfinancibres - Maatschappelijk kapitaal en financiele verrichtingen, in LA MODIFICATION BELGE, supra note 66, at 53, 54; Guyon, supra note 66, at n. 7. See supra notes 6287 and accompanying text.
97. For a historical example, see Ballentine & Hills, Corporate Capital and Restrictions Upon Dividends Under Modern CorporationLaws, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 229, 258 (1935).
It is important to distinguish between the trust fund doctrine and different systems which
are often seen as implementations of the trust fund doctrine in corporation law.
98. See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text.
99. Report of the Assembly Select Committee on the Revision of the Corporations
Code, 71 (1975); Amendments, supra note 5, at 1867.
100. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 8-39 and accompanying text. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 30;
Cohn, supra note 6, at 574; Ralston, supra note 7, at 1021.
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corporation as reflected by the entire range of information shown on contemporary balance sheets and income statements.'" 2
Legal capital on the balance sheet is not intended to show the
amount of the assets available to creditors. Rather, legal capital indicates
the assets which may not be distributed to shareholders. These assets can
only "leave" the company due to losses and they must be restored after
losses have been incurred before any distribution of assets to the shareholders may take place.1 0 3 In fact it may be argued convincingly that
creditors do not look to capital accounts because the statutory legal capital systems are not efficient in raising and maintaining legal capital as a
trust fund large enough to protect creditors. This deficiency is another
reason why the "old" systems has been criticized.
The lack of independent valuation of capital contributions in kind,'0
the possibility of reducing stated capital by several devices (without approval of the creditors or without giving them any other protection), 0 5
the allowance of nimble dividends0 0 and the lack of any meaningful minimum required capital' 07 are generally seen as major deficiencies of the
existing statutory legal capital systems.
In Europe these issues are resolved by requiring a valuation report
for capital contributions in kind (by one or more independent officially
approved experts), by limiting reductions of capital by severe rules, or by
forbidding any "nimble" dividends and requiring a minimum initial capitalization. In contrast, the MBCA has opted for the abolition of everything that has some connection with legal capital, including the existence
of any trust fund for creditors."0 ' In one sweeping revision, the MBCA
thereby dealt with the often criticised complexity of the statutory legal
capital systems.' 0 Consequently, under the MBCA more "economically
sensible transactions"'110 can be lawfully consummated than under the various statutory legal capital systems.

102. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 85; Cohn, supra note 6, at 575; Ralston, supra note
7, at 1026.
103. See supra notes 26, 75-78 and accompanying text. See also Siegel, supra note 96,
at 320.
104. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
105. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 86; Cohn, supra note 6, at 575; R. HAMILTON, supra
note 7, at 108; See supra notes 38, 83 and accompanying text.
106. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 86; T. FInis, supra note 7, at 434; Hackney, supra
note 24, at 800; See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text; Dreyfuss, supra note 43, at 840.
108. One could argue that if the assets of the corporation have a higher value (e.g. the
liquidation or market value) than the value used to determine the legality of dividends (e.g.
the book value), the difference between the two "values" constitutes a trust fund for creditors. The opposite is true as well. All depend on the valuation methods used. Even if a
cushion exists in some cases under the MBCA, it doesn't appear to have been the purpose of
the drafters.
109. See B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 86.
110. Id. at 88.

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 14:2-3

Nevertheless, the MBCA did not abolish all deficiencies."' As in the
legal capital systems, the decision power concerning distributions is still
in the hands of the board of directors which is elected by the shareholders." For important issues concerning the valuation of assets and accounting principles used in order to prepare the balance which is the basis of the "balance sheet test," no clear rules are provided."'
One commentator made the following cogent remarks about the
"old" systems:
The most persuasive evidence of the quintessential triviality of the
system, however, lies in the fact that any corporation lawyer of moderate skill can nearly always arrange things ... so as to make a lawful
shareholder distribution so long as insolvency is not the immediate
consequence.""
The MBCA has, by lowering the standards for legal distributions to

shareholders, made easier what already was possible (often after some expense) in some ineffective statutory legal capital systems. The dual insolvency test of the MBCA has the merit of simplicity. However, by prohibiting distributions where the ratio between total assets and total liabilities
is lower than one to one, the test is more likely to ascertain, than to predict insolvency (equitable or bankruptcy) as a consequence of the
distribution." 5
The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act"' will often provide better protection for creditors than the MBCA. While the MBCA is not specific about the method to be used to value the assets," 7 the UFCA determines the value of assets as the present fair saleable value.1' 8 If the assets
have a lesser value under the UFCA method, than by a calculation
method under the MBCA then there can be "legal distributions" that are
"illegal conveyances" according to the UFCA. 9
111. Some of them are issues in any known system regulating distributions to
shareholders.
112. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 85 and 87; R. HAMILTON, supra note 7, at 108;
Marsh, Jr, supra note 91, at 1044.
113. See infra notes 139-160 and accompanying text.
114. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 87.
115. The two tests of the MBCA are more useful as a tool for litigation than as a means
for planning. R. JENNINGS & R. BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS, 922 (5th ed. 1979); Ben-Dror,
supra note 41, at 381 and 395.
116. Unif. Fraudulent Conveyances Act, 74 U.L.A. 41 (1985) [hereinafter referred to as
UFCAJ, has been enacted in 26 states. The UFCA enables the trustee to recapture in some
circumstances for the benefit of creditors, funds distributed by debtors to others (e.g. shareholders). See Clark, supra note 2, at 505; Kummert, supra note 1, at 271-275.
117. See infra 154-159 and accompanying notes.
118. UFCA supra note 116, § 2(1). The UFCA has no provision for liability of directors.
In contrast, the MBCA provides liability of directors in § 48. Does this difference justify the
application of different standards? See also Amendments, supra note 5, at 1882-1883; REVIsED MODEL BusINEss CoRP. ACT 124 (1985), and R. JORDAN, W. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY,
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS, 337-343 (unpublished, 1984).
119. The issue of accounting principles used, is extremely important in all systems reg-
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A trust fund is a conditio sine qua non for a serious and fair protection of creditors. A study has shown that even if a trust fund of twentyfive percent of all the liabilities is required, many corporations can still
legally distribute assets to their shareholders one year prior to
120
bankruptcy.
Efficient rules for the raising and maintenance of a trust fund are
much more complex than the provisions of the MBCA. The European
system and the many complex rstrictive covenants imposed by finance
and institutional creditors 21 provide better protection for creditors than
the MBCA. The simplicity of the MBCA should not prevail over the fairness and efficient protection brought by more elaborate solutions.
Whatever the capital is at incorporation, this amount should never
be paid to shareholders without the approval of creditors or without giving them security to protect their claims.'22 Even if the creditors get security or approve distributions out of capital1 2 3 to shareholders, the law
should require a minimum capital to be maintained in all cases in order
to protect future creditors. The same minimum amount should also be
required as a minimum initial capitalization before commencing activity
in corporate form. This requirement will provide a cushion for creditors
during the lifetime of the corporation. If the rules for the raising and
maintenance of this amount are efficient, the available protection will be
largely determined by the amount or ratio required as minimum
capitalization.
C.

The Arbitrariness of the Trust Fund

The American statutory legal systems and the European corporation
laws have almost always required a fixed amount as minimal capitalization.'2 4 The very low minimal capital requirement or the absense of any
requirement at all in the United States,1 25 is based on the notion that the
"old" statutes are seen as mere enabling acts, with no regulatory function. 2 ' In the early 1900s, courts came to deny limited liability to shareholders if no reasonable amount of capital was in fact provided for the

ulating corporate distributions to shareholders.
120. Ben-Dror, supra note 41, at 395.
121. W. KLEIN, BusiNEss ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES
160-166 (1980); B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 105-106; See supra note 91 and accompanying
text. Creditors often require that businesses be financed with a large enough equity cushion
(W. KLEIN, supra, at 49) or satisfy financial ratios (Ballantine & Hills, supra note 97, at
259).
122. See supra notes 62-83 and accompanying text.
123. It is clear that "distributions out of capital" means distributions of these assets
which form the counterpart of the legal capital on the balance sheet, and which cause the
total assets of the corporation to be less than the total liabilities plus the legal capital.
124. See supra notes 21, 68, 69 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 21 and 23.
126. Katz, The Philosophy of Midcentury CorporationStatutes, 23 LAW & CoNrlEM.
PROBS. 117, 179, 181-183 (1958); Hackney & Benson, supra note 15, at 856.
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protection of creditors.127 Undercapitalization became one of the principal
factors looked at by the courts as a reason to "pierce the corporate
veil. 1 2' The doctrinal basis for these decisons was the improper use of
the corporate form.1 29 However, courts do not automatically impose liability for undercapitalization, but often look to equitable factors in determining whether to do so. " "
The law in this area is generally confused and many questions have
no clear answers.'s There is no assurance of economic viability for newly
formed corporate enterprises and courts limit the piercing of the corporate veil to extreme cases,1 - 2 in order to respect the principle of limited
liability. Although the concept of undercapitalization is in most cases a
difficult tool for corporate planning and protection of creditors, it should
be maintained as a device of last resort.
A larger than nominal "fixed" amount of minimal required capitalization, as in Europe, certainly gives better protection to creditors, but the
larger the corporation, the less protection a fixed amount will provide.
The minimal capital requirement is therefore not an entirely satisfactory
solution.
In order to have an efficient rule for small and large corporations, the
use of financial ratios should be considered. California was the first state
to use a combination of financial ratios as a mechanism for regulating
corporate distributions.33 Under California Corporation Law, a corporation may make distributions in excess of retained earnings if it can meet
two financial ratio tests.'" This test to evaluate the solvency and stability
of a corporation1 35 is commonly referred to as a "bankruptcy prediction
model."18 6 Under the California Corporation Code, however, it is still pos-

127. See e.g., Oriental Inv. Co. v. Barclay, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 543, 64 S.W. 80 (1901).
128. Note, Inadequate Capitalizationas a Basis for ShareholderLiability: The California Approach and a Recommendation, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 823, 824 (1972); Hackney &
Benson, supra note 14, at 854.
129. H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS, § 129 at 302-303 (1946); Hackney &
Benson, supra note 14, at 854 and 857. Worthwhile to mention here is section 5 of the
UFCA (See supra note 118), which forbids gratuitous or unfair transfers by a business
debtor when the transferor would be left with an unreasonable small capital. This is, however, different from the requirement for initial capitalization. Clark, supra note 2, at 540.
See also Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1982). These provisions
have not been enforced vigorously, and there are only a few cases. Hackney & Benson, supra
note 14, at 860-861 n.105. See also note 88 and accompanying text.
130. Hackney & Benson, supra note 14, at 885 and 901; Note, supra note 128, at 830.
131. Hackney & Benson, supra note 14.
132. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 17-18 n.2. For examples see Hackney & Benson,
supra note 14, at 891-898.
133. Ben-Dror, supra note 41, at 377.
134. See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text. CAL. CORP. CODE § 500(b) (Deering
1977).
135. § 500(b) attempts to predict bankruptcy by using a predictive factor of one quarter into the total assets ratio, i.e. total assets 11/4 times total liabilities.
136. Ben-Dror, supra note 42, at 376. The fact that these ratio tests only have to be
satisfied under California Law for distributions in excess of retained earnings means that no
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sible to make distributions of retained earnings, even if the two tests are
not met. Corporate assets can still be distributed to shareholders without
leaving a trust fund for present and future creditors, as long as the distributions consist of earnings. Protection for general creditors against distribution of assets, whether made out of earnings or not, has to be conditional on compliance with the financial ratio tests.
The model used should be applicable to all corporations, regardless
of size or industry. The most efficient ratio of capital versus leverage (liabilities), however, depends on many factors, such as the industry characteristics, the growth rate and stability of sales, the assets structure, management and lenders attitudes.13 7 It would be too complex to provide
different rules for different sizes or kinds of industries. In order to enhance the practical application, a simple standard model is preferable.
Simplicity, high prediction rates and low overprediction rates should be
taken into account according to their respective importance. The requirement of a fixed minimum capitalization, 1 the use of a bankruptcy prediction model, and as a last resort, the doctrine of misuse of the corporate
entity, provides a better standard for shareholders, directors and creditors than any existing system.
D.

Valuation Issues

Regardless of which requirements or tests regulating corporate distributions are imposed by law, no system will provide a clear rule if there
are no provisions concerning the definition and methods for the valuation
of assets.1 " There are different valuation methods that have different effects on the amount of protection available for creditors. 140 Many states
use the term "assets," but most do not resolve the fundamental question
of their valuation. Moreover, courts offer little guidance in the valuation

financial solvency has to be present to pay distributions out of retained earnings. See Cal
CORP. CODE § 500(a) (Deering 1977). The requirements of §500(a) and (b) should be cumulative instead of alternative.
137. See J. WESTON & T. COPELAND, MANAGERIAL FINANCE, ch. 20 (8th ed. 1985). The
California Corporation Code ratio of assets 11/4 times liabilities could give problems in industries where high leverage is common and economically sensible.
138. A fixed amount should be maintained in order to avoid that big risks are taken by
very small "corporations" that fulfill the tests, but have no reasonable trust fund available
to cover losses.
139. See B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 62; Hackney, supra note 24, at 801; Hackney,
supra note 33, at 1371.
140. Different "values" include: liquidating value, going concern value, book value, market value, fair or reasonable value. See J. WESTON & T.CoPELAND, supra note 137, ch. 23.
For example, if the book value of the assets is smaller than their going concern value (e.g.
because fast depreciation is allowed), creditors are better protected when the book value is
used to determine the minimal capital requirements, than when the going concern value
would be used. In the latter case, creditors would have only a little cushion or none at all if
the corporation were forced to liquidate, because the liquidating value often is smaller than
the going concern value.
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of assets. 4"
Searching for clear and detailed rules on the valuation of assets, authors have often referred to GAAP'4 2 for general guidance.' 48 Yet, because
GAAP often provides a choice of method, it gives no guarantee of cer44
tainty in financial determinations.1
GAAP, however, is much more clear than the "old" laws which, in
requiring that financial statements be made in a reasonable manner, leave
resolution of accounting matters to judgment under a common law of uncertain content and application." Another important advantage of
GAAP is its continuous adaptation in response to changes in economic
and social conditions, new knowledge and technology, and to demands of
1 46
users for more serviceable financial information.
Some states have taken a step to provide better protection for creditors by requiring valuation of assets according to GAAP.147 In Europe,
similar considerations supported the enactment of the Fourth Council Directive on the annual accounts of limited liability companies. 4 ' The
Fourth Council Directive contains detailed instruction on valuation methods in section seven which is entitled "valuation rules. 1 49 The Directive
also establishes a "contact committee" which will facilitate the harmonized application of the Directive and advise the European Commission

141. B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 62; S. SIEE. & D. SIEGEL, supra note 12, at 99;
Siegel, supra note 96, at 319-320; Ballantine & Hills, supra note 97, at 259. It is a very
difficult task for a legislature or a court to establish principles for the valuation of assets.
Hackney, CorporateLaw Aspects of Some Recent Developments in Accounting, 3 J. L. &
CoM.1 (1983).
142. See supra note 85.
143. Siegel, A Critical Examination of State Regulation of Accounting Principles, (unpublished, 1985); B. MANNING, supra note 1, at 61-62; Hackney, supra note 24, at 797 and
823.
144. Ackerman, Jr., supra note 43, at 1080.
145. Id.; Siegel, supra note 96, at 321-322.
146. APB No. 4, ch. 9, 1 2-3 (1970).
147. See e.g. North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-2(2), 55-49(b)(1982), Michigan
(Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 450.1110 (1973), Maryland (MD. CORP.& ASSNS CODE ANN. § 1402 (1982), California (CAL. CORP. CODE § 114 (Deering (1977)). B. MANNING, supra note 1

at 62 n.7; S. SIEGEL & D. SIEGEL, supra note 12, at 99; Task Force Report, supra note 28, at
294; Dreyfuss, supra note 43, at 845; Ackerman, Jr., supra note 43, at 1065, 1081; Siegel,
supra note 96, at 319 n.156; Hackney, supra note 141, at 12. Siegel, supra note 143, n.6.
148. See supra note 85. "Whereas the coordination of national provisions concerning
the presentation and content of annual accounts and annual reports, the valuation methods
used therein and their publication in respect to certain companies with limited liability is of
special importance for the protection of members and third parties." (emphasis added)
Statement of legislative purpose, Fourth Council Directive, supra note 85. For an overview
of all "accounting directives" (Fourth; Seventh, adopted 13 June 1983, and Eighth, adopted
13 March 1984), see van Hulle, The EEC Accounting Directives in Perspective:Problems of
Harmonization, 18 COMM. MKT. L. REv.121 (1981); Schneebaum, supra note 57, at 305-307
and 310-317; Nieuwdorp, supra note 60, at 426-430.
149. Fourth Council Directive, supra note 84, art. 31-42. Schneebaum, supra note 57, at
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on additions or amendments to the Directive15 in order to follow accountancy developments in Member States.'
Section 6.40(d) of the new MBCA provides that determinations of
corporate assets may be based upon financial statements prepared on the
basis of accounting practices and principles of a fair valuation or any
other method that is reasonable in the circumstances.' 52 While these "reasonable" principles are not necessarily consistent with GAAP,113 the
drafters expect that their use will be the basic rule in most cases.' The
statutory language, however, requires an informed business judgment in
the choice of the accounting principles used,15 5 and commentary to the
Revised MBCA suggests that, in most cases, "going concern" value would
be the appropriate method in determining the value of the assets.'"
These "guidelines" are of little help to directors, and the commentary by the drafters of the MBCA makes quite clear they are not intended to constitute a safe harbor for them. 5

7

The broad business judg-

ment rule on the other hand provides little protection for creditors. 5 8
Directors and creditors would be better off if state laws provided a safe
harbor for directors consisting of a dividend test exercised in good faith
reliance on financial statements prepared in conformity with GAAP.' 5 9
An informed business judgment should only be required if the GAAP
provide an important choice or if no solution for a specific problem is
given.
V.

CONCLUSION

The comparative overview and analysis of the United States and
150. Fourth Council Directive, supra note 84, art. 52.
151. van Hulle, supra note 148, at 129. For the development of the Belgian accounting
law, see de Lembre, Boekhoudrecht in Belgie: ontstaan en evolutie, 16 TuDSCHRIr VOOR
PRIVAATRECHT 401, 401-437 (1979); Lemaitre, RWforme de ta comptabilit6 et des comptes
annuels des enterprises beiges, 34 REvuE TRIMESTRiELLE DE Daorr COMMERCIALE 627, 627680 (1981); van Crombrugge, Boekhoudrecht en boekhoudtheorie, 18 "uSCHRiaT Vooa
PRIVAATRECHT 973, 973-1021 (1981).
152. For a more extensive discussion of these provisions of the MBCA, see Siegel, supra
note 143, nn.28-32 and accompanying text.
153. Goldstein & Hamilton, The Revised Model Business Corporations Act, 38 Bus.
LAW. 1019, 1021 (1983).
154. REVISED MODEL BusiNEss Coau,. Acr § 6.40(d) (1985).
155. Id.
156. Amendments, supra note 5, at 1885.
157. Id. at 1884; Task Force Report, supra note 28, at 301.
158. Problems arise in connection with goodwill and reappraisal of fixed assets as factors taken in account by the directors in determining the legality of dividends. Cohn, supra
note 6, at 577.
159. See Siegel, supra note 143, 17-20. See also Task force report, supra note 28, at

302-303; Hackney, supra note 141, at 32-34. In Belgium, accounts prepared according to
"general accepted accounting principles" (similar in many aspects to the GAAP of the
U.S.A.), provide a safe harbor for directors by creating the presumption that they give a
true and fair view of the corporation's financial situation. See van Crombrugge, supra note
151, at 998-999.
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E.E.C. financial provisions concerning distributions to shareholders has
shown that none of the existing systems provide sufficient protection to
general creditors of a corporation. The best way to achieve reliable protection is to provide a system which combines a fixed minimum capitalization (which should be high enough to give at least some protection by
itself) and the use of a financial ratio test (bankruptcy prediction model).
All distributions would have to be made subject to the minimum capitalization requirement and the financial ratio tests, even if the distributions
are earnings. Those earnings which may not be legally distributed under
the system will create a solid trust fund in case of thin initial
capitalization.
Because there are different ways to value an asset, the proposed system can only be made efficient by enactment or referral to detailed accounting principles for their valuation. While the E.E.C. countries have
chosen to enact accounting principles through the Seventh Directive, a
referral to the GAAP could fulfill this task in the United States.
The E.E.C. countries should improve their systems by enactment of
financial ratios as dividend tests. The existing system of minimum capitalization only provides protection to general creditors of small corporations. Financial ratio tests will provide adequate protection to creditors of
large corporations as well.
In the United States, the new MBCA has made a step in the right
direction by eliminating some outmoded concepts and adopting a financial ratio test. The assets-liability ratio requirement of one to one, and
the absence of detailed accountancy rules certainly diminished the complexity of the dividend regulating system. Unfortunately, the MBCA also
brought protection for general creditors down to a meaningless level.
Nevertheless, the revisers of the MBCA are in a perfect position to adopt
the proposed solution. The proposed system probably will be more complex than today's MBCA, but in these matters, simplicity should not prevail over efficiency.

CRITICAL ESSAYS
Proposed Amendments to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 and the
Act of State Doctrine
MANUEL R. ANGULO*
ADRIEN K. WING**
I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 3, 1985, United States Senator Charles Mathias (R-Md.) introduced Senate bill 1071 to amend the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA) of 1976.' These amendments are based on proposals adopted
* B.A. Yale, J.D. Harvard Law School, Member of the Bar of the State of New York,
Partner, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle
** A.B. Princeton, J.D. Stanford Law School, Member of the Bar of the State of New
York, Associate, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle
1. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f),
1441(d), 1602-11 (1982).
For discussion of a previous attempt by Senator Mathias to eliminate the act of state
doctrine through legislation, see Mathias, Restructuring The Act of State Doctrine: A
Blueprint for Legislative Reform, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 369 (1980).
It is beyond the scope of this article to provide extensive background information on
the FSIA. The statute has four major purposes: (i) to codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity; (ii) to place the determination of immunity questions squarely within the
judicial rather than the executive branch; (iii) to provide defined rules for service of process
upon foreign states; and (iv) to rectify inconsistencies existing between rules of immunity
from suit and from execution. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 1-8, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
The rule of jurisdictional immunity applicable to foreign states appears in § 1604 of the
FSIA which provides that subject to existing international agreements to which the United
States was a party at the time of the enactment of this Act in 1976, a foreign state is immune from the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts, unless one of the exceptions applies. In any
case where an exception does not apply, § 1330(a) and (b) gives federal district courts general personal and subject matter jurisdiction against foreign states, which are defined as
including any political subdivision of a foreign state or any agency or instrumentality of the
foreign state. See § 1603(a).
The exceptions to immunity are found in §§ 1605-1607. Under § 1605, exceptions to
jurisdictional immunity are provided for in cases involving: (i) waivers of immunity; (ii)
commercial activity of foreign states having a specified jurisdictional nexus with the United
States; (iii) certain claims arising out of foreign expropriation; (iv) rights in property in the
U.S. acquired by successor or gifts or rights in immovable property in the United States; (v)
certain non-commercial tort claims; and (vi) certain claims in admiralty. Also, § 1607 provides an additional exception for counterclaims asserted in an action initiated in the United
States by a foreign state.
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by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association in August,
1984.' The presumed purpose of bill S.1071 is to strengthen legal protections available to American business enterprises dealing with foreign governments and their agencies and instrumentalities.3
While bill S.1071 contains a number of proposals for amendments to
the FSIA, this paper deals only with that amendment which affects the
act of state doctrine and which, as will be demonstrated below, greatly
restricts its applicability, and thereby undermines its basic rationale and
purpose.4 If enacted into law, this amendment will, in the opinion of the
authors, truly "vex the peace of nations," 5 and potentially endanger the
harmony of our relations with friendly foreign states. In order to properly
divine the intent and purpose of the proposed amendment, the history
and current application of the act of state doctrine must be examined.
II.

THE ACT OF STATE DocTRINE

The classic formulation of the act of state doctrine was established
by the United States Supreme Court in a case dismissing a suit for
wrongful detention against the revolutionary government of Venezuela,
Underhill v. Hernandez. In Underhill the Court stated:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will hot sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers

For a general discussion of the statutory framework, see Carl, Suing Foreign Governments in American Courts: The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Practice, 33 Sw. L.J. 1009 (1979); De Laume, Long Arm Jurisdictionunder the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 640 (1980); Kahale & Vega, Immunity &
Jurisdiction:Toward a Uniform Body of Law in Actions Against Foreign States, 18 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211 (1979); Browen, Bistline & Loomis, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Practice, 73 AM. J. INrT'L L. 200 (1979); Van Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33 (1978); Kane, Suing ForeignSovereigns, a ProceduralCompass, 34 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1982).
2. Copies of the ABA proposals and ABA actions are available from the ABA Section
on International Law, 1800 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.
3. S.1071, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S5363 (daily ed. May 3, 1985).
4. The proposals amend the FSIA in the following ways: (i) enhancing recognition of
arbitration awards against defaulting foreign states (§ 1605(a)(6)); (ii) permitting in rem
suits in admiralty against a ship rather than against the foreign government involved, as is
presently required (§ 1610); (iii) authorizing prejudgment attachment of commercial property of a foreign state in certain situations (§ 1610); (iv) executing judgments against a
broader range of commercial property owned by the foreign state itself (Q 1610); and (v)
expanding the definition of commercial activity to include debt securities and other guaranties of the foreign sovereign. (Q 1603(f)). For a further discussion of the proposed amendments, see Atkeson & Ramsey, ProposedAmendment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 770 (1985). For a short comment agreeing with the authors' views on
act of state, see, A. Rubin, ABA Proposals to Amend the Foreign Immunities Act of 1976: A
Pointed Dissent, INrr'L PRAC. No'raooK 17 (Oct. 85).
5. See United Bank, Ltd. v. Cosmic International, Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 876 (2d Cir. 1976).
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as between themselves. 6
This is a simple and clear expression of the act of state doctrine, based
upon the principle of sovereign immunity from adjudication by United
States courts and the necessity of respecting the acts of foreign states
performed within their territory - all in the common interest of comity
and peaceful relations among nations.
In the seminal modern act of state case, Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, which involved the expropriation of the property of a sugar
exporter within Cuba by the revolutionary Cuban government, the Supreme Court broadened the simple concept articulated in Underhill and
stated that
[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of
property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government,
extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint
alleges that the taking vio7
lated customary international law.
Although the act of state doctrine is not mandated by the Constitution, the Sabbatino court found that it had "constitutional underpinnings."' The doctrine has its roots in the separation of powers between
the judicial and executive branches and the allocation by the Constitution
of the conduct of foreign affairs to the Executive. "The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the judicial branch
that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts
of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals
both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere."9
The Supreme Court recognized that judicial interference in this sensitive area might adversely affect relations between foreign sovereigns and
the United States. It might embarrass either the judicial or executive
branch or both, and it might impede the natural and beneficial development of international law. 10 The Court stated that, "its [act of state doctrine] continuing vitality depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions between the judicial and political branches of the
Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs.""

6. 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
7. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
8. Id. at 423. ("The act of state doctrine does, however, have 'constitutional' underpinnings. It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of
separation of powers.")
9. Id. For the earlier decisions referred to, see Oetjen v. Central Leather, 246 U.S. 297,
302 (1918); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918).
10. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 433-34.
11. Id. at 427-28. For discussion of Sabbatino by the lawyer who represented the Cuban
government, see Rabinowitz, Viva Sabbatino, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 617 (1977). For the discussion of the various aspects of the act of state doctrine, see Cooper, Act of State and Sover-
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Essentially, the effect of Sabbatino was to graft onto the Underhill
formulation additional factors to be considered by American courts as to
the applicability of the act of state doctrine. The Underhill formulation
was simple and unqualified. The acts of a foreign state performed within
its territory were sacrosanct and totally immune from scrutiny by courts
of the United States.
Sabbatino, decided some forty years later, apparently rejected the
unconditional immunity of an internal act of state from judicial scrutiny
espoused in Underhill and propounded a separation of powers, i.e. "constitutional underpinnings" basis for the doctrine. The application of the
act of state doctrine did not require "laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and all-encompassing rule," but rather a balance of relevant considerations, 2 and a careful case-by-case analysis of the extent to which the
separation of powers concerns on which the doctrine is based are implicated by the action before the court."3
The act of state doctrine has been applied, since Sabbatino, to a variety of sovereign acts. Several cases involved nationalizations and expropriations. 4 In addition, United States courts have found that other sover-

eign Immunity: A Further Inquiry, 11 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 193 (1980); Golbert & Bradford,
The Act of State Doctrine: Dunhill and other Sabbatino Progeny, 9 SW. U. L. REv. (1977);
Gordon, The Origin and the Development of the Act of State Doctrine, 8 RUT.-CAM. L. J.
595 (1977); Kleinman, The Act of State Doctrine from Abstention to Activism, 6 J. CoMP.
Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 115 (1984); Lengel, The Duty of the Federal Courts to Apply International Law. A Polemical Analysis of the Act of State Doctrine, 8 B.Y.U.L. REV. 61
(1982); Note, Adjudicating Acts of State in Suits Against Foreign Sovereigns: A Political
Question Analysis, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 722 (1983); Note, Rehabilitation and Exoneration
of the Act of State Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 599 (1980); Note, Limiting the
Act of State Doctrine: A Legislative Initiative, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 103 (1982); Note, Foreign
ExpropriationCases in the United States: Conflicting Legislation and JudicialPolicies, 17
U.S.F.L. REV. 117 (1982); Kahale, CharacterizingNationalizationsfor Purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Act of State Doctrine, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 392
(1982); Lindskog, Act of State or Act of Desperation,INT'L FIN. L. REV. 4 (Dec. 1982);
Mathias, Restructuring the Act of State Doctrine: A Blueprint for Legislative Reform, 12
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 369 (1980); Zimmerman, Applying an Amorphous Doctrine Wisely:
The Viability of the Act of State Doctrineafter the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 18
TEx. INT'L L. J. 547 (1983); Note, Judicial Balancing of Foreign Policy Considerations:
Comity and Errors Under the Act of State Doctrine, 35 STAN. L. REV. 327 (1982).
12. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
13. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 316
n.38 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). For discussion of problems arising
out of the case by case analyses, see Halberstam, Sabbatino Resurrected: The Act of State
Doctrine and the Revised Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 68
(1985); Note, The Resolution of Act of State Disputes Involving Indefinitely Situated
Property, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 92 (1985).
14. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977)
(act of state doctrine rendered plaintiff's antitrust and contract claims against other Libyan
oil producers nonjusticiable); D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 422 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Del.
1976), aff'd, 564 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978) (Mexican expropriation decree extinguishing corporation royalty and participation rights was valid act of
state); Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 570 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978),
aff'd, 583 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979) (nationalization of plaintiff's
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eign acts constitute unreviewable acts of state, including: denial of entry
and involuntary rerouting of a tourist's flight;' 5 extinguishing of a public
debt by statute; granting of authority to export offshore oil and gas resources;" denial of a request to emigrate;" revocation of a license to export monkeys for research;' 9 denial of import license in order to control
foreign trade; 20 and divesting of a former Director's authority to bring
suit on behalf of the corporation.2'
To illustrate application of the act of state doctrine, two contrasting
cases deserve mention.
In Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.,22 the Second Circuit, following the Sabbatino Court's rationale of the act of state doctrine as a "judicial articulation of the separation of powers doctrine,"'3 held that judicial inquiry
into the nationalization of oil concessions by the Libyan government involved an examination of that government's motivations and was tantamount to an examination of the validity of such an act. Accordingly, judicial inquiry was foreclosed by the act of state doctrine.
In this case, plaintiff Hunt brought an action against defendant Mobil Oil and other oil producers alleging violation of the antitrust laws and
breach of contract. The claim, which sought treble damages, asserted that
the defendants had combined and conspired to preserve the competitive
advantage of Persian Gulf crude oil over Libyan crude oil by preventing
Hunt from reaching a settlement with the Libyan government. Failure to
reach a settlement resulted in the nationalization of Hunt's Libyan
properties.
Although the government of Libya was not named as a co-conspirator
Libyan oil interests was a valid act of state).
15. Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisor's Corp., 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980) (Dominican Republic immigration officials denial of entry to plaintiffs on vacation tour was foreclosed by act of state doctrine).
16. Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1160 (2d Cir. 1982)
(Grand Duchess of Saxony Weimar's claims for annuity payments from German government
were barred by act of state).
17. Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984) (granting of an oil concession by governmental
officials of Umm Al Qaywayn entailed exercise of act of state).
18. Frolova v. USSR, 558 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Ill.
1983), affd, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir.
1985) (action against Soviet Union for refusal to allow plaintiff's husband to emigrate was
an act privileged under act of state doctrine).
19. MOL, Inc. v. Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, 572 F. Supp. 79 (D. Ore. 1983), afJ'd,
736 F.2d 1326, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 513 (1984) (refusal of Bangladesh officials to renew
plaintiff's license to capture and export rhesus monkeys was act of state).
20. Van Bokkelen v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 432 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (denial by Brazilian government of right to import farm type crop dusting plane was act of
state).
21. Tchacosh Co. Ltd. v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 766 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1985) (Iranian
decrees divesting former managing director of Iranian corporation of authority to bring suit
on payment under subcontract was ruled act of state).
22. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
23. Id. at 77.
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nor designated as a defendant, the court held that Libya's excision from
the pleadings as a party did not eliminate a consideration of its actions.
The Department of State described the Libyan government's actions as a
political reprisal against the United States government and economic coercion against United States nationals in Libya.2 4 Since the United States
government had officially characterized the motivation of the Libyan government, the court "would not make an inquiry into the subtle and deliberate issue of the policy of a Serbonian bog, precluded by the act of state
doctrine as well as the realities of the fact finding competence of the
court in an issue of far-reaching national concern". 25 The court held that
even if the Department of State had not spoken, inquiry as to the motivation of the Libyan government in nationalizing plaintiff's property was
26
foreclosed by the act of state doctrine.
The Hunt decision can be contrasted with Rasoulzadeh v. The Associated Press.2 7 In this case, an action was brought by Iranian nationals
against the Associated Press, which had leased a house from plaintiffs in
Iran, and thereafter allegedly breached the lease by permitting a Canadian press group to occupy the house without plaintiff owners' consent.
Ultimately, the house was seized by the Iranian government since
Canadians were in disfavor as a result of assisting American diplomats to
escape to France. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted since the action was barred by the act
of state doctrine and alternatively, on the ground of forum non
conveniens.2
As to the act of state defense, the Court followed the case-by-case
approach set forth in Sabbatino, and refused to adopt an inflexible per se
application of the doctrine to determine the extent to which separation of
powers concerns were implicated. Balancing the relevant considerations
as required by Sabbatino," the Court refused to apply the act of state
doctrine primarily because, unlike the Hunt decision, "[r]esolution of
plaintiffs' claims will not require sitting in judgment on the acts of a foreign government. ' 30 The court, following the reasoning of the Second Cir1
cuit in Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,'
found that the application of the act of state doctrine posed no threat of
embarrassment to the executive branch in its conduct of foreign affairs
and would not require assessment of the legitimacy of the Iranian government's actions. 2

24. Id. at 73.
25. Id. at 77.
26. Id. at 78.
27. 574 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) af/'d without opinion, 767 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1985).
28. The Court held forum non conveniens did not warrant dismissal of the action as
the availability of an alternate forum was not demonstrated. Id. at 860-61.
29. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
30. Rasoulzadeh, 574 F. Supp. at 860.
31. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
32. Rasoulzadeh, 574 F. Supp. at 860. The court found that the "executive branch has
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Thus at this point in judicial history, the apparently inflexible act of
state doctrine established in Underhill has been qualified by the balancing case-by-case formulation articulated in Sabbatino. Therefore, where
circumstances require an inquiry into the motivation of a foreign government, further inquiry must be made as to whether such an inquiry or an
adjudication as to a foreign sovereign's act would result in embarrassment
to the executive branch. While this articulation of the act of state doctrine would seem a reasonable compromise, the Hunt and -Rasoulzadeh
decisions show that this formulation nevertheless encompasses the danger
of differences of judicial opinion as to the degree of embarrassment to the
executive branch. Consequently, confusing and contradictory judicial pronouncements have been made by various courts, which in and of themselves may cause embarrassment to the executive branch.3" In the view of
the authors, the FSIA amendments will not rectify these problems in applying the doctrine.
A.

The Hickenlooper Amendment

The Sabbatino decision prompted an almost immediate reaction to
modify the application of the act of state doctrine. In 1965, soon after
Sabbatino was decided, United States Senator Hickenlooper proposed an
amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The Hickenlooper
Amendment requires United States courts to adjudicate any question involving "a claim of title or other right to property . . . based upon (or
traced through) a confiscation . . . by an act of that state in violation of
the principles of international law."'
Although the Hickenlooper Amendment was "intended to reverse in
part" the Sabbatino decision,3 5 it has only been applied in a few cases,

no interest in a tort claim by Iranian citizens against an American corporation arising out of
the latter's breach of a lease agreement, the use of plaintiff's Iranian property by Canadians,
and the subsequent confiscation of the property by Iran.. . . Iran's confiscation of plaintiff's property [cannot] fairly be compared to that 'integral governmental function' in Hunt
which formed a part of a 'continued and broadened confrontation between East and West.'"

Id.
33. "The importance of a unified national voice on foreign policy has been recognized
since the founding of the republic." Hunt, 550 F.2d at 78 n.12. In the OPEC decision, the
court stated that: "To participate adeptly in the global community, the United States must
speak with one voice and pursue a careful and deliberate foreign policy. . . . When the
courts engage in piecemeal adjudication of the legality of sovereign acts of states, they risk
disruption of our country's international diplomacy. The executive may utilize protocol, economic sanction, compromise, delay, and persuasion to achieve international objectives. Illtimed judicial decisions challenging the acts of foreign states could nullify those tools and
embarrass the United States in the eyes of the world." International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1163 (1982).
34. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982).
35. S. REP. No. 1188, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1964), reprintedin 1964 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3829, 3852.
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such as Sabbatino on remand. 6 The Hickenlooper Amendment has been
held not to apply unless the confiscated property has been brought into
the United States.3 7 It has not applied to the taking of property of nonUnited States citizens."8 It has also been held inapplicable to cases involving contract rights."9
In addition to the Hickenlooper Amendment, which is a legislative
attempt to restrict application of the act of state doctrine, courts have
developed additional "exceptions" to the act of state doctrine. This article will now briefly discuss the so-called commercial activity and extraterritorial exceptions, both of which will be impacted by the proposed FSIA
amendments.
B.

Commercial Activity Exception

The plurality opinion of the Supreme Court in Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,4 0 has been interpreted as creating an
exception to the act of state doctrine when the act of a foreign sovereign
is "commercial". In Dunhill, the Cuban revolutionary government "inter-

36. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
956 (1968).
37. Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983) (Act of state doctrine precluded consideration of a
tort claim brought by a Mexican natural gas purchaser against American natural gas exporter. Hickenlooper exception was inapplicable where neither the nationalized property of
plaintiff nor its proceeds were located in the United States). See Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
First National City Bank of New York, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds,
406 U.S. 759 (1972).
38. Compania, 686 F.2d at 327.
39. See Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Services Oil Co., 396 F. Supp. 461
(W.D. La. 1975) (Hickenlooper exception was not applicable to a claim for breach of contract in case where plaintiffs sought to recover crude oil seized on board three tankers in
area where offshore concession agreements had been granted by the adjacent sheikdoms);
Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 583 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 992 (1979); French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295
N.Y.S.2d 433 (1968).
This article will not discuss two other purported exceptions to the Act of State doctrine.
One is the "Bernstein exception," supported by three justices in First National City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba [hereinafter cited as Bancec], 406 U.S. 759 (1972). This exception,
which has never been applied in an actual case, states that the judiciary can refuse to give
recognition to an act of state if the executive branch so advises. Id. at 764. See Bernstein v.
N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansch, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) for further discussion of the
exception. See also McCormick, The Commercial Activity Exception to Foreign Sovereign
Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 477, 500-502 (1984).
The plurality opinion in Bancec also articulated a "counterclaim exception," stating
that a foreign state plaintiff cannot raise act of state as a defense to a defendant's counterclaim up to the amount of the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 768-69; See Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense de Came, 705 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1983) for discussion of the limited nature of
exception, which was held not applicable there. For further commentary on exceptions, see
Conant, The Act of State Doctrine & Its Exceptions: An Introduction, 12 VAND. TRANSNAT'L J. L. 259 (1979).
40. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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vened", i.e. nationalized the business and assets of five leading cigar manufacturers. The Intervention Decree did not by its terms repudiate any
debt or outstanding obligations of the supplier. It merely designated the
"interventors" who were directed to operate the business. The former
owners of the manufacturing companies brought an action against Dunhill and other importers for the purchase price of cigars that had been
shipped to them prior to the intervention. Dunhill had mistakenly paid
the interventors for these pre-intervention shipments. In due course, the
interventors refused to return these funds to Dunhill.
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court held that there was
nothing in the record of the case revealing an act of state with respect to
4 1
the interventors obligation to return the sums mistakenly paid to them.
The interventors refusal to repay the mistakenly paid funds did not constitute an act of state since no statute, decree, order, or resolution of the
Cuban government was offered into evidence indicating Cuban repudiation of its obligations.4 2
The plurality opinion stated that even if Cuba's repudiation of its
obligation was an act of state, it would not be shielded from judicial scrutiny. The doctrine did not apply to "repudiation of a purely commercial
obligation owed by a foreign sovereign or by one of its commercial
43
instrumentalities.
In the opinion of the authors, a commercial activity exception to the
act of state doctrine as enunciated in the plurality opinion does not and
should not exist. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of an "act of state" that is
"commercial" in nature, since by hypothesis, it is a governmental act performed in the exercise of governmental authority. Of course such an act
may involve commercial transactions, as for example, the repudiation of
an existing contractual obligation - for which there would appear to be
no defense of sovereign immunity under Section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA. 4'
But that is not the Dunhill case. Dunhill illustrates that there seems to
be some confusion between interpretation of the FSIA and the act of
state doctrine as to a foreign government's commercial activity. The FSIA
codifies the so-called restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, 45 which
does not permit a court to take subject matter or personal jurisdiction
over a foreign state (as therein defined), unless such foreign state falls

41. Id. at 690.
42. Id. at 695.
43. Id.
44. See McCormick, The Commercial Activity Exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 477 (1984); Note, Foreign
Sovereign Immunity and Commercial Activity: A Conflict Approach, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1441 (1983); Note, The ForeignSovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Direct Effects and Minimum Contacts, 14 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 97 (1981); Note, Effects Jurisdictionunder the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Due Process Clause, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 474 (1980);
Note, Direct Effect Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 13 INT'L L.
& POL'Y 571 (1981); and supra note 1.
45. See supra note 1, HousE REPORT at 7, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6605.

DEN. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 14:2-3

within one of the exceptions provided for, one of which is the commercial
activity exception. 46 The theory appears to be that if a foreign state enters the marketplace it must be treated for all purposes as any other
merchant with respect to jurisdiction.
On the other hand, a foreign state performing an act under governmental authority within its territory has not entered the commercial marketplace, and thus the restrictive theory of immunity has no application
in such a case. Whereas the FSIA is concerned with jurisdiction, the act
of state doctrine is not a jurisdictional doctrine, 47 but a doctrine, assuming jurisdiction, which precludes our courts from the adjudication of the
acts of foreign governments performed within their territory.
C.

ExtraterritorialException

Since the Underhill decision, the act of state doctrine requires that
the act of the foreign sovereign in question must have been "done within
its own territory. ' 48 If the foreign sovereign's act is not "done" (i.e. undertaken and completed entirely within its territorial boundaries), the act
of state doctrine simply has no application. 49 Where the act of the foreign
sovereign, by its terms, directly affects or impacts upon property located
outside of its jurisdiction, other established legal principles come into
play, e.g., the extent to which courts of the United States will recognize or
give extraterritorial effect to the decrees of a foreign state. The applicable
legal principle is that for reasons of comity, such foreign decrees will be
recognized and given effect by our courts provided the decrees are not
contrary to the laws and public policy of the United States.50 Thus in the
opinion of the authors, there is no extraterritorial exception.
It is interesting to note, however, the extent to which some United
States courts have avoided the doctrine's application by embroidering
upon the requirement that the act of state must have been performed
within the territory of the foreign sovereign. For example, Libra Bank
Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica,5" involved the refusal to pay debts

46. See supra note 1, for discussion of other exceptions.
47. Some courts and commentators have forgotten that "[w]hile the effect of sovereign
immunity is to shield the person of the foreign sovereign, and, by extension, his agents from
jurisdiction, the act of state doctrine shields the foreign sovereign's internal laws from intrusive scrutiny." Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465, 1470 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), afl'd, 762
F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985).
48. Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252.
49. See, e.g., Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966) ("principle of judicial refusal of examination applies only
to a taking by a foreign sovereign within its own territory").
50. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 43 (1965); see Republic of Iraq, 353 F.2d at 51 (U.S.
courts will give effect to acts of state only if consistent with the policy and law of the U.S.).
See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank, 658 F.2d 903, 908 (2d Cir. 1981);
United Bank 542 F.2d at 872.
51. 570 F. Supp. 870, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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incurred by the government-owned Banco Nacional of Costa Rica, because of currency decrees enacted by that government. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York adopted the formulation of the Second Circuit articulated in Menendez v. Saks, 52 that for
"purposes of the act of state doctrine, a debt is not 'located' within a
foreign state unless that state has the power to enforce or collect it ...
[Tihe power to enforce payment of a debt . . . generally depends on jurisdiction over the person of the debtor." The general rule in most contexts is that the situs of a debt is the domicile of the debtor. 3
Since the credit instruments expressly stated that they were payable
in New York, Judge Motley rejected the act of state defense and held
that the property "confiscated" by the government of Costa Rica was
"plaintiffs' legal right to repayment of the debt owed by the defendant"
in New York.5" In a similar case, Allied Bank International v. Banco
Credito Agricola de Cartago,55 the Second Circuit held that no act of
state was involved because the situs of the debt was New York, not Costa

52. 485 F.2d 1355, 1364-65 (2d Cir. 1973).
53. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). For
discussion of debt situs issues, see Note, Debt Situs and the Act of State Doctrine: a Proposal for a More Flexible Standard, 49 ALB. L. REV. 647 (1985); Note, The Resolution of Act
of State Disputes Involving Indefinitely Situated Property, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 901 (1985).
54. Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 878. The district court ignored the Hickenlooper requirement that a confiscation or taking in violation of international law must be tangible,
not intangible property such as contract rights. The district court also made the extraordinary statement: "[In a strict legal sense all property is intangible." Id. See infra notes 58
and 59 for authority that the enactment of exchange controls is not a "taking" or
"confiscation."
Another interesting example of act of state embroidery relating to the so-called "territorial limitation" was the articulation of the Second Circuit in United Bank, 542 F.2d at 874,
relying on the Fifth Circuit decision in Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar
Co., 392 F.2d 706, 715-16 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968), to the effect that
where an act of state has not "come to complete fruition within the dominion of [a foreign]
no fait accompli has occurred." Consequently, the inability of a foreign
government ....
state to complete an expropriation within its territorial borders reduces the foreign state's
expectations of dominion over the property in question. The foreign state is less likely to be
vexed by a judicial disposition of the property. United Bank, 542 F.2d at 875. This formulation is apparently an attempt to explain the underlying rationale of the territorial limitation
of the act of state doctrine. See also Tchacosh Co. Ltd. 766 F.2d 1333, in which the court
affirmed that Iranian decrees divesting former managing director of Iranian corporation of
authority to bring suit on payment under a subcontract for construction of certain defense
facilities in Iran was an act of State. At the time of divestment, general contractor held no
property or assets of Iranian corporation within U.S. territory. Therefore Iran was in a position to perform a fait accompli over the acquisition of any money owed Tchacosh by
Rockwell. Id. at 1338.
55. 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985) cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 30 (Sept. 20, 1985). This
decision was a rehearing and overturned an earlier Second Circuit Allied decision which
implicitly rejected Libra and held Costa Rica's debt rescheduling was consistent with principles of "comity", and thereby consistent with the law and policy of the United States. 733
F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984). For a discussion of this latter case, see Ebenroth & Teitz, Winning
(or Losing) By Default: The Act of State Doctrine, Sovereign Immunity and Comity in
InternationalBusiness Transactions, 19 INr'L Bus. TRANS. 225 (1985).
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Recent Applications

There have been some recent cases demonstrating the present vitality and vigor of the act of state doctrine and recognizing its basic purpose
and rationale. In the opinion of the authors, the FSIA amendments will
severely affect the application of the doctrine in these cases.
In Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C.,"6 plaintiffs were a number of United
States citizens who purchased peso and dollar denominated certificates of
deposit in 1981 from Bancomer, S.A., at the time, a privately owned bank.
In 1982, in response to an economic crisis, the Mexican government nationalized the entire private banking system and issued exchange controls
which decreed that all bank deposits must be repaid upon maturity in the
national currency. As a result of these decrees, plaintiffs received pesos at
the prescribed exchange rate of 70-80 pesos per dollar, instead of the then
free market rate of 135-50 pesos per dollar.5 7 Plaintiffs filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for
breach of contract in the amount of $900,000 as well as violations of the
federal securities laws. Bancomer moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction under the FSIA, and that even if
jurisdiction did exist, the act of state doctrine precluded examination of
Mexico's acts. The district court held that jurisdiction existed under the
FSIA, but dismissed the suit under the act of state doctrine.58 The plaintiffs appealed.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court and held that the issuance of certificates of deposit was a commercial activity under Section
1605(a)(2) of the FSIA.5 But the absence of immunity did not make
plaintiffs' claims justiciable. Utilizing the situs analyses found in Libra
and Allied discussed above, the court determined that because the situs
of the plaintiffs' certificates was in Mexico, the act of state doctrine prevented judicial examination of the complaint. The court held that Mexico's enactment of exchange controls was not commercial activity, but
sovereign governmental activity since only a sovereign could enact exchange controls. 60 "[T]he mechanisms used by Mexico were conventional
devices of civilized nations faced with severe monetary crises."6 1 The
56. 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985).
57. For further discussion of the Mexican economic crisis, see Zamora, Peso-DollarEconomics and the Imposition of Foreign Exchange Controls in Mexico, 32 Am. J. COMPL. 99
(1984); Morgan, Legal Issues Arising from the Mexican Economic Crisis, 17 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 367 (1984); Gomez-Palacio, Mexico's Foreign Exchange Controls, Two Administrations, Two Solutions, Thorough and Benign, 16 U. IAMI INT. AM. L. REv. 267
(1984).
58. Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465, 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d
222 (2d Cir. 1985).
59. Braka, 762 F.2d 222.
60. Id. at 225-26.
61. Braka, 589 F. Supp. at 1472.
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Braka court refused to recognize the so-called commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine enunciated in Dunhill, since the relevant
acts taken "for the purpose of saving its national economy from the brink
of monetary disaster, surely represents the exercise [of] powers peculiar
to sovereigns. 62
Eight other courts including two courts of appeal have also held,
based on similar facts, that the important governmental act, imposition of
exchange controls and regulation of the Mexican economy, mandated dismissal under the act of state doctrine. 2 Other courts have also held that
the same sovereign act (i.e. refusal by a foreign government to pay an
alleged debt owed in U.S. dollars based upon the urgent need to preserve
scarce foreign exchange), is an unreviewable act of state. 4
After having discussed the relevant historic background and exceptions to the act of state doctrine, it is now possible to focus on the impact
that the proposed legislation would have on the doctrine.
III.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION

The relevant proposed new Section 1606(b) of the FSIA provides as
follows:
The Federal act of state doctrine shall not be applied on behalf of a
foreign state with respect to any claim or counterclaim asserted pursuant to the provisions of this chapter which is based upon an expropriation or other taking of property, including contract rights, without
the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation or otherwise in violation of international law or which is based upon a
breach of contract, nor shall such doctrine bar enforcement of an
agreement to arbitrate or an arbitral award rendered against a foreign
state.

62. Braka, 762 F.2d at 225 (quoting Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 704 (plurality opinion)). Plaintiffs can always seek their remedies in the courts of Mexico or via diplomatic claims, arbitration or treaty, not in the application of one state's version of international law to another
state.
63. Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985); Frankel v. Banco Nacional de
Mexico, No. 82, Civ. 6457 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983), appeal dismissed, No. 83-7543 (2d Cir.
July 12, 1983); Offshore Express v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., N.Y.L.J., July 7, 1983 at 6,
col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.); Braka v. Nacional Financiera, No. 83 Civ. 4161 (S.D.N.Y. July 9,
1984). Sanger v. Bancomer, No. 84-1223 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1984); Reidel v. Bancomer, SA,
No. C84-219-A (N.D. Ohio Sept 28, 1984), appeal filed, No. 85-3517 (6th Cir. 1985); West v.
Multibanco Comermex, SA, No. 83-0174 (N.D. Ca. May 23, 1985), appeal filed, No. 85-2162
(9th Cir. 1985); Braka v. Multibanco Comermex, SA, 589 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). (All
cases filed by American plaintiffs who lost the dollar value of their deposits in Mexican
banks after the 1982 exchange controls were implemented).
64. French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 55, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 442, 242
N.E.2d 704, 711 (1968) ("[Tjhe currency regulations of a foreign state ... are not appropriate subjects for evaluation by state courts applying local conceptions of public policy.");
DeSanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, No. 79-4281 (E.D. La. Mar. 9, 1984), aff'd on
other grounds, 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
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What is this proposed amendment designed to accomplish? Since the
amendment appears to restrict the application of the act of state doctrine, it follows that the intent of the amendment is to improve the remedies available to United States nationals, both individuals and enterprises, against foreign states. Clearly, restrictive application or total
elimination of the doctrine would improve such remedies. But it would
seem that the availability of unlimited remedies against foreign states in
our courts would certainly "vex the peace of nations" and prove highly
prejudicial to our foreign relations with friendly countries. Moreover, unlimited remedies might result in judgments that would not be enforced in
other jurisdictions. The question then becomes, to what degree can the
application of the act of state doctrine be restricted without undermining
the United States in the conduct of its international relations?
It is submitted by the authors that the direct intention and purpose
of the proposed amendment is to reverse the Braka decision and the
other recently decided cases cited above, relating to the imposition of
Mexican exchange controls and the resultant non-payment of United
States dollar certificates of deposit.6 5 Assuming that the language of the
proposed amendment inhibits the application of the act of state doctrine
in such cases, can anyone conceive of a more "vexing" result than a foreign state found subject to the judgment of a United States court requiring it to pay obligations, the payment of which is prohibited by its own
laws? In the Mexican banking cases discussed above, Mexican law prohibited the payment in dollars of plaintiffs' accounts. Furthermore, by refusing to obey the United States judgment, that foreign state then becomes
subject to possible orders of attachment or execution on its property located in the United States." This might well lead to significant and se7
vere economic problems for the foreign state.
In this connection, note the casual statement of Judge Motley in Libra Bank:
The court is not unmindful that the effect of its judgment is to
reverse the Costa Rican decrees. The court believes, however, that in
this situation, because its judgment is unlikely to "vex the peace of
nations" . . . there is less need for judicial deference to the foreign
affairs competence of the other branches of government.6 8
Other courts have disagreed with the statement of Judge Motley. Re-

65. The part of the amendment dealing with the recognition of arbitral agreements or
awards is clearly designed to reverse the case of Libyan American Oil Co. v. Libya, 482 F.
Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated mem., 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recognition or
enforcement of arbitration award granted to United States oil company declined based on
act of state doctrine).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1610.
67. A discussion of problems of lenders is beyond the scope of this article. See Allied
Bank, 757 F.2d 516 and articles discussing the Allied decision.
68. 570 F. Supp. at 882.
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cently, in Callejo v. Bancomer,9 the Fifth Circuit rejected any commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine and stated: "[W]hile we
are doubtful of our ability to foresee what will vex the peace of nations,
we have no doubt that disregarding the Mexican regulations would be
very vexing indeed." 70 Hence, as this article has shown, the acts of a foreign state have been treated differently in various United States jurisdictions, with easily imagined negative consequences for our international
relations.
Regrettably, the drafters of new Section 1606(b) of the FSIA have
created confusion and doubt by not defining the scope and applications of
the amendment with appropriate clarity. There are numerous examples.
There are several instances of undefined and imprecise use of language. First, since the amendment provides that the doctrine shall not be
applied "on behalf of a foreign state" as to certain claims, there would
appear to be no prohibition to the application of the doctrine in cases
involving only private parties. Thus, a private party could assert an act of
state defense involving a contract right or breach of contract, but the foreign state could not. It would be hard to justify such an inconsistent result. For example, in the Hunt case, the defendant Mobil could assert an
act of state defense on its own behalf.7 1 But if the Libyan government
became a party, it could not assert the defense.
Second, as further evidence of the unclear use of language in the proposed amendment, it appears only to cover claims or counterclaims
"based upon" direct acts of a foreign sovereign, which constitute expropriation or breach of contract in violation of international law. What
about situations where the act of state, while relevant, is only indirectly
implicated in the claim, such as in the Hunt and Rasoulzadeh cases?
Third, the term "breach of contract" does, in the opinion of the authors, require some elucidation. To what exactly, does any claim "based
upon a breach of contract" refer? Is this limited to a voluntary repudiation by a foreign government of a contractual obligation? Must the contract be part of a commercial transaction? Does this refer only to an isolated international transaction? What about the total repudiation of
obligations payable in a foreign currency resulting in a breach of contract? What about a claim based on breach of contract between private
parties where the breach is the result of a nationally mandated sovereign
fiscal policy such as the imposition of exchange controls? In this latter
situation can it be argued that there has been no breach since the contract has been "reformed" by operation of law, rendering it legal and enforceable in the foreign jurisdiction?
Assuming that the thrust of the proposed amendment is to deal with
exchange controls and similar fiscal enactments by a foreign state, a con-

69. 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
70. Id., at 1116.
71. See Hunt, 550 F.2d 68 cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984.
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flict arises with foreign policy objectives since the United States is a party
to the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement creating the International Monetary Fund (IMF).7 2 The United States supports and promotes the policies
of the IMF which has mandated that third world countries establish exchange controls and devalue national currencies in order to be eligible for
international bank loans. A conflict may arise for U.S. foreign policy interests if the third world country complies with U.S.-backed IMF-imposed controls, which may cause that country to default on individual
obligations to private U.S. lenders.
Fourth, the amendment purports to extend the application of the
Hickenlooper Amendment to the expropriation or taking of intangible
property (i.e. contract rights, in violation of international law). Assuming
the amendment is directed to situations similar to those involved in Libra
and in the Mexican exchange control cases, it fails to recognize that the
imposition of exchange controls such as those imposed by Costa Rica and
Mexico, have been expressly held not to be an "expropriation" or "taking. ' 7 - Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that United States property is not "taken", as that term is used in the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution, by the enactment of legal tender and currency legislation by
74
the United States.
Fifth, if we return to the words of the Sabbatino case concerning
expropriation:
Communist countries, although they have in fact provided a degree of compensation after diplomatic efforts, commonly recognize no
obligation on the part of the taking country. Certain representatives
of the newly independent and underdeveloped countries have questioned whether rules of state responsibility toward aliens can bind nations which have not consented to them and it is argued that the traditionally articulated standards governing expropriation of property
reflect 'imperialist' interests that are inappropriate to the circumstances of emergent states .
The disagreement as to relevant international law standards reflects an ever more basic divergence between the national interests of
capital importing and capital exporting nations and between the social
ideologies of those countries that favor state control of a considerable
portion of the means of production and those that adhere to a free
enterprise system. It is difficult to imagine the courts of this country
embarking on adjudication in an area which touches more sensitively
the practical and ideological goals of the various members of the com-

72. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, as amended, effective
April 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. no. 8937.
73. French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 55, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 442, 242
N.E.2d 704, 710 (1968); F.A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY, 473-74 (4th ed. 1982).
74. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (17 Wall.) 457 (1871) (Legal Tender cases); Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (Gold Clause Cases).
75. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 429-430. (statement of Mr. Padilla Nervo (Mexico)).
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munity of nations. 78

[I]t rests upon the sanguine presupposition that the decisions of
the courts of the world's major capital exporting country and principal
exponent of the free enterprise system would be accepted as disinterested expressions of77sound legal principle by those adhering to widely
different ideologies.
Thus, if under the new legislation United States courts revoke the
use of the act of state doctrine in the major areas in which it is used, it
will likely give great offense to the expropriating or breaching nations. It
could result in retaliation on an economic or political level by that state.
"Terrorist" actions against United States businesses, military, and civilians may increase "since the concept of territorial sovereignty is so deep
seated, any state may resent the refusal of the courts of another
sovereign
78
to accord validity to acts within its territorial borders.
The United States Department of State has had reservations about
the type of legislation represented by the proposed amendments. Concerning a similar Congressional bill, former Legal Adviser of the State
Department, Davis Robinson, has stated, "[F]riction with foreign governments occurs with some frequency over alleged conflicts of jurisdiction
and with regard to enforcement actions perceived to be inappropriate extraterritorial exercises of jurisdiction by the United States. Such controversies may be isolated events in our relations with particular countries.
Or they may involve long-term and deep-rooted differences, sometimes
79
with close friends and allies.
Mr. Robinson recently expressed concern about the implications of
S.1071. "What if the shoe were on the other foot?" Would the U.S. Government and its agencies resist in a case if comparable rules were applied
in a foreign jurisdiction? Secondly, diplomatic relations could be adversely affected, and there may be an increase in nonappearances and default judgments in the U.S. courts by foreign sovereigns."' This may be
followed by attempts in the United States to then undo the damage to
foreign relations wrought by judicial decisions rendered without the benefit of adversary proceedings.8 "

76. Id. at 430.
77. Id. at 434-35.
78. Id. at 432.
79. ACT OF STATE & EXTRATERRITORiAL REACH 57 (J. Lacey ed. 1983) (remarks by
Robinson in reference to S.1434, an unadopted bill limiting the act of state doctrine).
80. Summary of Remarks made at ABA Annual Convention Presidential Showcase:
Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, July 10, 1985, attended by author
Wing.
81. An actual example of judicial interference with foreign policy objectives occurred in
Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ala. 1982). The United
States Department of Justice advised the federal district court that failure to set aside a
default judgment against the Government of China for the value of bearer bonds issued by
the Imperial Chinese government in 1911, would exacerbate international tensions and harm
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Mr. Robinson can probably answer his own questions since he was
still Legal Adviser when the United States decided to withdraw from further proceedings on the merits after an unfavorable jurisdictional decision
by the 16 member International Court of Justice in the Nicaraguacase. 2
If the United States Government was not willing to accede to the jurisdiction at the at least arguably impartial Hague, would it be willing to accede to the jurisdiction of the state courts of Nicaragua, which are governed by socialist and civil code principles concerning international law?
Imagine a suit brought against the United States by Nicaraguan private
businessmen for interference with the Nicaraguan domestic economy as a
result of the United States-imposed blockade. Would the United States
permit prejudgment attachment of United States government assets or
execution of a default judgment by the Nicaraguans? If not, would it accept nationalization or expropriation of one of the many United States
owned private companies when Nicaragua desired to collect the default
judgment? If suit was brought in Libya, would the United States government submit to jurisdiction or abide by the judgment?
IV.

CONCLUSION

The proposed amendments affecting the act of state doctrine ignore
the interdependent nature of the world economy. "We live in a world that
daily grows more interdependent. In 1970, international trade accounted
for only 6 percent of the United States' gross national product. Today, it
is over 12 percent. 8 3 We live in a country with a trade deficit of over
$123 billion."
Therefore, it is more important than ever before that in order to encourage our export efforts, we acknowledge and be cognizant of the different economic and political systems that characterize our current and potential major trading partners. In order to peaceably co-exist with our
fellow humanity, it is important to respect diversity. The amendment relating to the act of state doctrine is ambiguous and could cause major
political, diplomatic, and economic repercussions with other foreign
states. It should be abandoned. The act of state doctrine remains a positive and vitally important doctrine which should not be eliminated
through the "back door" of the FSIA. It remains a viable and important
doctrine as we head toward the year 2000.

bilateral relations with China. Nevertheless the court retained its jurisdiction, but later dismissed the bondholders' claim on the ground that the FSIA did not apply to transactions
predating the statute's existence. 596 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1984).
82. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicr. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26), 24 I.L.M. 59 (1985).
83. 131 CONG. REc. S5370 (daily ed. May 3, 1985) (statement by Mr. Mathias).

84. Id.

The Act of State Doctrine: Abandon It
DONALD
I.

W.

HOAGLAND*

INTRODUCTION

The act of state doctrine is being referred to repeatedly in court decisions in the United States and is used in different ways by different
courts. The U.S. Supreme Court tried to state the doctrine definitively in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino' in the following terms:
The Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant
and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a
treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal
principles, even if the complaint
alleges that the taking violates cus2
tomary international law.
Congress immediately expressed its dislike for this case in the second
Hickenlooper Amendment (Hickenlooper II) of the Foreign Assistance
Act and has done so since by its amendments to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA).3 The courts responded by narrowing the application of this legislation. Reversals and dissents are common in these cases."

Lawyers attempting to advise clients on the operation of this doctrine
and the available protections against its adverse impacts are confronted
with the problem of deriving comprehensible guidance from conflicting
cases. There are drastic consequences for U.S. lenders and investors
* LL.B. Columbia, formerly Assistant Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development, Partner, Davis, Graham & Stubbs; Member, Advisory Board, DEN. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y.

1. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
2. Id. at 428.
3. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(2)(e)(2); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq. (1976). At least two federal
district courts considered the FSIA amendment to indicate an intention to substitute the
courts for the executive in determining sovereign immunity questions, which should be persuasive as to Congress' attitude toward act of state cases. National Airmotive v. Gov't of
Iran, 499 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1980); National Am. Corp. v. Federal Rep. of Nigeria, 448 F.
Supp. 622 at 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afl'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979).
4. For example, no U.S. Supreme Court decision on this subject has been without a
dissent; since the Sabbatino case, no U.S. Supreme Court opinion has attracted a majority
of the Justices. In the Allied Bank I case, see infra note 6 and accompanying text, the trial
court did not apply the doctrine; the court of appeals affirmed by applying the doctrine and
then on reconsideration reversed itself in 1985, see infra note 7 (Allied Bank II).
5. The currency control cases described below illustrate the uncertainty-the state
courts in New York will not require a New York bank to pay twice on a Cuban certificate of
deposit, but the federal courts will. Compare Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61
N.Y.2d 460, 463 N.E.2d 5, 463 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1984) with Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984). In Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985), the trial
court made its decision on sovereign immunity grounds; the court of appeals rejected that
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when foreign governmental financial obligations are declared to be unenforceable in U.S. courts, both for U.S. investors and for foreign governments seeking U.S. investment and when the availability of judicial remedies for future wrongs is so uncertain. It is timely and important,
therefore, to examine these cases, to examine the act of state doctrine and
to consider what the proper function of the doctrine is (if any). It will be
my contention that we need not assume that the courts are unable to
make judicious choices about which acts of foreign states they should respect without further inquiry, that the doctrine should be reconsidered by
the Supreme Court at the first opportunity, and that the doctrine should
be dispensed with in favor of reliance upon concepts of conflict of laws
and comity. Three sets of cases are illustrative of the confusion and uncertainty being caused by the act of state doctrine.
II.
A.

RECENT EVIDENCE OF THE CONFUSION

The Currency Control Cases

The trial court in Allied Bank Internationalv. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago6 held that Costa Rica's currency control regulations would
not be scrutinized by a federal court sitting in New York because of the
act of state doctrine. The Second Circuit affirmed, but not on the basis of
the act of state doctrine, ruling instead on the basis of comity. Both decisions up to that point in the litigation barred payment in New York on a
promissory note issued in Costa Rica notwithstanding the fact that the
instrument provided for payment in U.S. dollars in New York. The Second Circuit then heard reargument in response to the request of the
massed New York Clearing House banks and reversed itself in Allied
Bank IP after the executive branch, in effect, gave the court permission
to inquire into the Costa Rican action. The Libra Bank case,8 in contrast
to Allied Bank I and the Allied Bank trial court decision, held that these
same Costa Rican currency controls may be scrutinized by a federal court
sitting in New York, and that the act of state doctrine does not require

analysis and reached the same result on act of state grounds. In both Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) and First National City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals, which in turn had reversed the respective trial courts partially or entirely. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressed its appraisal of the architecture of the act of
state doctrine in the Callejo opinion, by stating that ". . .if the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is a tangled web of statutory ambiguities, the act of state doctrine is an airy castle."
Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1113.
6. 566 F. Supp. 1440, aff'd 733 F.2d 23 (2nd Cir. 1984) This first decision of the Second
Circuit, which will be referred to as Allied Bank I, was withdrawn when the case was reconsidered, but will be cited in this article merely as an event in the history of the case. See
infra note 7.
7. 757 F.2d 516 (2nd Cir. 1985). This second decision will be referred to as Allied Bank

II.
8. 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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otherwise. 9
In a contemporaneous case involving Mexico's currency controls, in
Callejo v. Bancomer,10 a different court found that, because the situs of
the debt for act of state purposes was in the country issuing the obligation, it would ban inquiry into the validity of the Mexican currency controls. If a situs can indeed be found for an intangible, then its role in
these cases should only be to contribute to a choice of laws conclusion,
which should then be followed by a comity analysis if the applicable law
is determined to be foreign-in this case, Mexican. This court did indeed-by an analysis which penetrated to the heart of the issues-try to
balance the relevant policy considerations, but only succeeded in demonstrating the absence of a clear basis for decision in act of state cases. In
analyzing the governmental character of the defendant, it was led to conclude that the actions of the defendant bank could not be insulated from
U.S. jurisdiction by sovereign immunity, but that the governmental character of the actions complained of was sufficiently sensitive, given the
finding of a situs in Mexico of the obligation in question, to require the
application of the act of state doctrine. The situs conclusion could have
been otherwise because of the U.S. contacts involved in the indirect
method by which the instruments in question had in substance been payable in Texas, although the form of Mexican payment was observed. If
the Callejo court had found Mexican law applicable, it could still have
addressed the questions of foreign relations sensitivity under the framework of comity, rather than being required to refrain from considering
such questions because of the act of state doctrine. The decision could
then have turned on the court's evaluation of the severity of the exchange
rate reduction, balanced against Mexico's financial predicament, the investor's assumption of risk, and the concern, if expressed, of the executive
branch.
In Perez v. Chase ManhattanBank, N.A.,' the New York Court of
Appeals held that Chase Manhattan was not required to pay the Cuban
holder of a certificate of deposit which had been issued by a Chase Manhattan branch in Cuba. The branch had been nationalized by the Cuban
government, and the branch had paid the amount payable on the certificate to the Cuban government when asked to do so. The account was
payable in Cuba, as well as in New York. The highest New York State

9. The Libra opinion identified the subject matter of the sovereign's taking as plaintiff's legal right to repayment. Id. at 878. The opinion in Allied Bank I before Allied Bank
H treated the debtor's location as the situs of the debt. Allied Bank I, 733 F.2d 23.
10. Callejo, 764 F.2d 1101. A question might also be raised as to whether the treatment
by the Callejo court of the commercial exception possibility (Id. at 1115) is not inconsistent
with Justice White's opinion in Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 706. Justice White would apply the
commercial exception to the impact of governmental actions causing a commercial operation
(here, a cigar business) to breach a contract; in Callejo, the court would clothe the commercial banking transaction with the governmental character of the act which caused it to
breach its contract.
11. 61 N.Y.2d 460, 463 N.E.2d 5, 463 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1984).
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court found the situs of the debt to be in Cuba, so that the right to collect
the debt had been acquired by the Cuban confiscation. Since the thing
taken was within the acting state's territory, this court concluded that it
"could" not review the validity of the taking-because of the act of state
doctrine-and that the Cuban holder of the certificate had no valid claim
to collect on in New York. The second Hickenlooper Amendment was
avoided by two conclusions which severely limit its application: (i) that
uncompensated takings from the sovereign's own citizens do not violate
international law, and (ii) that the Amendment does not apply to property that remains within the confiscating country and does not come
within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. When you add to these conclusions the impact of Hunt v. Coastal States Gas ProducingCo.,12 which
excluded contract rights from its coverage, there is not much left of Hickenlooper II.
On the other hand, in the Garcia case, s which dealt with a certificate
of deposit also issued by a Cuban branch of a New York bank to a Cuban
citizen, the federal Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit required
Chase Manhattan to pay the certificate holder in New York even though
it had already paid in Cuba as it had done in the Perez case. The Garcia
rationale was that the seizure of the Cuban branch did not constitute acquisition of the plaintiff's certificate of deposit, so that the branch should
not have paid when the Cuban government demanded payment. The
court found the situs of the property taken to be outside Cuba, and held
that the act of state doctrine did not require unquestioned acceptance of
Cuba's effort to confiscate something situated outside of Cuba's territory.
This reflects the extraterritoriality exception to the act of state doctrine
which the Sabbatino opinion invited. Whether situs will be found in the
acting state's territory or not is said to be decisive in many of these cases,
but the basis for distinction is so unclear that it leaves both lenders and
borrowers in a damaging state of uncertainty. The Allied Bank II decision stated that the act of state doctrine would not apply if the note was
capable of being collected, among other places, anywhere outside of the
issuing state. The Perez decision stated that the act of state doctrine
would only be inapplicable if the debt "is not payable at all in the confiscating state." The confusion is obvious, but we should keep in mind that
it will not be enough to achieve consistency in choice of law analysis.
What is needed is a basis for decision-making that has a rational basis in
principles of justice.

12. 583 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1979); see also Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt, 694
F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1983).
13. Garcia, 735 F.2d 645. The Sabbatino quotation from the opinion set forth on page
321 above contains the limitation of the holding in the Sabbatino case to takings "within its
own territory by a foreign sovereign." Id. at 428. Since all that can be "taken" is someone's
rights in property, the precise impact of a territorial limitation of laws opens the question
whether it addresses the location of the subject of the rights or of the holder of the rights.
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Anti-Trust Cases

The Clayco case'" held that the plaintiff was barred by the act of
state doctrine from pursuing an antitrust claim which is based upon the
alleged bribery by the defendant of the petroleum minister of the country
in which both were trying to obtain a valuable oil concession, and which
the defendant succeeded in obtaining. On the other hand, the Sage International case 5 holds that the act of state doctrine does not bar the pursuit of a plaintiff's antitrust claim even though the allegations of the complaint might call for a review of corruption charges or of the motivation of
the foreign sovereign in making procurement decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Sabbatino that it was limiting its holding to expropriation cases, 6 but these courts considered that it might apply in antitrust cases and one of them actually applied it. What is evidenced in
these cases is uncertainty about the application of the doctrine, or else
the expedience of using it to forestall the trial of unwelcome issues of
fact. The Clayco case would seem to have been disposable by finding the
petroleum minister's unauthorized act not to have been an act of state. At
some point, sovereign compulsion may become a defense to discovery or
even liability in such cases, but the foreclosure of all proof of wrongdoing
outside the expropriation area (which presumably is now open because of
Hickenlooper II) does not serve the ends of justice. It could be avoided by
merely permitting the executive branch to intervene in the unlikely event
that it wished to try to persuade the court to abstain.
C.

The Treaty Cases

The Sabbatino holding stated that its restraints on judicial action
applied only "in the absence of a treaty. . .regarding controlling legal
principles.' 1 7 Since that case, two lower courts have reached opposite conclusions as to whether the terms "prompt, just and effective compensation" stated an unambiguous and usable principle of law so as to satisfy
the treaty exception.' 8 One court said these terms were unambiguous and
usable, and the other (reversed on appeal) said they were not. Consequently, the doctrine would have been applied by one trial court and not
the other. The irony is that the well-meaning Kalamazoo court, reversed
on appeal, had evaluated these terms approximately the way Justice
Harlan did in his Sabbatino opinion.' 9

14. 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984). Such cases have led
writers to propose a bribery exception to the act of state doctrine. See infra note 75.
15. 534 F. Supp. 896 (S.D. Mich. 1981).
16. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398.
17. Id. at 428.
18. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't. of Ethiopia, 729 F.2d
422 (6th Cir. 1984), and American Int'l. Group, Inc. v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 493 F.Supp. 522

(D.D.C. 1980).
19. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-437.
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GUIDANCE FROM THE U.S. SUPREME COURT

Faced with the welter of confusing decisions in the lower courts, it is
necessary to look to the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court to see
whether adequate guidance can be found there. A substantial literature
exists which examined the Sabbatino case as it worked its way through
the courts after the Cuban expropriations began in 1959.20 Eminent writers have since taken the position that the act of state doctrine is unsatisfactory."1 A useful consideration of the sets of cases referred to above,
which I believe add fuel to the fire started by previous writers, requires
some review here of Sabbatino and the intervening decisions. The continuing flow of recent cases has done nothing to clarify, and only illustrates,
22
the confused state of the law.
A.

The Sabbatino Case

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino5 held that, in a dispute in
New York over the proceeds of sale of Cuban sugar, the validity of the
actions of the government of Cuba in expropriating the sugar from a U.S.
owned Cuban company while the sugar was in Cuba cannot be examined
by U.S. courts, in deference to the act of state doctrine. The majority
opinion stated that the doctrine is not constitutional, although it has
roots in the separation of powers; nor is it a rule of international law,
although it has international consequences. The Court also said that it is
not merely a conflict of laws rule to be applied variously by the several
20. Representative examples include Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 826 (1959) and Association of the Bar of the City of New York, A Reconsideration
of the Act of State Doctrine in United States Courts (1959).
21. See, e.g., Lacey, ed. Act of State and ExtraterritorialReach (ABA publication,
1983) and an excellent article, Leigh and Sander, Dunhill: Toward a Reconsideration of
Sabbatino, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. (1976). CF. Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in
Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1967); 3 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 107 (1964);
and The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 805
(1964). There is now a vast literature on this subject which it is not possible to acknowledge
fully.
22. See, e.g., Boland v. Bank Sepah-Iran, 614 F. Supp. 1166 (D.D.C. 1985) in which the
courts found that the act of state doctrine did not apply unless all acts constituting the act

of question had come to fruition within Iran; the Perez court, 61 N.Y.2d 460 concluded that
the doctrine would apply if the acting sovereign had the power to change ownership within
his territory, even though comparable action could have occurred outside his territory. The
Allied Bank opinions offer three different legal analyses of the same facts, the latest in
Allied Bank II, decided in 1985. See supra notes 6-7. In Tahacosh Co., Ltd. v. Rockwell
Intn'l. Corp., 766 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1985), the court approached the conflicting situs-based
arguments by calling them "a quagmire of legal difficulties" (766 F.2d at 1337) and then
decided that even though the defendant was a U.S. company, the claim of plaintiff had
insufficient U.S. contact to permit avoidance of the act of state doctrine. In De Roburt v.
Gannett Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1984) a head of state was blocked from pursuing a
libel claim by the defendant's assertion against him of the act of state doctrine. Surely, as
Justice Douglas concluded with respect to counterclaims, a head of state waives the act of
state doctrine by initiating litigation outside his own country.
23. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398.
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states. Instead, it is a doctrine of federal law derived from the Supreme
Court's deference to the role of the executive branch in dealing with sensitive international relations. The majority opinion limited its holding to
24
expropriation cases.
Unfortunately, unless the courts drastically limit or abandon the doctrine, or unless the executive branch will really pursue each of these situations and obtain a remedy for each victim, the effect of the decision is
that many acts of confiscation, repudiation of obligations and other
wrongful acts will be treated as valid and beyond question in U.S. courts,
even in the face of allegations of illegality under international law principles. This is the galling result which is not adequately explained in the
Sabbatino majority opinion, and not cured by Hickenlooper II.

B. The White Dissent
In a forceful dissent in the Sabbatino case, Mr. Justice White stated:
I am dismayed that the court has, with one broad stroke, declared the
ascertainment and application of international law beyond the competence of courts of the United States in a large and important category
of cases.1
And the damage is even greater than that expressed in Justice White's
dissent: under Sabbatino, our courts cannot consider whether an act of
state offends the forum's public policy unless they can first find some
exception to the doctrine-even if its policy is not reflective of some principle of international law and they cannot in the process make any contribution to the development of international legal principles.
Since the Sabbatino case, the Supreme Court has been unable to
achieve a majority opinion in any case dealing with this doctrine. Congress, however, reacted quickly to the Sabbatino case. It agreed with Justice White's position and adopted Hickenlooper 11,26 which states in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United
States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine
to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the principles
of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other right to
property is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a party
claiming through such state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in
violation of the principles of international law, including the principles of compensation and the other standards set out in this subsection; provided, that this subparagraph shall not be applicable (1) in
any case in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to international law or with respect to a claim of title or other right to property
acquired pursuant to an irrevocable letter of credit of not more than

24. Id. at 428.
25. Id. at 439.
26. 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (2)(e)(2) (1965).
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180 days duration issued in good faith prior to the time of the confiscation or other taking, or (2) in any case with respect to which the
President determines that the application of the act of state doctrine
is required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the
United States and a suggestion
to this effect is filed on his behalf in
27
that case with the court.
It should be noted that in this legislation Congress not only instructed the courts to adjudicate allegations of takings in violation of international law, but it also instructed them to assume that the executive
branch has no objection unless the President speaks up-thus inverting
the exception which Judge Learned Hand felt obliged to observe in the
Bernstein case"s (that the courts could only act if the Executive Branch
affirmatively released them to act).
C.

Subsequent Supreme Court Cases

The act of state doctrine has returned to the Supreme Court twice
since Sabbatino, and in neither of those cases did as many as five justices
agree on the same opinion. The first was First National City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba. 9 Cuba had expropriated branches of the First
National City Bank (FNCB) located in Cuba. FNCB had previously made
a secured loan to Banco Nacional and responded to the expropriation by
selling the collateral it was holding in New York. It realized 1.8 million
dollars' profit. Banco Nacional sued FNCB for the profit so realized, and
FNCB counterclaimed for the value of its expropriated Cuban branch assets. Opinions by the Supreme Court Justices were split, but a majority
held, for varying reasons, that the lower courts should deal with all aspects of the case and not abstain from inquiring into the validity of the
Cuban government's actions on the grounds of the act of state doctrine.
Three members of the Court reached this conclusion on the basis of the
Bernstein exception (relying on a communication from the executive
branch raising no objection to judicial action).30 Justice Douglas voted
with the majority on the equitable ground that a sovereign's claim can
always be reduced by a counterclaim; if the sovereign chooses to come
into our courts, then he must be prepared to have all related claims adjudicated, at least up to the amount of his claim. The fifth vote came from
Justice Powell based on the broad proposition that the courts should take
and deal with any case involving expropriation unless to do so would up-

27. Id.
28. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Frres Soci6t6 Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2nd Cir. 1947);
but consider the reasonable dissent of Judge Clark in which he would have asked for proof
from the executive branch of the necessity to abstain from acting, rather than to assume it
from executive branch silence. Id. at 253.
29. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
30. Id. In FNCB the Legal Adviser to the State Department informed the Supreme
Court on November 17, 1970 that "[T]he Department of State believes that the act of state
doctrine should not be applied to bar consideration of a defendant's counterclaim or set-off
against the Government of Cuba in this or like cases." Id. at 764.

1986

ACT OF STATE: ABANDON IT

set the foreign relations of the United States. The result of these five
votes was to permit the Court to act, and to avoid limiting its inquiry
because of the act of state doctrine."1
The guidance provided by these three opinions in the FNCB case is
obviously obscure, since it took three different routes to convey a majority to a common destination. They at least made it clear that the Court
32
was quick to find reasons for avoiding use of the act of state doctrine.
What was also left unclear, and is still unclear, was whether the courts
were to be the final judge of the need for abstention (on the grounds of
potential embarrassment of our foreign relations) or whether the executive branch could signal for, and cause, judicial abstention without proof,
and in no specified fashion.
The Supreme Court's next opportunity to address the act of state
doctrine came in the Dunhill case. 3 Without attracting more than four
Justices to its rationale, the plurality opinion written by Justice White
would create a commercial exception to the act of state doctrine.3 Pursuant to such an exception, a court would not be required to abstain from
examining the validity of a sovereign action if the sovereign act drawn
into question was by its nature a commercial activity rather than an activity in which only a sovereign could engage. As illustrated by the Callejo case, a decree barring the conversion of local currency into dollars
would be in the nature of a sovereign act, but stopping payment on a
dollar check as a result of such a decree could be regarded as a commercial action. The Callejo opinion analogized this approach to the "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity, pursuant to which sovereign states
are subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in cases in which a party
wishes to sue a sovereign directly because of its commercial activities.3s A
majority of the Justices voted in the Dunhill case to consider the validity

31. The trial court had concluded that the Sabbatino case did not bar its inquiry because Hickenlooper II had overruled it. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City
Bank of New York, 270 F.Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The court of appeals reversed believing that was not the case and that the act of state doctrine barred the inquiry. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York, 442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971). The
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, thereby freeing the trial court to proceed with
the case, although three reasons for barring inquiry were presented. First National City
Bank, 406 U.S. at 759.
32. Justices Rehnquist and White and Chief Justice Berger relied on the Bernstein exception; Justice Douglas referred to the fact that the claim was a counterclaim and relied on
National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955), to the effect that a sovereign's claim can be cut down by a setoff. Justice Powell rejected both the Bernstein and the
setoff escape routes, but found another method of overriding the doctrine by assuming the
adjudicator's responsibility for determining whether this particular case presented a risk of
damage to our international relations sufficient to justify judicial abdication, and concluding
that it did not.
33. DunhiU, 425 U.S. 682.
34. Justice White referred to an opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, which stated
that "when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself. . .of
its sovereign character and takes that of a private citizen." Id.
35. Callejo, 764 F.2d 1101.
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of Cuba's action, although only four felt free to do so on the basis of a
commercial exception.
As noted by Justice Marshall in his dissent in the Dunhill case,3 6 the
Supreme Court had up to that time never given its stamp of approval to
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. However, Congress has remedied this condition by explicit legislation adopting the restrictive theory.3 7 This action by Congress might be enough to allow us to predict a
Supreme court majority in support of the commercial exception to the act
of state doctrine if such a case were to arise now. (It should be noted that
the distinction between "sovereign" and "commercial" activity is itself a
likely breeder of disagreement, as in the Callejo case.)
In commenting upon the state of the law as a result of these three
Supreme Court opinions, one lower court federal judge observed that
[Ilt is evident that there remains disagreement as to the origins and
proper application of the [act of state] doctrine. It is however understood in theoretical terms and a practical application of the doctrine
requires a balancing process which will lead to some variance
in re3
sults depending on how the subject factors are weighted.

IV. THE POLICY

CONTENT OF ACT OF STATE DECISIONS

In order to become comfortable with the act of state doctrine, we
must become comfortable with its consequences and its policy foundation. We know that its two principal consequences are: (1) certain actions
of foreign governments will not be questioned even when alleged to be
offensive to our public policy or to international law, and (2) the executive branch will be unencumbered in the conduct of foreign relations by
the indelicate intrusions of the judiciary where acts of state are involved.
Let us examine the possible sources of policy supporting the doctrine.
A.

Situs

Act of state decisions often reach a result by manipulating the policyneutral concept of "situs" in order to determine whether the subject matter of the action is (i) located within the territory of the acting sovereign
and thus within, or (ii) located outside the territory of the acting sovereign and thus beyond, the territorial powers of the sovereign which are to
be given exemption from inquiry under the act of state doctrine. These
cases are tied to territoriality concepts which were strained to their limits
in American Banana Company v. United Fruit Co. 9 Many courts have
realistically identified the superficiality of act of state conclusions based
on situs considerations-especially when the subject matter is an intangi-

36. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 715.

37. U.S.C. 28, §§ 1602-1611 (1976).
38. Sage, 534 F. Supp. at 900.

39. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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ble. If all a decision does is to determine that an intangible has a situs
abroad, as in the Callejo and Perez cases, and then conclude that U.S.
courts must not intrude further, it is omitting a critical step. If the situs
determination was used only to determine the applicable law, it would
then be possible (if the act of state doctrine were abolished) to examine
the effect to be given to the foreign law under comity standards. But
when situs conclusions are used to determine the applicability of the act
of state doctrine, then the essential policy level is omitted and the harm
is done.
Of course there can be some policy underpinnings for respecting the
implications of situs. Property which can clearly be located territorially
can inspire some deference to a sovereign state's attempts to affect legal
relationships within its own borders. U.S. courts could give offense to a
nationalizing government, and look foolish at the same time, in denying
the validity of a transfer of the real estate of a foreign citizen through
nationalization in his own country. But acts of state can, and usually do,
have some extraterritorial effects, however indirect or secondary, as occur
when the owner is a foreigner or the assets taken (or their fruit or proceeds) are or become located outside the nationalizing state. When such
acts of state have offensive content when viewed by reasonable standards
of commercial or human decency, differences of result based entirely on
the paper-thin concepts of situs of intangibles are not satisfactory. Did
Mr. Callejo lose because the situs of his certificate was in Mexico, or was
its situs in Mexico because he lost?
B. Military Reality
Underhill v. Hernandez ° is often referred to as the classic U.S.
statement of the act of state doctrine. The facts arose in Venezuela,
where Mr. Underhill, a U.S. citizen, was detained in the country against
his will by the revolutionary leader, General Hernandez, who was trying
to coerce him to operate his waterworks for the revolutionaries during
military operations. The revolution succeeded, but Underhill sued Hernandez for damages based on his detention in the country against his will.
The court held that Underhill could not recover and made the unnecessary but often quoted statement that
[Elvery sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers
as between themselves."
The statement was overly broad for the case presented, and unnecessary because sovereign immunity should have disposed of the case. The

40. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
41. Id. at 252.
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opinion relies on cases such as U.S. v. Rice4 as authority for the conclusion that ". .acts of legitimate warfare cannot be made the basis of individual liability."' This consideration is a practical piece of bedrock worth
retaining and could also have disposed of the Underhill case without using the broad act of state language as stated and quoted above. It must be
recognized by all who venture into foreign sovereignties that in time of
war, including civil war, personal assets and privileges may be unceremoniously seized without compensation. Unless the government of the venturesome citizen should espouse the claim and seek to satisfy it at the
national state level, war damage is beyond private redress. This is as far
as the Underhill analysis had to go and, confined to its own facts, it
would appear to relate to a historic military reality rather than to the
deference to the executive branch referred to in the Sabbatino decision.
The law has always recognized that there is a point at which the results and realities of acts of war and conquest are beyond the powers of
courts to undo."" Calvin's case' 3 is the classic example, stating that title
based on conquest is irreversibly established. Acceptance of the results of
conquest requires another type of judicial tolerance, which has history
and practicality behind it. But it is a far cry from the delicate abstention
of the Sabbatino case. Of course, the day may come when acts of war are
not legitimized so readily, but that is a stage of the evolution of international law that we can only hope for and can never approach unless we
overcome the lesser hurdle of the act of state doctrine.
C.

Reasonable Expectations of Sovereigns

Judge Motley, in a thoughtful opinion in the Libra Bank case'"
groped for bedrock by proposing that the act of state doctrine be viewed
as a requirement for courts to refrain from questioning actions which a
foreign sovereign could reasonably expect to be respected by foreign
courts. This approach is echoed in the Callejo opinion.' 7 Using this approach, courts of other nations would not, for example, presume to challenge the effectiveness of a sovereign's act purporting to change title to a
tangible asset located within the territorial reach of its undeniable sovereignty. But how would courts deal with intangible assets and invisibles
such as insurance relationships that represent transactions having many
points of contact with many sovereignties? Would the degree of a sovereign's annoyance when courts do act depend on such questions as

42. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246 (1819).
43. Underhill, 168 U.S. at 253.
44. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246 (1819).
45. Calvin's Case, 7 Coke 2a (Trin., 6 Jac 1) (1609).
46. Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 870.
47. Compare Libra Bank: ". . .a foreign state cannot be said to have reasonable expectations of dominion over property located in this nation." Id. at 884, with Callejo: ". . .disregarding the Mexican regulations would be very vexing indeed. Note that here the distinction between sovereign and commercial is not based on the nature of the activity, but the
degree of sovereign sensitivity. 764 F.2d at 1116.
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whether the situs of a debt is with the debtor or the creditor? To use the
"reasonable expectations" rationale, the forum court would try to determine what expectations would be "reasonable" in the mind of the foreign
sovereign who took the action in question, and would respect those expectations. There is a superficial rationality to this approach, but it is largely
comity by another name and in effect evades the act of state doctrine
without supplying any reason for doing so. "Reasonable expectations"
would presumably contemplate the well-informed thought processes of a
mature sovereign conscious of internationally acceptable standards of
conduct. Such a search for reasonableness should open up all of the same
questions of conformity to international legal standards which a U.S.
court is told not to consider when the act of state doctrine applies. To a
critic of the act of state doctrine, this approach is appealing because it
does offer a workable technique for evading the doctrine. But if that is
what we want to do, let us openly abandon it.
D.

Comity

The Second Circuit's opinion in Allied Bank 148 reasoned that constructive international relations require that courts of one state, even
though they have jurisdiction, will as a matter of comity permit certain
actions of another state to be respected and taken at face value. The term
has been broadly defined to mean ". . .the courteous and friendly understanding by which each nation respects the laws and usages of every
other, so far as may be without prejudice to its own rights and interests."49 This exercise in pragmatic courtesy has the great benefit of being
less conceptual and formalistic than debates over situs. Comity precipitates a valuable case-by-case process for evaluating the deference to be
accorded to the executive's prerogatives in the field of foreign relations,
the acceptability of the policy effects of the act of state in question and
the rights of the parties-both procedurally, to a disposition of their dispute, and substantively, on the merits.
The flexible concept of comity contains qualifications and exceptions
not contained in the act of state doctrine. In particular, comity does not
require recognition of the acts of a foreign sovereign which are found to
be in conflict with the public policy of the forum state."' Since the crux of
the act of state doctrine lies in its refusal to permit an examination by the
courts of the possible conflict between the act in question and the policies
of the forum state, concepts of comity do not authorize or explain the
policy of the act of state doctrine, but rather cast it in a "super-comity"
48. Allied Bank I, 733 F.2d 23.
49. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, (2d ed. 1936).
50. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-164 (1894), stating: "Comity, in the legal
sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and
good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens .... "
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role, in which even more deference is offered to acts of state than the
ancient doctrine of comity had previously thought necessary.
E.

Customary InternationalLaw

Propositions about matters of international law which have been applied in the courts of most sovereign states should be given substantial
weight in U.S. courts. If the act of state doctrine had been regularly applied in the courts of other states whose judicial system had stature in the
international community, that fact alone might supply a policy reason for
applying it in U.S. courts.
An act of state doctrine does exist by that name in other nations,'
but when used, it is really a combined exercise in rules of comity and
conflicts of laws. The courts of other countries have no hesitation in stating that an expropriation by a foreign sovereign would not be recognized
in their courts if it violated significant principles and interests of the forum state. 52 Since the U.S. act of state doctrine is peculiarly derived from
the constitutional framework of the U.S., the existence of references to a
doctrine by that name in the jurisprudence of other nations is to that
extent irrelevant. But the content of such cases illustrates the fact that
the U.S. courts have deferred to the executive in such cases to an extent
not found in the jurisprudence of other nations with governmental structures which differentiate among the principal branches of government.
Although the doctrine itself is not derivable from international law, it
continues to be defended on the policy ground that it leaves the determination of the U.S. position on matters of evolving international law to the
executive branch of government.5" This approach implies a mistrust of
the ability of the judiciary to find or develop usable international legal
principles. For a nation intending to be governed by laws and not by men,
this would be an anomalous view of the allocation of roles in our system
of government.
F. Separation of Powers
In the context of a separation of powers, the U.S. act of state case
offers the most identifiable policy base: deference by the judiciary toward
the prerogatives of the executive in foreign policy matters. To the extent
that the doctrine has a clear meaning, this is where its roots lie. Is there a
special necessity in the U.S. constitutional framework to let the executive
determine when the acts of other nations should go unchallenged in U.S.
51. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, n.21 and the dissenting opinion for a collection of
cases from other nations.
52. See id. See also 12 I.L.M. 187, 251 (1973) for translations of two of these decisions.
53. E.g., Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1116 (quoting French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23
N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E. 2d 704, 295 N.Y.S. 2d 433, (1968)) that "the currency regulations of a
foreign state... are not appropriate subjects for evaluation by state courts applying local
conceptions of public policy."
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courts? As pointed out in Justice White's dissent in the Sabbatino case,
[N]o other civilized country has found such a rigid rule necessary for
the survival of the executive branch of its government; the executive
of no other government seems to require such insulation from international law adjudications in its courts; and no other judiciary is apparently so incompetent to ascertain and apply international law.54
The Supreme Court in the Sabbatino case may have been persuaded by
the eloquence of Mr. Katzenbach when he argued that the executive
branch could do more to obtain compensation for U.S. citizens by negotiations with Cuba than the courts could achieve by adjudication. 5 It is
late in the day to focus criticism on the Sabbatino case itself, and much
has already been written about it, but, in fact, the Sabbatino plaintiff
seems to have obtained his relief from the courts because Congress passed
and applied to him Hickenlooper II, not because the executive branch
took care of him. 6
It might indeed be reasonable for the courts to abstain from taking
actions which would truly threaten the conduct of foreign relations by the
executive branch. But is that risk really credible? Isn't it, on the contrary,
less abrasive for contract and property rights to be determined in the relatively non-political and detached courts, which are by definition not our
chosen instruments for the conduct of foreign policy, than by the executive branch, which is? Could not the executive branch in such situations
respond to an irritated sovereign that in its constitutional system it does
not and cannot control the courts?
Can all citizens damaged by the questionable acts of foreign sovereigns realistically expect espousal and reimbursement through intervention by the executive branch? Perhaps so in the case of comprehensive
programs of nationalization, but is this true of incidents of individualized
and discriminatory takings? If the actions are egregiously wrong by rational standards of fair behavior, why not take advantage of the court
system and let the matter be adjudicated? The executive branch cannot
focus on each such incident, and by definition such individual cases are
too isolated to be capable of upsetting international relations.
And by what kind of process should courts decide whether to abstain? Was a judicial process used to determine that Fidel Castro would
have been offended by a U.S. court's conclusion that discriminatory and
uncompensated seizures of U.S. property were illegal, after the U.S. State
Department had already sent him a note saying just that?5" And if it were
found to be likely to offend him, should a U.S. court defer to his sensitiv-

54. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 440.
55. Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Esq. argued the Sabbatino case, amicus curiae, for the
United States, and must have argued the point accepted in the majority opinion. Id. at 431.
56. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affd, 383
F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967).
57. See State Dept. Note No. 397, July 16, 1960 (to Cuban Ministry of Foreign
Relations).
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ity? And if we are to invite the executive branch to be heard in such
situations, should it be enough, as provided in the second Hickenlooper
Amendment,5 8 for the President merely to make a "suggestion" to the
court that it defer to the executive in a given situation?
A preferable way to dispose of this concern would be to permit the
executive branch to appear and submit proof on the issue, as Justice
Powell appears to prefer in his opinion in the Dunhill case, subject to
normal judicial processes and the protections of privilege and even closed
hearings as required. The painful facts surrounding the Bernstein cases5
gave the name to this kind of exception to the application of the act of
state doctrine, but did not develop a proper process for the determination
of whether the courts should render judgment on offensive acts of foreign
states even if the executive requested they not do so. Courts which purport to evaluate the impact on the nation's foreign relations of proceeding
with a case solely by soliciting the executive branch's ex parte advice may
be abandoning their critical roles as adjudicators of complex issues and as
the arbiters in the U.S. system of checks and balances.
In the cases in which they have purported to evaluate the risk of
damage to the conduct of foreign relations, our courts have been without
suitable evidentiary materials to work with, and have relied on speculation or taken the executive's word for it.' Allied Bank I and Allied Bank
H should truly be an embarrassment to the judicial branch, since the
court confessed in Allied Bank H that it had not understood the executive branch's position in Allied Bank I, and changed its decision after
having obtained further advice from the executive branch." One of the
judicial speculations has been that the executive branch can negotiate
better settlements with foreign sovereigns than the parties would obtain
if the courts acted."2 This was given substantial weight in the majority
opinion in the Sabbatino case. Yet the State Department, which is responsible for negotiating settlements for American citizens with foreign
sovereigns, did not object to the possibility that the courts might act and
has indeed informed the Court that it is difficult to see how decisions in
such cases could interfere with the conduct of foreign relations by the
United States.
There is actually strong evidence that Congress would prefer to have
the courts, and not the legislature, decide whether to challenge acts of
foreign states.63 The FSIA gave this role to the courts, and the legislation
58. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(2)(e)(2).
59. See supra note 28. Cf. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d
375 (2d Cir. 1954).
60. Cf. Allied Bank II, 757 F.2d 516.
61. Id. at 519.
62. Sabbatino,376 U.S. at 431.
63. By passage of the FSIA, particularly U.S.C. 28 § 1605, which specifically vests jurisdiction in the courts to hear matters in which foreign sovereigns have acted commercially or
even tortiously in certain respects.
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indicates that Congress expressly preferred that channel over the executive channel, as a way of avoiding political actions.
Finally, by purporting to refrain from acting, the federal courts have
nevertheless acted, with substantial consequences to the parties before
them. By refusing to question the acts of a foreign sovereign, they have
validated them. This is not abstention, it is ratification, and that is as
much a judicial act as invalidation would be.
Closely akin to separation of powers considerations is the "political
question" concept through which a court may refrain from acting in certain situations out of the sense that the political structure in which it
operates does not contemplate that it should deal with such issues."' Although the executive is clearly vested with the power to conduct our foreign relations, our courts have concluded in act of state cases that this is
not sufficiently explicit as guidance to create a constitutional barrier to
the disposition of such cases by the federal courts. If they do abstain
under the act of state doctrine, they recognize it as a judicially fashioned
doctrine with constitutional roots but not compelled by controlling constitutional principles. To that extent, the act of state doctrine is analogous to the "political question" approach, since both are judicially-fashioned principles of federal law of less than constitutional dignity, both
involving judicial abstention. The primary operational distinction is that,
in political question cases, the other mechanisms of American political
action are available in our governmental system to dispose of the problem-all interested parties are situated under the umbrella of U.S. governmental and political institutions. In act of state cases, one principal
protagonist is foreign, and there can be no similar assurance that the executive branch will have the interest or the capacity to pursue the needs
of the U.S. parties to a successful conclusion.
V.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE APPLICATION OF THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE

There are now at least five identifiable exceptions-so many exceptions that one wonders whether the basic doctrine has much integrity left.
Writers are advocating ever more exceptions.6 5 It should shed considerable light on the utility and strength of the doctrine to examine the exceptions which the courts now recognize. They include the treaty exception,
the agreement exception, the commercial exception, the extraterritorial
exception and the Bernstein exception.
A.

The Treaty Exception

The decision in the Sabbatino case expressly stated that the act of
state doctrine need not apply if controlling legal principles were found in

64. See Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), and cf. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in the First National City Bank case. See supra note 29, which
stated that the validity of a foreign act of state is a "political question."
65. See supra notes 75-76.
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a treaty binding on the state whose acts were in question. The Supreme
Court stated reasonably that it should not upset the relations between
the United States and a sovereign for the courts to apply the very principles which the sovereign had expressly accepted in a treaty.
The Kalamazoo case hinged upon this exception. The district court
declined to act and applied the act of state doctrine because it concluded
that the bilateral Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations between Ethiopia and the United States failed to provide a usable standard of international law principles. The treaty language, which the district court found
to be excessively general and doubtful, required that there be "prompt
payment of just and effective compensation" in the case of an expropriation. The trial court was reversed on appeal, and its decision exemplifies
the problems courts are having with these cases. The Sabbatino decision
itself had questioned whether the kind of treaty language the Kalamazoo
court was dealing with was clear enough to offer an internationally-accepted standard. 6 The Kalamazoo court accordingly declined to accept
the treaty language and applied the act of state doctrine, yet was reversed
by an appellate court which concluded that this was "...a
controlling
'67
legal standard in the area of international law."
The Sabbatino case itself nullified most of the potential usefulness of
the treaty exception it created. The case involved an expropriation; the
disputes involved in expropriation cases generally have to do with the adequacy of compensation; the provisions of the U.S. treaties brought into
question in such cases in U.S. courts are, therefore, the provisions which
virtually all U.S. treaties have contained, providing in substance for
prompt, just and effective compensation. But the Sabbatino opinion asserts that nothing is more unclear in the field of international dispute
resolution than the meaning and acceptability of the standard requiring
"...prompt, just and effective compensation." As a result, the very terms
of the Sabbatino opinion undermine the utility of the treaty exception in
those cases in which it is most likely to be called in question.
The adherence of a sovereign government to a relevant treaty does
offer evidence of its predictable attitude toward a challenge to the legality
of its actions, and would be useful in evaluating the respect to be given to
its position. But changes of government do not automatically abrogate all
treaties then in force. The sensitivities of revolutionary (or even evolutionary) governments may be (and predictably are) different from those
of their predecessors. Accordingly, the existence of a treaty is really not
conclusive of the attitude of later governments of the same country. If
comity were the applicable rationale, a court could take the existence of
such a treaty into consideration and test the acts of a foreign sovereign in
question against the standards of the treaty. There is nothing impolite
about holding a foreign sovereign to the terms of his own treaty; but there

66. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 429.
67. Kalamazoo, 729 F.2d at 426.
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will be times when the treaty is not representative of the thinking of the
current government, and courts should be free to regard the treaty as one
element of its analysis, but not a conclusive element. Treaties are either
controlling in U.S. courts as the supreme law, if applicable, or are merely
evidentiary materials suitable for courts to use in balancing the elements
of a comity decision-they should not be independently conclusive as
proposed in the Sabbatino formulation.
B.

The Agreement Exception

The agreement exception is very similar to the treaty exception. The
rationale is essentially the same: if a government agrees to a principle of
law, it should not be offended if that principle is applied in U.S. litigation
involving the legal consequences of its related acts of state."' The expropriation subject matter is dealt with, for example, in the bilateral agreements entered into pursuant to the political risk insurance program of the
United States, presently administered by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). These are not treaties; yet they are relevant
bilateral agreements. All of the shortcomings of the treaty exception apply to the agreement exception, and the existence of such agreements
should be viewed in the full factual context to determine the proper respect to be given to foreign acts of state.
C.

The Commercial Exception

The Dunhill case 69 produced an opinion, supported by only four justices, that the act of state doctrine need not be applied to shield inquiry
into acts of state which are of a commercial nature. This is perhaps the
strongest of the exceptions to the act of state doctrine and follows logically from the basis for the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity: if
sovereigns can be required to appear and defend their actions in the commercial area, it follows logically, and as a lesser intrusion, that they
should be prepared to see the validity and effect of such actions adjudicated in our courts. Because Congress has since enacted the same exception in the statute dealing with sovereign immunity, it is likely that the
commercial exception would now be applied by a majority of the Supreme
Court to the act of state doctrine. The exception narrows the theoretical
policy basis for the act of state doctrine to those actions of a foreign sovereign which only a sovereign can perform. This in turn necessarily means
that the judicial branch need not fear the disruption of U.S. foreign relations if it only inquires into the kinds of activity which (in other cultures)
persons other than the sovereign customarily conduct. Again, the very existence of this exception indicates the weakness of the act of state doctrine-courts continue to create exceptions to it.
But we cannot rest easily with the act of state doctrine just because

68. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 429.
69. Dunhill, 425 U.S. 682.
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there are such exceptions to it. This one could become unworkable when
faced with the actions of largely state-controlled economies. If we were to
use a commercial exception, by what standard are we to classify acts as
"commercial"? If we look to the allocation of functions found in the U.S.,
we find a substantial area of private sector activity which a commercial
exception would liberate from the act of state doctrine. We have a vast
private sector, and we assign many functions to it. But what is "commercial" activity in a state in which it is unlawful for anyone but the state to
own the means of production? If what we seek to avoid is the presumptively clumsy offense by a U.S. court to a sovereign's sensitivity about the
finality of his actions in his sovereign capacity, it would be illogical to use
any but the sovereign's definition of his own sovereign capacity in estimating the probability that he will be offended. In a centrally controlled
socialist economy, the processes of owning and earning are all within the
sovereign's sphere. If the U.S. system of government truly intends to limit
dispute resolution within the sovereign's sphere of activity to the executive branch, there is no room for a commercial exception in dealing with
such countries because it recognizes no commercial activities separate
from the acts of the central government. If applied with fidelity to its
presumed purpose, it would be useless in dealing with comprehensively
socialized economies. If applied without reference to its purpose, it is a
fiction.
Congress appears to want the federal courts to recognize a commercial exception to the invulnerability of sovereigns, and such an exception
has indeed become a very large source of avoidance of the act of state
doctrine. But how many amputations need we tolerate before deciding
that the host carcass has lost its viability?
Further evidence of the accumulating discomfort with the act of state
doctrine is found in certain proposed amendments dealing with commercial activity in the FSIA.7 0 These amendments include two provisions relevant to this discussion:
§ 1603(f). A 'commercial activity' includes any promise to pay made
by a foreign state, any debt security issued by a foreign state, and any
guaranty by a foreign state of a promise to pay made by another
party,
and
§ 1606(b). The Federal act of state doctrine shall not be applied on
behalf of a foreign state with respect to any claim or counterclaim
asserted pursuant to the provisions of this chapter which is based
upon an expropriation of other taking of property, including contract
rights without the payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation or otherwise in violation of international law or which is
based upon a breach of contract, nor shall such doctrine bar enforce70. See Atkeson & Ramsey, Proposed Amendment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 770 (1985).
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ment of an agreement to arbitrate or an arbitral award rendered
against a foreign state.
These sections would not only eliminate the ct of state defense in any
of the certificates of deposit and exchange control cases in which the foreign state or any of its instrumentalities can be characterized as the
promisor, but would also eliminate the act of state doctrine as a justification for a sovereign if the act in question is a taking of property or contract rights without compensation (as defined) or, for example, in a discriminatory fashion, or a breach of contract. This would repair one of the
gaps in the Hickenlooper II, by nullifying the decision in the Hunt 7' case
which held that contract rights were not protected against the act of state
defense by the Hickenlooper II. The proposed amendment to § 1606(b)
would indeed weaken the act of state doctrine, and for good reason.
Surely it would be an abuse of our judicial system for a foreign state to be
allowed to elect to file a claim here, and take it to judgment in our courts,
while at the same time denying our courts the right to consider whether
the foundation for the claim was offensive to our fundamental views of
fairness and equity. If an American citizen had been lucky enough to escape from Cuba with assets which the Castro government had declared
confiscated without compensation, do we really want to offer a forum in
our federal courts for Cuba to demand the return of those assets without
having to justify its actions against a legal standard? Do we really believe
that the executive branch will pursue the rights of all U.S. citizens holding broken contracts with an obstreperous foreign sovereign, so that the
courts need not take any action to protect them? I think not.
Those amendments illustrate the demands for a firmer position by
the U.S. courts on these subjects, but they do not go far enough. It would
be far simpler, and more effective, to abandon the act of state doctrine.
D.

The ExtraterritorialException

Some courts are avoiding the doctrine by finding some manifestation
of the action in question which did not take place, or take place exclusively, or come to fruition, within the territory of the sovereign state in
question. The holding of the Sabbatino case can be read to be limited to
expropriations within the territory of the acting state or can be read to
invite other applications determined on a case-by-case basis. It does not
explicitly endorse the devotion to the situs of intangibles evidenced by
the conceptual logic of the Allied Bank and Perez decisions. Whether a
state's action is within its own territory depends in part on whether one
seeks indirect effects, or foreseeable subsequent effects, or multiple simultaneous effects. In today's complex financial world, no state action affecting international commercial or financial relationships can be said to have
only domestic effects; and if we mean to exclude from the scope of the
doctrine any actions having any external effects, then again we should
71. See supra note 12.
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face the fact that the doctrine would have almost no application. Convenient though this would be as a way of narrowing its use, the extraterritorial exception approach is only another conceptual device expressing the
same policy purpose, namely to avoid the act of state doctrine. The
probability of diplomatic abrasion is not reduced by the availability of
such fine distinctions. The fact that a certificate of deposit allegedly frozen and seized by a confiscating sovereign might be collectible, not only in
the sovereign's issuing banks but also in some foreign location, is not
likely to placate the sovereign when required by a U.S. court to pay it in
the U.S. Nevertheless, the extraterritorial exception must purport to rest
on that principle and permit that result.
E.

The Bernstein Exception

In the first of the Bernstein cases7 2 a great judge, Judge Learned
Hand, assumed that he was unable to look behind the Nazi seizure of a
Jewish-owned vessel without the affirmative encouragement of the executive branch. Since that time, executive branch letters have been tendered
to federal courts consistently refraining from asking the courts to abstain
from adjudicating the matter before them. A majority of the Supreme
Court has yet to adopt the Bernstein exception, but as recently as Allied
Bank II, a federal court of appeals has considered that a signal from the
executive branch would liberate it to consider matters from which it
would otherwise have been obliged to abstain pursuant to the act of state
doctrine.7 Allied Bank II illustrates the continuing vitality of such an
approach, even without the endorsement of a Supreme Court majority;
but for the reasons referred to above, it should only be applied in modified form, giving the executive branch standing to appear and assert its
views on the need for judicial abstention-in secret, or in private, as the
court may find necessary in its discretion.

VI.

THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE SHOULD BE ABANDONED

Serious consideration should be given to abandoning the entire doctrine. Sophisticated opinions such as those in the Callejo and Libra cases
come close to doing that, by penetrating the conceptual level of situs considerations enough to permit a weighing of the risk of sovereign irritation.
But they do not yet consider themselves free to weigh the offensiveness of
the act of state against any standard of acceptable sovereign behavior, as
they should be. The many exceptions developed by the courts-the treaty
and agreement exceptions, the commercial exception, the extraterritoriality exception, the "reasonable expectation" approach, the Bernstein exception-all in the aggregate evidence the courts' efforts to reduce the
doctrine to the minimum. Recent writers have proposed ever more excep-

72. See supra note 37.
73. See supra note 28.
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tions: a corrupt practices exception, 7 and a waiver exception.78 And yet
how many situations can there be in which the decision of a court can be
expected to do more damage to the conduct of foreign relations by the
U.S. government than the executive branch would have inflicted on the
same issue? It seemed unnecessary for the Supreme Court to be so delicate as to withhold its judgment on the legality of Cuban acts of expropriation when those very acts have been the subject of complaints by the
U.S. State Department which assert in explicit terms that they are in fact
unlawful. What can the courts do that would be so destructive as to upset
the conduct of foreign relations? Foreign governments would always know
that the courts are not the executive branch and that the courts are not
conducting foreign policy when they reach decisions based upon the customary judicial function of seeking to develop and apply legal principles.
Where did this skittishness come from? What do we have courts for if not
to decide disputes between private individuals, granting for the present
the necessity for sovereign immunity in noncommercial situations, when
foreign governments are directly involved as parties-or sought to be
made parties? Congress has clearly signalled, in its restrictions on the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, that it wishes the courts to be more assertive in such cases.
How will international law develop if our highest courts will not function in these crucial areas? It is no answer to refer to classical concepts of
situs and territoriality, and to state that it is an exercise in principles of
international law to apply the foreign state's own law and thus validate
the offensive actions of foreign sovereigns. We should not seek the preservation of "international law" as a museum to shelter ancient policy-neutral concepts-if we seek to develop an international community governed by humane and decent standards of conduct, we must free our legal
system to play a part in achieving that purpose.7 6 We will not reach that
goal using the act of state doctrine. The best resolution of this subject
would be for the courts to reject the act of state doctrine entirely.
The concepts of comity and conflict of laws are sufficient for this purpose. The excellent preliminary analysis in the Callejo opinion successfully penetrated to the true elements of decision in such cases, but felt
obliged to apply the act of state doctrine rather than seek what might
have been the same result through application of principles of comity after deciding to apply Mexican law. Comity would permit a consideration
of the possible conflict between the acts of state in question and the pol-

74. Comments, Foreign Corrupt Practices:Creating an Exception to the Act of State
Doctrine, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 203 (1984).
75. Recent Development, Act of State Doctrine-Waiver as an Exception-Private
Defendants May Assert the Act of State Defense Against a Resisting Sovereign, 25 VA. J.
INT'L L. 775 (1985).
76. Of course we must be alert to the risk of imposing the views of the United States on
parts of the world where different views are held, but there must be some areas of general
agreement beyond Nuremberg which U.S. courts could join in developing and applying.
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icy interests of the forum state. The Callejo court could have considered
whether the assumption of risk by the U.S. investors outweighed the
drastic reduction in exchange rate forced upon them by the Mexican government's exchange control action. The executive could have been given
standing to contend that the foreign relations of the U.S. would be damaged by a judicial inquiry into the act of state in question, and the court
could have considered the merits of that contention on the basis of live
evidence and informed analysis. If the courts can require the executive
branch to produce documents otherwise classified as secret or claimed to
be privileged, it can develop procedures to provide suitable protections
for an adjudication of the necessity to abstain from inquiring into the
actions of a foreign state or its agents. And, of course, the military reality
of a given case would determine some outcomes-the courts would not
purport to do a useless thing, if its orders could have no effect, and would
recognize the legal consequences of legitimate acts of war. Yet even that
formulation leaves room for challenge to illegitimate acts of war, to continue the desirable development of international standards of conduct
even in a state of war. The act of state doctrine was not needed for a
proper disposition of any of the cases since Sabbatino.
In the absence of an act of state doctrine, all of the recent cases could
have been suitably disposed of. In each case, conflict of laws principles
might have determined that the applicable law was the law of the foreign
state. If so, comity could then have determined whether to give force and
effect to the act in question. If not, U.S. law would be applied. In each
case, the court could have determined under principles of comity whether
the acts of the foreign sovereign should be given legal effect. Only the
most egregious and offensive acts of state would be repudiated under this
approach, such as discriminatory or uncompensated confiscations not covered by Hickenlooper II, but at least some standard could be applied.
Nationalizations accompanied by plans for compensation which are something short of prompt might well earn judicial acceptance. Blatantly uncompensated and discriminatory takings would not be. Stringent currency
controls would probably survive as long as they fall short of a repudiation
of significant national obligations, as in the Allied Bank H case.
Of course, there would remain some issues to be resolved in new ways
without the act of state doctrine. Some period of limitations would be
needed if U.S. courts were to retain the right to question the validity of
uncompensated seizures of the assets of a representative of an abused minority. Title acquired by a thief eventually becomes secure in the hands
of a bona fide purchaser, and the same could be done for the innocent
purchaser of unconscionably confiscated property. Some concept of sovereign compulsion might be needed in antitrust cases. Erie v. Tompkins
would require the federal courts to look to state law if these cases were
treated only as conflict of laws cases. But if the state law of the forum
state determines that the law of the foreign state whose action was in
question should be applied, then the second level of analysis (the application of principles of comity) could be declared to be preempted for the
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federal courts just as easily as Sabbatino declared that the act of state
doctrine was a rule of federal law. The difference, thereby, could be that
the courts would evaluate the acts of the foreign state against evolving
standards of decency and fairness, rather than abstaining when they find
the acts in question to have come to "fruition" within a foreign sovereign's territory. No satisfactory explanation seems to exist for freezing
one element of the flexible doctrine of comity into an impenetrable
wall-the bar is being confused by it, it blocks the development of international standards of governmental conduct, and it should be abandoned.

